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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the discourses of US newspapers during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) 
and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq to see how the themes: i.e., Saddam, Iraqi people, Shiites, 
Halabja/the use of chemical weapons are discursively represented in these two wars. The 
research also examines whether there is a shift in the US press stance in its reporting by 
comparing the treatment of the themes during the two wars in question. To operationalise an 
interdisciplinary framework for this investigation the study employs corpus linguistics tools: 
frequency, collocates and concordances, in combination with the Discourse Historical 
Approach (DHA) to CDA.  
 
The investigation reveals that during the Iraq-Iran war, the US press covered the conflicting 
official statements of all countries involved in the war, while there was an over-reliance on the 
opinions and statements of US officials during the US-led invasion, with Saddam’s voice being 
muted. In the same vein, although Saddam is portrayed negatively in the Iraq-Iran war, he is 
much more sharply vilified, Hilterlised and demonised in the US-led invasion, and constructed 
as a threat that needs to be faced and eliminated.  
 
With regard to the Iraqis/Shiites, there is also a shift in reporting in the two wars. In the 2003 
US-led invasion they appear as worthy victims, a portrayal that fits in within the propaganda 
that the war had a humanitarian motive. However, the Iraqis/Shiites are never represented in 
this way during the Iraq-Iran war. In a similar way, whereas the US press coverage of Halabja 
and chemical weapons (in 1988) consists mainly of reports of the conflicting opinions and 
statements of Iraqi, Iranian and US officials during the Iran-Iraq war, this is not the case during 
the 2003 US-led invasion, when the history of the Halabja gassing and the use of chemical 
weapons by Iraq is brought back to the surface to serve the aims of demonising and 
criminalising Saddam in particular and Iraq in general: these events are used to support the 
claim that Iraq possessed WMDs and that there was a real threat that Saddam would use them. 
 
It is hoped that this thesis makes a multifaceted contribution to the field: first, in revealing the 
US press selective nature of human rights violations with regard to Iraqi social groups and 
showing how this was in line with US foreign policy; secondly, by contributing to our 
understanding of the quality of journalistic practices in the US during times of conflict and the 
way they may function to form the overall characteristics of US press discourses during 
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international conflicts, especially conflicts in the Middle East. The study also highlights the 
mechanisms through which the US press discourses incorporate the official state voices in the 
processes of legitimising and persuading the public of the necessity for a war.  
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Chapter 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview  
Iraq has gone through various wars and conflicts in the past few decades. These include the 
Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), the first Gulf War (1990-1991), the US-led invasion (2003), 
sectarian violence (2006- 2007) and recently, the conflict with ISIS (see Chapter 2 for context). 
The stance of the US and the degree of its involvement in these wars has varied from one war 
to another. For instance, in the Iraq-Iran war the US was tilted towards Iraq through lifting the 
restrictions imposed on Iraqi exports and providing intelligence information during the war. 
Although it did not supply arms to Iraq directly, it supported France in providing military 
equipment. On the other hand, it rejected all Iran’s requests for providing it with the required 
military parts and equipment (El-Azhary, 2011, p. 95).  
 
However, this stance had changed after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, an action which was 
condemned unanimously by the UN. After a series of unsuccessful negotiations and Iraq’s 
refusal to withdraw following a deadline set by the UN, a coalition force led by the US launched 
a massive attack on Iraqi forces in Kuwait, liberating Kuwait. This anti-Iraq stance became even 
more dramatically obvious after the 9/11 attacks, when the US administration accused Iraq of 
having a link with al-Qaeda and of harbouring and training al-Qaeda members.  This was in 
addition to the constructed Iraqi threat of WMD (Cox and Stokes, 2018). These claims formed 
the justification for the US-led invasion of Iraq.  
 
Alongside this development of the US stance, Iraq’s image in general and Saddam’s image in 
particular in the media also changed during this long periods of wars. For instance, immediately 
after the Iraq-Iran war (1989), Iraq’s army was described as “the fourth largest in the world”, 
and as being “1 million-strong”. Similarly, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, 
Saddam was represented as the “butcher of Baghdad”, the “new Hitler”, and as the “Monster 
Saddam”. This demonised depiction of Saddam remained constant in the press even in the 
newspapers known for their criticisms of the attacks conducted by US in 1993, 1996, 1998, and 
2003 (Keeble, 2004).  
 
The overall aim of this study is to examine the discourses of the major American newspapers 
in terms of their coverage of the Iraq-Iran war and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq to determine 
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how the main themes: Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Shiites, the Iraqi people, 
Halabja gassing (see section 2.6) and the use of chemical weapons, are constructed in these two 
wars, and also to see whether there are any changes or development in the US press stance in 
reporting these themes, through tracing the historical changes in the US press coverage of these 
themes.  
In light of this, the main guiding questions developed for my research are:  
 
1. How are the main themes: Saddam, Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people, Halabja and Iraq’s use 
of chemical weapons, discursively constructed during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988)?  
2. How are the main themes: Saddam, Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people, Halabja and Iraq’s use 
of chemical weapons, discursively constructed during the 2003 US-led invasion? 
3. What are the main differences in the reporting of these two wars with regard to the 
coverage of the five themes: Saddam, Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people, Halabja and Iraq’s use 
of chemical weapons?   
 
Iraqi people comprise diverse religious and ethnic groups, such as Sunni, Shiites, Kurds, 
Yazidis, Christians, etc. (see section 2.2.). The rationale for creating a theme for Iraqi Shiites 
that is separate from Iraqi people or mentioning some of Iraqi population as Kurds and Sunnis 
in the analysis chapters is that this is how they were reported and categorized in the US press 
and by US politicians. Moreover, only some partitions of the Iraqi population were reported 
repeatedly and extensively in the US press and speeches made by US politicians, rather than 
others, during the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion. The reporting of partitions of the Iraqi 
population by the US press was to provide a context on the role of these ethnic and religious 
groups in the war. However, US press coverage of these groups is not always innocent and has 
ideological and political motives that reflect US political propaganda; for example, the 
victimisation of Iraqi Shiites and Kurds who were used as a pretext to invade Iraq in 2003. This 
will be detailed in the analysis chapters. Therefore, the data for the query words for the Iraqi 
Shiites and Iraqi people were collected in the two wars to see how they were talked about in 
different wars. 
1.2 Objectives and rationale 
One of the main news values is that of proximity and relevance. Those events that are most 
closely related culturally to the news gatherers become more meaningful than others (John, 
1982, p. 77). He adds that events that take place in far-off countries are not considered 
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newsworthy unless they are relevant to the news collector’s home culture or the news that are 
viewed as a threat to the home country. The wars in Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan were seen 
by the media to be of popular interest because of the US involvement in those wars. However, 
it appears that only wars in which a sense is generated of their being ‘our’ wars, in which ‘we’ 
are involved or interested, are seen as being worthy of coverage by the mainstream media in 
the West, and ‘their’ wars as in the case of Iraq-Iran war, that happen in different parts of the 
world, do not matter very much. Therefore, one of the rationales of this study is to investigate 
how the Iraq-Iran war and 2003 US-led invasion, two conflicts in which both the US stance and 
the US involvement were different, are reported.  
 
Another concern in this research is the way an unequal access to the news may give rise to 
power abuse and dominance. In times of war, “journalists are exposed to propaganda from all 
sides, most notably from organisations and institutions with a stake in the killing” (Richardson, 
2007a, pp. 180-181). Thus, journalists become more “shaped and driven” by the propaganda. 
Richardson adds that “[p]owerful institutions, in this case governments, the military and the 
rest of the security state, want to use journalism to promote their version of the war to the world 
and hence shape the behaviour of the public in their favour”. Therefore, another aim of this 
research is to show how these voices are distributed and whether the Iraqi themes in question 
are given a voice and access to the news discourse.  
 
It was also thought that conducting this type of research could contribute to “discovering 
inconsistencies, self contradictions”, inequalities and misuse of power in the media and to 
unearthing the practices that are employed to draw a representation of social actors (Wodak and 
Meyer, 2015).  
 
Furthermore, another rationale for conducting this research is that it is hoped to contribute to 
the literature in understanding the media behaviour in times of war. Also, the contribution made 
by this research lies in its critical analysis of the construction of Saddam, the Iraqi people, Iraqi 
Shiites, CWs and Halabja in the major US press during the periods of these two conflicts, using 
a corpus-based critical discourse analysis. The amount of news corpus in the Iraq-Iran war is 
(7,937,701) million words and (9,223,117) million words in the US-led invasion. To the best 
of my knowledge, no research has so far been conducted either on the press and media texts for 
the two wars in general, or on the representation in these texts of these five themes in particular 
(see section 1.3). Therefore, this study could act as a springboard for further exploration by 
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future researchers. Furthermore, it is hoped that my investigation of the construction of these 
themes helps to provide a clearer picture of the practices of the US press and the news media 
in times of war and conflict.  
1.3 Iraq wars in the media 
Iraq wars have attracted scholars’ attention across different disciplines e.g. politics, economy, 
history, and international relationship along with many other studies. However, since the focus 
of this research is media discourse, this section will only provide a survey of media studies on 
Iraq wars. Many treatments on the war reporting on Iraq examined newspapers’ discourse (e.g. 
Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2005; Dirks, 2006; Maslog et al., 2006; Høyer, 2008; Steuter and 
Wills, 2009) have highlighted the over-reliance of the press on US official and military sources, 
the framing of information as well as the social actors constructions. Dimitrova and Strömbäck 
(2005) investigated the framing of the 2003 Iraq war in the elite Swedish and US newspapers: 
Dagens Nyheter and The New York Times respectively. Dirks (2006) examine the discourse of 
British and German quality press in regards to the US admin claims of Iraq’s possession of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Saddam’s link to al Qaeda. Steuter and Wills (2009) 
examined the headlines of the Canadian newspapers on the way the enemy (Iraq and 
Afghanistan) constructed and demonised in the press.  Robertson (2004) examined Scotland’s 
two national broadsheets discourse for the overrepresentation of the government and military 
voice and the underrepresentation of the other’s voice.  
 
Many other treatments have examined the governmental language or those who are in power. 
e.g. Miller and Johnson (2009) have examined the congressional positioning on the war in Iraq, 
Paul Bayley and Bevitori (2009) examined the language used by the British government in the 
House of Commons in 2003 in relation to Iraq invasion. Rashidi and Souzandehfar (2010) 
examined the debates between republicans and democrats over the continuation of war in Iraq 
in 2008. Van Dijk (2005) examined the speeches by Prime Minister José María Aznar in the 
Spanish parliament in which he justified his support for the US to invade Iraq. Furthermore, 
Oddo (2011) examined four speeches of Franklin D. Roosevelt and George W. Bush. that ‘call-
to-arms’ two of which are  related to Iraq; the first President Bush’s State of the Union address 
– 20 September 2001 and the second is President Bush’s Cincinnati address – 7 October 2002.  
 
Other scholars (Clark, 2009; Lombardo, 2009; Riccio, 2009) have focused mainly on TV 
discourse through looking on the evaluation of the reporters’/writers’ attitudes towards or 
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stances on the topic they talked about when reporting. Clark (2009), for instance, investigated 
the discourse of BBC and CBS reporters (Embedded Reporters (ERs) and War Zone 
Correspondents (WZs)) and on how they portrayed their voices. Lombardo (2009) analysed the 
stance and positioning of the Anchor on CBS and the News Presenter on BBC through 
comparing their discourse during a month of reporting.  
 
Other scholars have investigated the use of visuals in the media and their role in framing the 
news (e.g. Griffin, 2004; Zelizer, 2004; Machin, 2007; Schwalbe et al., 2008; Parry, 2011; 
Mhamdi, 2017). For instance, Parry (2011) investigated the role played by press photography 
in the UK newspapers during the invasion, particularly those photographs that had humanitarian 
implications. Griffin (2004) examined the photo coverage of the ‘War on Terrorism’ in two US 
magazines during the war in Afghanistan and during the invasion of Iraq. Machin (2007) 
conducted a multimodal and social actors analysis on photographs of the Iraq invasion that 
occurred in press in 2005–2006. Schwalbe et al. (2008) examined the way visuals framed in the 
early period of the US-led invasion.  
 
Other scholars have adopted Herman and Chomsky (1988) propaganda module in their studies 
as (DiMaggio, 2009; Zollmann, 2017). Zollmann (2017) investigated US, UK and German elite 
news in cases that involved human rights violation in Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2004), Libya (2011), 
Syria (2012) and Egypt (2013). Similarly, part of DiMaggio (2009) study was investigating the 
human rights violation in the  U.S. media coverage in allied and enemy states taking Iraqi and 
Turkey Kurds as a case study. 
 
Other accounts have examined the construction of Saddam, for instance,  Lakoff (2003) how 
the war fought in terms of a metaphor, so Saddam was seen as “a nation in person” and the fight 
was seen as being against one person rather than against a group (Lakoff, 2003). Griffin and 
Lee (1995) also showed how the war was depicted as being between George Bush and Saddam 
Hussein. Many other studies have shown how Saddam was represented as the personification 
of evil (Dennis, 1991; Boyer, 1992; Katz, 1992; Taylor, 1992).  
 
It could be clearly seen that although there have been abundant studies on reporting the Iraq 
wars, none of them have examined the major US press using such a large scale corpus of data, 
nor have Saddam, the Iraqi people, Iraqi Shiites, CWs and Halabja been examined 
diachronically during all the weeks of the war. The construction of these themes in the US press 
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has received little attention, especially the construction of Iraqi people, Iraqi Shiites, CWs and 
Halabja. Equally important, it is hoped that, by means of the comparison made between the 
reporting of the five themes (see Figure 1) in the major US press in two different wars - the first 
of these, the Iraq-Iran war, being one where the US was not directly involved, and the second 
being one in which the US was directly involved – this research will contribute to a deeper 
understanding of the major US press and its practices which is another research gap that have 
been overlooked in the previous studies.  
 
 
Figure 1 The construction of themes in both wars 
 
1.4 Why Iraq-Iran war (190-1988) vs 2003 US-led Invasion?  
The main reasons for examining the US press discourse of the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 is because of the different treatments the US government made in 
relation to the themes in question in these two wars and to see if the US press is influenced by 
the US government stance in reporting these themes in the two wars. In regards to the US stance 
in the two wars, the Iraqi Shiites, along with the Iraqi people, were consistently referred to at 
Bush press conference on March 7, 2003, as being victimised and as suffering under Saddam’s 
regime, and this was one of the arguments on which the US administration called for an 
intervention. However, the fact that hundreds of thousands of Iraqi people died as a result of 
the Iraq-Iran war but they were not paid attention to. The Iraqi people only were portrayed as 
worthy victims who needed to be saved and liberated from Saddam in 2003 war build-up and 
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the US-led invasion.  Furthermore, the gassing of Halabja and the use of the CWs between 
1984- 1988 by Iraq forces against Iranian forces happened during the Iraq-Iran war. But the 
history of the uses of CWs , together with the Halabja gassing were brought to the surface by 
Bush and other US officials to help justify the war, on the grounds that the effect of the conflict 
would be to disarm Saddam of his weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  
 
1.5 Thesis overview 
The current chapter has shed some light on the motivation and rationale behind this research 
and the research questions have been presented. Some of the existing literature on the 
construction of Iraq in the US press during the two conflicts in question has also been discussed 
to indicate the need for research into the chosen topic and to identify the research gap. The 
second chapter presents the socio-political and historical context to the research subject. A brief 
sketch of the recent history of wars in and involving Iraq is provided, with particular attention 
being given to the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion, since these formed the background 
for the subject of the study. The insights obtained from the socio-political history not only help 
in expanding the discussion beyond a mere description of the discourse used; they also account 
for why such discourse was used and how it was produced (KhosraviNik, 2015, p. 5) The socio-
political history thus sets the scene for the linguistics analysis that is conducted in the 
subsequent chapters. Thus, Chapter Two provides a historical account of the main wars Iraq 
has been through: the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the 
US-led invasion of 2003. The ethnic groups and the role each of them played in the wars are 
also described in this chapter.   
  
Chapter Three provides a theoretical account of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), including 
a brief discussion of its historical background and of the seminal figures involved in the field, 
together with an explanation of the main aims and principles of CDA. Also, the relationship 
between Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), the main framework for conducting this 
research, and CDA is discussed. This is followed by a description of the relationship between 
and the role of discourse in relation to other aspects that were important in conducting this 
study: for instance, ideology, and the notions of domination, representation and power. Finally, 
in the last sections of this chapter the concepts of the news values through which stereotypes 
are created and misrepresentations can occur in the process of including, excluding, 
foregrounding or backgrounding news, are discussed. The chapter also sheds some light on the 
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practices of war reporting in times of war and how they might be affected by the war in terms 
of restrictions on reporting, bias, journalists’ relationships with soldiers etc.  
 
In Chapter Four the methods of data collection and analysis and a detailed description of the 
methodological framework used for the study are presented.  The chapter is divided into four 
main sections. In the first section the theoretical framework of DHA, together with the 
methodological tools used to analyse the datasets, are discussed. The second section provides 
an overview of corpus linguistics and of the main related tools, followed by a discussion of the 
main methodologies used in combining CDA and CL. The third section focuses on the 
integration of CL into CDA in which I argue for the strengths and weaknesses of both 
approaches and how integrating the two approaches can be useful in reducing the risk of 
subjectivity and a lack of generalisability. This is followed by a discussion of some of the 
limitations of corpus linguistics.  
 
In the four subsequent chapters – Five, Six, Seven and Eight - the results of the detailed analyses 
of the data obtained from an exploration of the discursive construction of the main themes: 
Saddam, Iraqi people, Iraqi Shiites, Halabja and Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, in the Iraq-
Iran war and the 2003 US-led invasion, in the major US newspapers are presented. Chapter 
Five shows how these five themes were constructed during the Iraq-Iran war. In Chapters Six, 
Seven and Eight this is compared with the way in which the same themes were constructed 
during the US-led invasion.  The reason why the US-led invasion war has three chapters 
covering the five themes is that this period has more corpus data, coverage and consequently 
more analysis themes and sub- themes when compared with their counterparts in the Iraq-Iran 
war. Finally, in Chapter Nine, I present a summary of my findings, limitations, contributions, 
and indicate opportunities for future research. 
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Chapter 2: IRAQ’S SOCIO-POLITICAL HISTORY 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In order to analyse and understand the construction of the five themes in question: Saddam, 
Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people, Halabja, CWs in Iraq, the diachronic and synchronic axis of the social 
context should be taken into account (KhosraviNik, 2015, p. 9). The wider socio-political and 
historical context, one of the context’s four dimensions in the main DHA framework this study 
informed by, is therefore provided. The aim of which is to understand how meaning is 
(re)produced and to “attempt to establish how (micro) linguistic mechanisms at the textual 
analysis feed into (or fit into) a prejudiced macro-structure while explicating the effects of the 
control over the topics” (KhosraviNik, 2010, pp. 61-62).   
 
Therefore, this chapter highlights the political history of the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) and of 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990) and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, as well as providing 
background information on some of the Iraqi ethnic and religious groups. Similarly, some 
historical accounts on the social groups/ events involved in this research as Halabja and Iraqi 
Shiites are also provided.  Iraq: ethnic and religious groups 
 
2.2 Iraq: ethnic and religious groups 
The vast majority of Iraqis are Arabs, who constitute between 75 and 80 per cent of the 
population. They are followed by the Kurds, who make up 15 and 20 per cent of the total 
population. Turkomans, Assyrians and other ethnic groups represent the remaining 5 per cent. 
The vast majority of Iraqis speak Arabic, while Kurds speak Kurdish. Although some Kurds 
speak Arabic, language is still a barrier for many (Hunt, 2005, p. 5). The Kurds speak an Indo-
European language which is similar to Persian (Marr, 2012, p. 16).  Even within the Kurdish 
area there are two main dialects: Sorani and Kurmanji, and there are significant cultural and 
political divisions between the speakers of each dialect (Hunt, 2005, p. 7). 
  
Furthermore, to speak of an Iraqi identity is to speak about religious sects: Arab Shiite Muslims, 
Arab Sunni Muslims and Christians. The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims. These religious 
sects play a crucial role in Iraqi society that should not be underestimated (Hunt, 2005, p. 5). 
These divisions have led to some internal sectarian conflicts, particularly after the 2003 
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invasion; for example, in the 2006 there was a sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shiites in 
some areas of Iraq, the ISIS terrorist group also used the Sunni- Shiites division in some parts 
of Iraq to seize three major cities (2014- 2018) and lastly, the skirmishes over Kirkuk in 2017 
between the Iraqi central government forces with Kurdistan, the autonomous region in the north 
of Iraq.  
 
 
Figure 2 Iraqi Ethnoreligious Groups (from Marsh, 2015) 
The Shiite1-Sunni2 dispute has been 1,400 years in the making. Technically the 
religious/historical is over who should succeed the Prophet Mohammed, who died in 632 AD, 
and over whether to bestow the leadership on one of the prophet companions who is ‘qualified 
and pious’, or on a successor through the Prophet’s bloodline (Blanchard, 2009, p. 1). Shiites 
hold the view that only descendants of the Prophet can hold the caliphate, and therefore they 
took the side of the fourth Caliph, Ali, the Prophet’s cousin, arguing that the leadership should 
have been awarded to him because he is the descendant and heir of the Prophet. Sunnis, on the 
other hand, hold that a Caliph should be elected (Vanhala, 2011, p. 234; Marr, 2012, p. 14). The 
Shiites also hold that Ali was named as the Prophet’s successor by the Prophet Mohammed 
                                                 
1 The word Shia comes from ‘Shi’at Ali’ which means ‘helpers of Ali’ or ‘Supporters’ (Vanhala, 2011, p. 234), or 
“the partisans of Ali” (Salmoni et al., 2010, p. 285).  
2 The other branch of Islam, whose followers accepted the caliphate’s legitimacy while objecting to political 
succession in line with the Prophet’s lineage. Over time, this was referred to as “Sunni,” which is defined as 
“followers of [the Prophet’s] customs [sunna]” (Blanchard, 2009, p. 1).  
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himself. The Shiites’ doctrinal belief is that Ali is the legitimate Caliph, and this was verified 
by the Prophet Hadith, who is called Hadith of the pond of Khumm after the place (Ghadir 
Khumm) where the prophet gave the power to Ali (Guidère, 2017, p. 230) 
 
The Muslim community leaders named Abu Bakr as the first Caliph to be the successor of the 
Prophet. This decision had led to uneasiness for the followers of Ali. They did not accept this 
decision since they believed that the claims of Calipha Abu Bakr, and Umar and Uthman, the 
two subsequent Caliphs, were illegitimate. Ali succeeded the third Caliph Uthman, who was 
assassinated in 656 AD. Imam Ali was also murdered in 661 AD, as were Hassan (his son), 
who was killed in 670 AD and his other son Hussein, who was killed in an uneven battle with 
the Sunni Caliph in 680 AD (Blanchard, 2009, p. 2). Hussein’s death and the day he was killed 
are still nowadays commemorated by the Shiites.  
 
Shiites make up approximately 10-15% of Muslims in the world (Lane and Redissi, 2016, p. 
181). Large populations of Shiite Muslims live in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan (Marshall, 
2013, p. 77). Moreover, large numbers of Shiite groups reside in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Syria. Sunni Muslims, on the other hand, 
comprise the majority of Muslims worldwide (Malbouisson, 2007, p. 11). Although Arab 
Sunnis are the minority in Iraq, they have been politically dominant and powerful. Their power 
is derived from the time of the Ottoman Empire, when the Ottomans supported the Sunnis, who 
have since retained this power (Marr, 2012, pp. 15- 6). Geographically, Arab Sunnis are mainly 
concentrated in northern Iraq; in addition to the tribes and villages located on the western 
steppe, they also occupy the towns and cities of the central and Northern provinces. They also 
live in some cities in Basra in the south of Iraq (Marr, 2012, pp. 15- 6). The Shiites, on the other 
hand, who constitute the majority of the population of the country (60-65%), live mainly in the 
south of Iraq.  
 12 
 
 
Figure 3 Sunni and Shiite Muslim Populations (taken from Durden (2016)) 
 
The Kurds’ true origin remains the subject of a historical dispute. McDowall ( 2004, p. 8) says 
that it is believed that they moved across Iran, being descended from the waves of Indo-
European tribes, possibly around the middle of the second millennium BCE. Marr (2012, p. 16) 
states that most Kurdish scholars believe that they are descended from the ancient Medes3. 
However, he adds that their origins remain in dispute, as there is no written Kurdish literature 
until the tenth century. Kurds are Sunni Muslims. More importantly, they have developed a 
sense of a national identity based on language, shared history, tribal ties and costumes, which 
have inspired many Kurdish nationalist movements. They live in the north of Iraq and have 
always sought separation and independence from Iraq (Marr, 2012, p. 16). The last attempt to 
achieve this aim was the independence referendum held on 25 September 2017, which was 
rejected by the federal government of Iraq.  
 
                                                 
3 Medes and Media resided in the Iranian mountains and the East and the North of Mesopatamia. These people 
were of Indo-Iranian descent, with a close relation to Persia. More prominence is given to Medes is Assyrian 
writing (Skolnik and Berenbaum, 2007, p. 717). 
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In addition to the three major groups, there are many other smaller religious and ethnic groups. 
The Turkmans, who make up to 3 per cent of the total population, are a Turkish- speaking 
minority who inhabited the towns and cities in northern Iraq along the old trade route through 
the foothills that link Anatolia to Zagros and Baghdad. They are more concentrated in Erbil and 
Kirkuk and they are mainly Sunni Muslims. They are believed to be the remnants of the Turkish 
tribes from the era of Seljuk and the Turkman tribal dynasties (Marr, 2012, p. 17). 
 
Other non-Muslim minorities constitute 6 per cent of the population. The largest group are 
Jews, whose origin can be traced to the Babylonian captivity in the sixth century. The Jews 
lived mainly in Baghdad and they were able and prosperous. However, this situation did not 
continue and everything changed with the establishment of Israel in 1984. Their exodus to Israel 
meant that by 1951 only a few of them were left in Iraq, and they later disappeared (Marr, 2012, 
p. 19; Marr, 2017). Similarly, the number of Christians, who composed 3 per cent of the total, 
diminished after 2005. The Yazidis live near Mosul and they are “racially and linguistically 
Kurdish”. Their religious practice is a form of Zoroastrianism. The other group, called Sabians 
or Mandeans, are, according to (Marr, 2017, p. 19), “a sect of ancient origin and diverse 
elements” who live in the south of Iraq. Their “faith stresses baptism and contains elements of 
Manicheanism”.  
 
2.3 The Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) 
 
The Iraq-Iran relationship has been marked by periods of alliance, rivalry and friction, which 
ended with a devastating war that broke out in 1980 and ended in 1988 (Bakhash, 2004, p. 11). 
This rivalry, for some historians, can be traced back to the rivalry in the pre-Islamic period 
between the Babylonian Empire and the Achaemenids, to the destruction of the Sassanid 
Empire by Arab Muslims and to the competition and dispute between the Turkish Ottoman 
empire and the Persian empire over boundaries and interference in each other’s affairs, when 
Iraq become a battlefield for their war (Karsh, 2009, p. 5). Although the above are one possible 
reason for the rivalry between the two countries, to comprehend the reason this war broke out, 
it is essential to explain the proximate motifs: i.e., the ideological and political situation, as well 
as the nature of the leadership in these two countries at the time. The two countries had fought 
on many fronts before they really met on the battlefield.  
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The Iraq-Iran war resulted from the power vacuum Britain caused when it announced its 
withdrawal from the ‘Persian Gulf’ in the late 1960s. Britain had exercised hegemony over the 
strategic Gulf location for a long period, as it feared that hostile forces might take over the Gulf 
and invade India. This control, according to Pelletiere (1992), led the Shah of Iran to assume 
that he should take over policing the Gulf area from the UK. The fact that the Shah had made 
his hatred of the Arab nationalist regimes public and explicit was perceived as a threat by the 
neighbouring countries, including Iraq, and thus interfered with the relationship between Iran 
and those countries.  
 
From 1968 onwards, the Shah worked on establishing undisputed hegemony over the Gulf 
region, and in 1969 he unilaterally abrogated the treaty between Iraq and Iran concerning the 
Shatt al Arab River that Britain had brokered. This treaty gave Iraq exclusive control of the 
waterway (Pelletiere, 1992; Hauss, 2009, p. 411). The Shah claimed half of the waterway’s 
main channel when he abrogated the treaty. Iraq reacted by expelling some Iranians from Iraq 
and also giving aid to Iranian opposition (Hauss, 2009, p. 418).  
 
The tension between the two countries continued to build. In 1970, the Shah sponsored a coup 
against the Ba’athists, but it was foiled (Hiro, 2003, p. 5). Consequently, a large number of 
Iranian expatriates residing in the Shiite-dominated areas were expelled. In 1971, three islands 
that were on dispute between UAE and Iran were claimed by the Shah; although the Shah’s 
move was not directly aimed at the Ba’athists, Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Iran 
(Hauss, 2009, p. 418) 
 
Much more threatening to Iraq was Iran’s continuous support for the Iraqi Kurds’ uprisings, 
and this became a source of tension that led to a series of skirmishes on the border. By 1975, 
while the Shah’s forces were helping the Kurdish rebels on the borders, either indirectly or by 
providing direct assistance to keep them going, clashes had begun to take place between them 
and the Iraqi forces (Pelletiere, 1992, p. 8). In 1975, a truce was declared at Algiers, stipulating 
that the Shah should close his border to the Kurds and that Saddam must agree to have only a 
portion of the waterway of Shatt al Arab and abandon his claim of sovereignty over the entire 
river (Stockman-Shomron, 1984, p. 87). However, this truce did not last, since the Ba’athists 
felt that they had been forced to agree to it by the Shah, the CIA and the Israelis, and that they 
had complete rights over the Shatt al Arab, leading them to reclaim it and reopen the matter 
after rebuilding their strength (Pelletiere, 1992, p. 8). 
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By 1979, relations between the two countries had taken a turn for the worse, with the Shah 
being overthrown and a new Islamic Republic being established. The accession to power of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini after the fall of the Shah trigged a return to the cold war between Iraq and 
Iran. The Islamic revolution was represented as an ideological challenge to the status quo in the 
region, as it introduced “a new ideological factor, pitting a radical, universalist, pan-Islamic, 
religious regime in Iran against a secular, socialist, nationalist regime in Iraq” (Jassim, 1984, p. 
178). The fact that, in 1978, the Ba’athists expelled Khomeini from Iraq, the country where he 
had lived for 14 years with the Shah’s agreement, complicated the matter still further. It created 
a personal antipathy against the government in Iraq on the part of Khomeini. Khomeini’s 
opposition to the status quo and his call for a restructuring of the pan-Islamic regime under his 
political as well as spiritual leadership were seen as a threat to Iraq. This ideological vision was 
articulated by Khomeini in a speech given in 1980 (Jassim, 1984, pp. 178-80), in which he 
declared that “we will export our revolution4  to the four corners of the world” (ibid.). 
 
Although Iraqi suspicions had continued after they had begun to fear the Shah’s long-term 
objectives in the Gulf, the advent of Khomeini to power caused more uneasiness and uncertainty 
in Iraq, particularly after the series of turmoils in Iran. The incompatible ideologies of the two 
regimes led to a confrontational discourse. (Jassim, 1984, pp. 182-83). The confrontational 
discourse continued to engulf the two countries as a result of the ideological clash, and relations 
between them deteriorated as a result of the mutual accusations. Iraq accused Iran of reviving 
and supporting the Kurds’ rebellion in Iraq by providing them with weapons and a radio station 
that transmitted anti-Saddam and anti-Ba’athist propaganda, as well as supporting the Shi’i al-
Da’awa opposition in Iraq, in an attempt to increase the pressure on the Iraqi government. Iran 
also accused Iraq of changing the names of historical and geographical cities in Iran such as 
Khurramshahr, which is called Mohammarah by Iraq, and Ahvaz, which Iraqis call al-Ahwaz, 
and Khusestan Khistan, which the Iraqis call Arabistan. Furthermore, Iran accused Iraq of 
giving asylum to the pro-Shah forces (Jassim, 1984, p. 188).  
 
                                                 
4 Ramazani’s (1985) states that the Islamic Revolution export represents far more than a calling card of revolution. 
Rather, it is fundamental foundation of Iran’s foreign policy. The conception of an “Islamic world order” is rooted 
in the ideal of a world order within the Imami or Twelvers’ Shiite cultural tradition as interpreted by the Ayatolah 
Ruhollah Khomeini. From his perspective, the existing world order is imperfect, but it will be perfected on the 
appearance of the Twelfth Imam, variously called Messiah (Mahdi), or “master of the Age” (sahib-I zaman). The 
messiah will create justice and equality in the world” (p.5). Khomeini’s ideology had an impact on the Shiites in 
the Gulf; however, he wanted it to be ‘universalist’ by calling all oppressed Muslims to rise against all forms of 
injustice and the domination of the superpowers (Marschall, 2003, p. 26; Hinnebusch, 2003, p. 194). 
.  
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The tension escalated even further when a failed attempt to assassinate Tariq Aziz, Iraq’s 
Deputy Prime Minister, on April 1980, took place on the Mustansirriyyah university campus, 
causing the deaths of two students. The assailants were said to be Iraqis of Iranian origin and 
the victims’ funeral procession was attacked as it passed an Iranian school in Baghdad (Chubin 
and Tripp, 1988, p. 26). These incidents marked a critical turning point in the Iraq-Iran 
relationship. Seven thousand Iranians of Iraqi and Iranian descent were expelled from Iraq 
(Pelletiere, 1992). Thousands of Shiites in Karbala, Thawra town in Baghdad and Najaf were 
arrested. The death penalty was the fate of the members of the Al-Da’wa party and expulsion 
from Iraq for anyone who had connections with Iran, even if these were remote (Chubin and 
Tripp, 1988, p. 27). Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, a famous Iraqi Shiite scholar and 
theologian who was said to have links with Iran, and his sister were also executed by the Iraqi 
government, which caused more tension when Iran declared three days of mourning in Iran. 
The confrontational discourse continued until war broke out when Iraq launched an all-out 
invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980. The war lasted for eight years and ended in 1988.  
 
2.4 US Involvement in the Iraq-Iran War 
 
In the early months of 1982, the advances of the Iranian military on the battlefield caused the 
United States some disquiet. Consequently, as a way of supporting Iraq, Iraq was deleted from 
the register of nations condoning and funding terrorist activity, without holding any discussion 
with Congress, on the basis that Iraq had withdrawn its support for terrorists (Chubin and Tripp, 
1988, p. 193; Tarock, 1998, p. 83; Willett, 2004, p. 34). However, the real reason for the shift 
toward Iraq was not made explicit. The fear of an Iranian victory and of Iran carrying the war 
into Iraq, according to Tarock (1998, p. 83), was overtly expressed in the US officials 
statements as that US was ready to  
[I]ntervene militarily in the Iraq-Iran war to prevent an Iranian victory… we do not want 
to see the government in Baghdad destabilized. We want to see a stable and internally 
secure Iraq. We see it as the first line of defense against Iranian expansionism, whether 
Shiite expansionism or Iranian imperialism.  
 
The US administration worked on maintaining the status quo in the region through the neutrality 
policy, claiming that a “victory by either side is neither militarily achievable nor strategically 
desirable” (Hurst, 2009, p. 37). 
 
The US-Iraq relationship had developed with the increase in trade between the two countries, 
with Iraq purchasing American technology, transport planes and helicopters that could be used 
 17 
 
for the defence effort (Chubin and Tripp, 1988, p. 193). In a statement in 1995 (cited in Joyner, 
2016, p. 16), Howard Teicher, former director of Political Military Affairs for National 
Security, stated:  
 
[T]he United States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with 
billions of dollars of credits, by providing U.S. military intelligence and advice to the 
Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq 
had the military weaponry required. The United States also provided strategic 
operational advice to the Iraqis to better use their assets in combat (Joyner, 2016, p. 16). 
 
In 1984, Iraq also received intelligence information on Iranian military activities from the 
United States, which was very effective in changing the course of action on the battlefield, and 
responded successfully to predicted Iranian moves and attacks. This is exemplified by the 
Iranian defeat across the Howeiz marshes in 1985. However, Iraq failed to tackle the Iranian 
onslaughts in 1986 and 1987, and blamed the US for ‘misleading’ Iraq on these occasions 
(Chubin and Tripp, 1988, p. 194).  
 
On January 12, 1987, a detailed report published by The New York Times (cited in 
(Fayazmanesh, 2008, p. 45) on the information and misinformation which were delivered to 
Iraq and Iran stated that these nations were in receipt of incorrect or manipulated information 
from US intelligence agencies with a view to progressing the objectives of the Reagan 
government in the region. Furthermore, this data was imparted to prevent victory for either Iran 
or Iraq, some of which was doctored in order to mislead. 
 
2.5 The Iraq-Iran war and the Iraqi Shi’ites 
Although Shiites make up the majority (about 60%- 65%) of the Iraqi population, they are ruled 
by the “Sunni and clan-oriented minority” (Cordesman, 1994, p. 141). This religious group has 
for a long time been seen as being marginalised: for instance, under the Ottomans, who feared 
the Shiites’ links to the Persians, and under the British, who favoured the Sunnis and wanted 
someone who is loyal to King Faisal. A similar approach was adopted by Saddam when the 
Shiites started to form political groups who opposed the Ba’ath party, some of whom were 
known to have links to Iran (Holden, 2012, p. 353).  
 
Iraqi Shiites caused the Iraqi regime the most anxiety during the Islamic revolution in Iran, 
when Iran openly announced its intention to export its revolution to Iraq. There was already 
unrest among the Shiites, and this announcement, along with the calls for the Iraqi Shiites to 
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revolt and overthrow Saddam, stirred up the situation. These public expressions of intent finally 
materialised in the failed assassination attempt on Tariq Aziz. This attempt was one of 
Saddam’s major justifications for attacking Iran (Marr, 2012, p. 181). As a result, a major 
deportation of Iraqis of Iranian origin started in 1980, and continued after Mohammad Baqir al-
Sadr was executed. These actions by the Ba’ath regime muted the Shiite opposition, who began 
working mainly in Iran. The total number of deported people had reached 200,000 by the end 
of the war. This large group of alienated Iraqis formed “an ideal resource to be organised by 
the Iranians and the exiled leadership of the Iraqi Shi’i opposition” (Marr, 2012, p. 196).  
 
The loyalty of the Shiites was tested during the Iraq-Iran war by whether they revolted against 
the regime and supported Iran or went the opposite way. They fought the war in a similar way 
to the Sunnis against Iran, and no massive defections were reported on the frontline (Marr, 
2012, p. 195). Despite the heavy Iranian propaganda directed at them, urging them to rise up 
against Saddam, they made up the majority of the Iraqi troops and fought loyally. Some of the 
Shiites viewed Saddam as less of a threat besides  they benefited from the government’s aids, 
while others were put off by the superior security services operating in Iraq (Cordesman and 
Hashim, 1997, p. 99). On the other hand, Shiite families, such as the family of the Hakim, who 
opposed the Iraqi regime and who were based in Iran, supported Iran, obtaining training, 
military equipment and funds, as well as using the Iranian facilities in Iran (Cordesman, 1994, 
p. 141).  
 
Also, Cordesman and Hashim (1997, p. 99) argue that: 
Iraq Shi’ites could hardly fail to notice the Islamic republic’s failures: political 
upheavals, large-scale executions, failure to implement socioeconomic programs, and 
international isolation. Above all, Iran's fanatical insistence on continuing the war after 
1982 alienated Iraqi Shi’ites who saw Iran prolonging an irrational war that was killing 
Iraqi Shi'ite soldiers and was devastating the south with its artillery  
 
Also, by employing the discourse of Arabism, Islamism and Iraqi patriotism, Saddam 
succeeded in cultivating the majority of Iraqi Arabs, the majority of whom were Shiites, and 
also the majority of the non-Arabs, the Kurdish population. The way Saddam dealt with the 
Shiites in the Iraq-Iran war was described as a carrot and stick policy. On the plus side, he 
involved the Shiites in government by giving them political positions. However, they were not 
integrated or put in sensitive positions where important decisions were made. This limited 
political integration was accompanied by funding projects in the south, for facilities such as 
housing, hospitals, water and sewage projects, and even included the improvement and 
 19 
 
embellishment of the mosques. Shiites were allowed to engage in religious practices such as 
celebrating the birthday of Imam Ali, which was made a national holiday. However, Shiite 
opposition or any other anti-regime group or movement still faced persecution (Marr, 2012, p. 
195).  
 
2.6 Halabja Genocide  
Halabja is located in the northern Iraqi region of Kurdistan about ten miles from the Iranian 
border. The total population was 40,000 in 1988; however, this number was increased by the 
influx of 20,000 displaced Kurds from neighbouring villages fleeing the war (Kelly, 2008, p. 
33). The region has been controlled by the Peshmerga (Kurdish fighters) for almost thirty years, 
along with some active parties: e.g., socialists, communists and others. In addition to these, the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani and the pro-Iranian Islamic Movement 
Party both had local strength in the area (Watch, 1993, pp. 102-103). In 1987, Halabja was 
targeted by the Iraqi government, which bulldozed parts of the town in response to its support 
of the Peshmerga. The strategic importance of Halabja lies in its location, which is about seven 
miles east of the Darbandikhan Dam, which controls the water supply for the Iraqi capital, 
Baghdad (Marr, 2012, p. 199; Yildiz, 2007, pp. 27- 28). By seizing Halabja, the Iranians were 
attempting to put pressure on the Iraqi government by gaining control of the two largest 
hydroelectric dams that supplied Iraq with a significant proportion of its electricity (Razoux, 
2015, p. 437). 
 
During the Iraq-Iran war, Iranian troops made secret reconnaissance visits to Halabja. In early 
March, Iraqi intelligence reported that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the Peshmerga had 
begun to assemble near Halabja in a build-up for a full-scale attack, with Iranian forces shelling 
the town of Sayed Sadeq. On March 13, Iran officially announced the launch of a new joint 
offensive with the PUK, Peshmerga and Pasdaran (Watch, 1993, p. 103). The next day, a second 
attack was also coordinated, and Iran claimed that it had seized twelve miles of Sulaymaniyah. 
On March 16, Iran announced that its forces had advanced to the Darbandikhan Lake, and now 
controlled 800 square km of land inside Iraq as well as seizing Halabja. During the three days 
of the offensive, Halabja had been shelled heavily from the hills by the Iranian forces leading 
the Iraqi military to pull back from their posts, which fell one after another.  
 
In the early morning of March 16, 1988, the Iraqi counterattack began, first with conventional 
air strikes and artillery shelling. Trying to protect themselves, most families in Halabja built 
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shelters close to their homes. Some went into the government shelters (Razoux, 2015, pp. 438-
9). The attack involved the use of napalm and phosphorus, which caused huge walls of fire in 
the some parts of the city. Soon, a lethal cocktail of chemicals had spread over the city. This 
was followed by continuous shelling for several hours. Some of the people made it to the Iranian 
border. Others who had been directly exposed to the gas either died or suffered from the 
symptoms (Watch, 1993, pp. 102-103). The massacre’s toll is estimated at between 3,000 and 
5,000 dead and about 10,000 wounded (Razoux, 2015, pp. 438-9).  
 
Iraq claimed that it was the Iranian forces which had launched the chemical attack on Halabja, 
and not the Iraqi forces under General Ali al-Majid, who later became known as Chemical Ali 
for gassing Halabja. It was reported that Iraqi forces were dispatched to Halabja to remove the 
any evidence that Iraq from the area as unexploded projectiles. However, a British columnist, 
Christopher Hitchens, found evidence that the attack was indeed carried out by Iraqi forces and 
took a picture of himself sitting next to in the basement of a destroyed house alongside 
unexploded bombs emblazoned with the markings of the Iraqi air force (Kelly, 2008, p. 36) 
 
2.7 Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait  
 
Iraq emerged after the war against Iran exhausted by the loss of human lives and materials, and 
found itself burdened with heavy debts to the neighbouring Gulf countries, particularly to 
Kuwait, to an estimated value of $80 billion (Al-Ebraheem, 1991, p. 96; Paiaman and 
Moghadasi, 2009, p. 5). The impact of this disastrous war on Iraq had been to turn it from a 
country that possessed over $30 billion in foreign exchange reserves in 1980 to a country about 
$100 billion in debt, as well as needing to recover from the destruction caused by the war to the 
nation’s infrastructure, the cost of which was estimated as being twice this amount (Finlan, 
2003, p. 1).   
 
For Iraq to sell its oil at desirable prices was the only way it could offset the social and economic 
consequences of that war. The recovery of Iraq’s economy was seen to be totally dependent on 
its being able to sell its oil at high prices on the international market; however, a surplus of oil 
globally had depressed the prices, which had aggravated Iraq’s economic situation. The OPEC 
policy of continuing to sell oil despite the overproduction had dashed Iraq’s hopes of being able 
to set higher prices. Kuwait and the UAE, whose production capacity was higher than their 
export quotas, wanted to maintain the existing prices, whereas Iraq was trying to press for a 
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higher price. Consequently, Iraq lobbied the Gulf States in the early 1990s to push oil prices up 
from $18 to $20 per barrel, as well as to reduce their oil production (Hassan, 1999, p. 21). In 
1991, the financial crisis had reached a breaking point and all Saddam’s requests to the Gulf 
States had been ignored (Finlan, 2003, p. 3).  
 
Iraq directed a series of accusations at the Kuwaiti government, accusing it of stealing oil from 
Iraq near the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border through slant drilling; the value of the stolen oil was 
estimated at over $2 billion, which Iraq said should be paid immediately. Secondly, Iraq 
accused Kuwait of taking Iraqi territory while Iraq was distracted in the war with Iran (Finlan, 
2003, p. 10). The dispute between Iraq and Kuwait included Iraq’s claims that Kuwait was an 
Iraqi possession since it used to be part of Basra under the Ottoman Empire (Stork and Lesch, 
1990). The third accusation was that Kuwait had overproduced oil, which had caused Iraq to 
lose $4 billion in oil revenue. The Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, said, “We started to realize 
realise that there was a conspiracy against Iraq, a deliberate conspiracy against Iraq by Kuwait, 
organised and devised by the United States”. He added, “Each dollar less in price means [a loss 
of] one billion [dollars] in revenue in a year for us. If you do not intend to wage a war against 
Iraq, please stop it” (Frontline, 1997).  
 
The language of the Iraqi leadership became increasingly inflammatory in the summer of 1990 
in a series of speeches delivered by Saddam Hussein. In these speeches, although Kuwait was 
the main object of the conflict, references to Kuwait actually only appeared a few times – in the 
speeches Saddam gave on February 24, April 1, May 28 and July 17 in 1990 – as part of Iraq’s 
preparations for the invasion of Kuwait. The rest of the time, the focus was on expressing anger 
and frustration with the status quo and using an anti-United States and anti-Israel discourse 
through the use of religious themes (Hassan, 1999, p. 24).  
 
By the same token, the speeches of Iraqi officials and statements were centered around the main 
subject matter of the conflict: Kuwait. The United States appeared 216 times in speeches, either 
alone or along with references to Zionism and Israel, whereas Kuwait only appeared 26 times, 
and in two of these occurrences it was referred to as the nineteenth province of Iraq (Hassan, 
1999, p. 24). Saddam’s  territorial  claims on Kuwait (the claim that Kuwait is part of Iraq) were 
not present until a few days before the invasion. After that the rulers of Kuwait were perceived 
by Saddam to be a threat to Iraqi security and to the national interests of the entire Arab region 
(Hassan, 1999, p. 24). 
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On the 22nd anniversary of the Ba’ath Party coming into power, Saddam accused the ‘Gulf 
rulers’ of arranging, along with the US, to overproduce the oil to keep the oil prices low. He 
said (quoted in Springborg, 1990, p. 222), “if words fail to protect Iraqis something effective 
must be done to return things to their natural course and return usurped rights to their owners”. 
Tariq Aziz sent a letter the next day to the Arab league, accusing both Kuwait and the UAE of 
executing an external agenda for the ‘imperialist-Zionist plan’. One week later, 30,000 Iraqi 
troops were moved to the Kuwaiti border (Springborg, 1990, p. 222). 
 
The Kuwaiti administration had until then considered all the military build-up, manoeuvres and 
political diplomatic efforts as not serious and as being merely an attempt by Saddam to improve 
his negotiation position. The Arab League in return sent Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s president, to 
mediate between the two countries and try to find a solution to the imminent crisis. When Hosni 
visited Saddam, the latter left him with the impression that he would not invade Kuwait and 
that he was willing to engage in more face-to-face negotiations (Finlan, 2003, p. 12).  
 
The diplomatic efforts came to an end in Jeddah on July 31, when Iraq requested $10 billion 
for the loss of the oil from the Rumaila oilfield. With the failure to fulfil this demand, Iraqi 
forces were given the green light by Saddam to attack Kuwait on August 2, 1990. (Frontline, 
1997).  
2.8 First Gulf War 
Iraq invasion of Kuwait have received a world- wide condemnations and have resulted the UN 
Security council to impose economic sanctions against Iraq (Scannell-Desch and Doherty, 
2012, p. 15) started on August 6, 1990 four days after the invasion and remained in action until 
the 2003 US-led invasion. The Gulf war was a reaction to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. The first 
objective of this war was to defend Saudi Arabia and its oil fields amid fear of a possible attack 
from Iraq (Tucker, 2010, p. 598).  
 
Bush called Saddam Hussein for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. 
Saddam's response was he announced in the second day for the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq 
(Cipkowski, 1992, p. 72). Within days, an international coalition was formed according to the 
United Nations Security Council. The United States began to build military alliances gradually 
in the Gulf. On August 7, in a televised address, Bush announced the deployment of airborne 
division to Saudi Arabia. The collation build- up was called the Operation Desert Shield which 
was the largest deployment of the US troops overseas since the Gulf War (Cipkowski, 1992, p. 
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72) whereas the actual war launched to liberate Kuwait called the Operation Desert Storm 
(Scannell-Desch and Doherty, 2012, p. 15). Foreign forces started arriving in the Gulf and some 
Arab countries participated in it. Egypt was the first Arab country to commit troops to join the 
US and Saudi forces, and then several countries followed suit (Cipkowski, 1992, p. 73). 
 
UN Security Council had issued a number of resolution in regards to Iraq invasion. The most 
momentous one of which was Resolution 678, issued on November 29, 1990 according to which 
Iraq was given until 15 January 1991 as deadline to withdraw from Kuwait and according to 
this Resolution if Iraq failed to comply the use of force is authorised to use "all necessary means 
to uphold and implement Resolution 660" (Riley, 2010, p. 198).   
 
With Saddam refusal to withdraw and having the Resolution 678 set, the next day the coalition 
forces launched the Operation Desert Storm with a campaign of a large scale aerial bombing 
with the aim of degrading the Iraqi defence system i.e. air force, radars, air defence (Riley, 
2010, p. 204) which was the priority and then attacking the Iraqi command and communication 
system. In response to the coalition attack, Iraq had launched 40 missile against Israel and 48 
against Saudi Arabia hours after the aerial campaign (Tucker, 2010, p. 1085). The aerial 
campaign was followed by the ground campaign consisted of four thrust that succeeded to 
liberate Kuwait and cause a big damage for the Iraqi army.  
 
2.9 The Shiite Uprising after the Gulf War 1991  
There are several factors that contributed to the outbreak of the Shiite uprising (Intifada). The 
first of these was the vacuum that had been created in the south following the Iraqi military 
defeat in the Desert Storm; everything there was in disarray: the transportation networks had 
been destroyed by coalition force strikes, the Iraq-Iran border was unguarded and there were 
no military services, all of which motivated the rebels to revolt. The second was the fact that 
the tacit ‘social contract’ between the authoritarian Iraqi system and the populace was accepted 
by the latter on the basis that the former provided economic development and other services. 
However, the Iraqis had suffered in the two wars Iraq had gone through, with many people 
being killed, and also from the fact that the bankrupt Iraqi government was unable to meet the 
population’s needs. Third, the Shiites’ deep-seated sense of grievance at being marginalised 
and excluded, as well as their misrepresentation in the government compared with their Sunni 
compatriots, was another factor contributing to the uprisings (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997, p. 
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100). Finally, the repeated calls of the Americans to overthrow Saddam made the rebels believe 
they would receive assistance from the US (Khadduri and Ghareeb, 2001). 
 
The first sign of the Intifada occurred in Zubair and Abu’l Khasib, two Sunni towns located in 
the south of Basra about 60-70 kilometers, three days before the formal Iraqi surrender at 
Safwan. It then spread to other cities in the south: Basra, Nasiriyya, Najaf, Karbala, Amara, 
Hila and Kut, as well as to some cities in the north of Iraq (al-Jabbar, 1994, p. 228; Cordesman 
and Hashim, 1997; Marr, 2012). Following the revolt of the two Sunni towns, the angry 
retreating military personnel took up arms, followed by the equally angry civilians. In the words 
of an armoured vehicle driver, “the Iraqi army cannot bear the responsibility of the defeat 
because it did not fight. Saddam is responsible” (al-Jabbar, 1994, p. 107). The situation was 
similarly described by an officer as follows: 
 
We were anxious to withdraw, to end the mad adventure, when Saddam announced 
withdrawal within 24 hours - though without any formal agreement with the allies to 
ensure the safety of the retreating forces. We understood that he wanted the allies to 
wipe us out: he had already withdrawn the Republican Guard to safety. We had to desert 
our tank and vehicles to avoid aerial attacks. We walked 100 kilometres towards the 
Iraqi territories; hungry, thirsty and exhausted. In Zubair we decided put an end to 
Saddam and his regime. We shot at his posters. Hundreds of retreating soldiers came to 
the city and joined the revolt: by the afternoon, there were thousands of us. Civilians 
supported us and demonstrations started. We attacked the party building and the security 
service headquarters. Within a few hours, the uprising spread to Basra, at exactly three 
o’clock on the morning of the first of March (al-Jabbar, 1994, p. 107) 
 
The general picture of the revolt was masses of people gathering in the streets and denouncing 
Saddam and the Ba’ath party, marching to seize the main governmental buildings and 
institutions such as the mayor’s office, Ba’ath party headquarters and prisons, as well as pulling 
down and shooting posters of Saddam. The Basra uprising triggered the Iraqi uprising in many 
cities in Iraq. However, this revolt was spontaneous and it lacked an integrated organisation, a 
well forged leadership or any programme, and no plan was drawn up to move on the capital, 
Baghdad (al-Jabbar, 1994).  The rebels benefited from the presence of the coalition forces in 
the south which prevented the Iraqi forces from acting, and a coalition statement made it clear 
that the use of any aircraft or chemical weapons would not be tolerated. Furthermore, elements 
of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic revolution (SAIRE), who were Iraqi Shiites in origin, 
were allowed to infiltrate Iraq by Iran to support the rebels.  
 
However, this revolt was an explosion of rage and anger by a devastated people and soldiers, 
characterised by “an orgy of looting and destruction” with no organisation from the protestors   
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(Cordesman and Hashim 1997, 101). Thus, it did not make it to the end, and failed to take root 
and spread all over Iraq and overthrow Saddam  The uprising acquired an ideological nature 
when it continued and become more organised as it was led by religious Shiite leaders, 
opposition parties and infiltrators from Iran. Many of whom raised the green banner of Islam 
(that represents Shiites), carrying with them portraits of Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim,  and 
Ayatollah Khomeini (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997, p. 103; Marr, 2012, p. 229). Those who 
carried such portraits actually contributed to the failure of the Intifada, and by focusing on Najaf 
and Karbala narrowed the scope of the uprising, which in reality included elements of the Sunni 
military and even Ba’athists (al-Jabbar, 1994, p. 112).  
 
The slogans raised in the uprising in the south caused much concern. One Shiite dissident 
related the story of his Sunni relations seeking refuge in his home in fear of the possibility of 
random revenge attacks following the uprising. These fears were commonplace and were 
undoubtedly a factor in Saddam’s consolidation of power, particularly in cities that were 
predominately Sunni (al-Jabbar, 1994, p. 112) 
 
Other slogans that were bandied by the rebels in Basra included “Maku wali ilia ‘Ali” and “La 
hakim ilia Ja’fari”, which mean “There is no authority except ‘Ali” and “No ruler other than 
]a’fari (Shi’i)” (Khadduri and Ghareeb, 2001, p. 193). These slogans gave rise to fears of 
sectarianism and interference by Iran, as well as giving the revolt a narrow ideological slant of 
being a purely Shiite revolt, which worried the coalition as well as Saudi Arabia, which was an 
ally of the United States (Marr, 2012, p. 229).  
 
The vacuum left by the military proved to be temporary and the rebels paid the price. The Iraqi 
military along with the Republican Guards fought back with the use of helicopter gunships in 
the cities. Lacking political organisation and coordination the towns the rebels had taken fell 
one by one and they were all silenced. In March 1991 the Iraqi government announced that the 
rebellion was over (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997, p. 103) 
 
Other factors which caused the failure of the revolt was the way both the Arab and Western 
media portrayed the Shiites and some of the inflammatory statements the Shiites themselves 
made. Also, the mass execution of Ba’athists in the north and south of the country sent a 
message to those in the rest of Iraq and to those in Baghdad that they were also wanted dead or 
alive, which helped Saddam, causing his party to rally round him and resist to the end. The 
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uprising was put down in blood and many mass executions were carried out of the rebel Shi’ites 
(al-Jabbar, 1994, p. 112).  
 
The violence the uprising created in some areas in the south aroused concern in the rest of the 
world, as well as among the moderate Shiite groups. There were many instances of bloody 
massacres: for instance, in Kut, Najaf and Karbala, where officials were cut into pieces, dragged 
through the streets and sometimes even burned to death. Members of al-Tawwabin brigades, 
Iraqi POWs who decided to join Iran and refused to return to Iraq, al- Badr (opposition from 
Iraqi origins), and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards were involved in these incidents (Khadduri 
and Ghareeb, 2001, p. 193).  
 
2.10 Second Gulf War (US-led Invasion) 
Although, the second Gulf War and the crisis that began in 2002 is seen as being linked to the 
trauma caused by what happened to the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on September 11 but in 
reality it was a pretext for invading Iraq through linking Saddam to al Qaeda (Hogue, 2016). 
Furthermore, it was mooted to be a continuation of the aim of Bush’s predecessor to remove 
Saddam, and to allow the US, which had been merely biding its time, to complete its unfinished 
confrontation with Saddam (Schwab, 2009, p. 102). According to Paul O’Neill, Bush’s 
Treasury Secretary, the plan of invading Iraq was already in mind and was reviewed on January 
30, 2001 at the first meeting of the president’s senior staff. Also, it was believed by many that 
Bush’s aim in going to war with Saddam was to take revenge for the assassination attempt on 
the elder Bush in Kuwait in 1993 (Fawn, 2006, p. 1). Woodward (2002, p. 42) argues that 
Rumsfield made this point clear:  
 
Before the attacks, the Pentagon had been working for months on developing a military 
option for Iraq…Any serious, full-scale war against terrorism would have to make Iraq 
a target – eventually. Rumsfeld was raising the possibility that they could take advantage 
of the opportunity offered by the terrorist attacks to go after Saddam immediately. 
 
Therefore, Bush sought to seize the opportunity provided by the September 11 event by 
declaring the so-called ‘war on terror’, to move public opinion to support him in waging a war 
against Iraq (Aruri, 2003, p. 35). This war was seen to be waged against all US opponents who 
were constructed to have “the will and the means to launch terrorist attacks like those of 11 
September” (Tripp, 271). Also this tragedy provided the US with the political capital it needed 
to achieve a long awaited and established goal of rooting out terrorists, a goal which had first 
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been formulated in Afghanistan in December 2001 when the Taliban were ousted by the US for 
harbouring the al-Qaeda terrorists who were responsible for the September 11 incident.  
 
After the quick defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, plans to occupy Iraq were processed and 
rapidly implemented. On January 29, 2002 Bush delivered his famous ‘Axis of Evil’ speech. 
This speech is seen by many as a continuation of the ‘war on terror’, in which he listed Iraq 
among other countries like Iran and North Korea as being part of the ‘axis of evil’, claiming 
that they posed a direct threat to the USA (Mral, 2006, p. 27). This axis, he claimed, contained 
“the world’s most destructive regimes” that poses a direct threat to the US. 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten 
the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a 
grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the 
means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the 
United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic 
(CNN, 2002 ). 
 
Bush and his advisors attempted to draw the world’s attention to the fact that Saddam was a 
threat and that he was actively developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), an allegation 
that was later proven to be false (Tucker, 2010, p. 1), and as a result sought to gain the approval 
of the congressmen and convince the international community of the veracity of these 
allegations. On 7 October, Saddam was accused by Bush of providing training to al-Qaeda 
operatives. This preparation of the public perception for war was further developed when Bush 
announced his doctrine of preemptive war, in an argument that the US might strike Iraq to avoid 
a potential threat from Iraq. On 11 October, Congress decided to authorise Bush to attack when 
necessary (Fawn, 2006, p. 1).  
 
Persuaded by Colin Powell and Tony Blair, Bush sought the agreement of the UN to invade 
Iraq by making the case that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). On 12 
September 2002, he described Iraq as being in “flagrant violation” of UN Security Council 
resolutions (UNSC), and he further indicated that the US would act unilaterally if the UN did 
notsupport US policy . Germany, however, objected to this manipulation of UN authority with 
Gerhard Schroder referring to the intended invasion as a US “adventure” in Iraq. France and 
Russia were similarly unconvinced by the justifications that had been presented for the war 
(Fawn, 2006, p. 2).  
 
Comprising between those countries who were unconvinced of the threat posed by Iraq and the 
US, a key watershed was reached unanimously passing of 1441 UNSC on 8 November allowing 
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Iraq to prove that it did not possess WMD.  With the ongoing inspection, only little information 
were declared by Hans Blix. On December 19 Mohamed El- Baradei stated, “We still need 
much more cooperation from Iraq in terms of providing evidence to demonstrate that it is clean 
of weapons of mass destruction” (Fawn, 2006, p. 3). Although the UN inspection teams had 
access to the suspected weapons sites, and had searched 150 sites, with 13 different sites being 
searched in surprise visits, nothing was found. The US, however, insisted that Iraq was in 
material breach of Resolution 1441. Similarly, Rumsfeld stated emphatically that “any country 
on this earth with an active intelligence programme knows that Iraq has weapons of mass 
destruction” (Fawn, 2006, p. 3).   
 
At the same time, in the second half of 2002, the deployment and build-up of the US military 
continued. On 9 January 2003, Hans Blix announced that there was no “smoking gun”(Reinold, 
2012). However, the US and Britain warned against taking action against Iraq without a second 
UN resolution. Saddam with his two sons were offered the opportunity to leave Iraq with 
immunity from prosecution to avoid the war. The accusation that Saddam had links with al-
Qaeda kept resurfacing in Bush’s addresses, and finally, on 28 January 2003, he declared that 
he had learned that Saddam had “recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa”, 
intelligence which was proved to be unfounded after the war, and which had been used to justify 
an invasion without UN authorisation (Fawn, 2006, p. 4).  
 
It was neither of the UN two conditions that authorise the use of force internationally were 
acknowledged in the UN because “the United States was not directly threatened by Iraq (Article 
51); nor could the United States and its allied obtain UNSC agreement for military action 
(Article 42)”. Therefore, under the UN Charter, the US invasion on Iraq was illegal (Lynch et 
al., 2013, p. 390). It was after this that Operation Iraqi Freedom started, as British and US troops 
entered southern Iraq from Kuwait, accompanied by an air campaign to cause the Iraqi forces 
to collapse. They were  resisted by the Shiites, who they had expected would collaborate with 
them and rise up to overthrow Saddam. In the north, with the help of Kurdish forces, US troops 
advanced, seizing many cities, and driving on to the capital where the resistance also collapsed. 
The official fall of Baghdad was represented symbolically when the statue of Saddam was 
brought down by some Iraqi people with the help of the US troops’ military equipment (Fawn, 
2006, p. 7).  
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2.11 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has provided some socio-political and historical background on the some of the 
wars Iraq has gone through, with particular focus on the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion. 
Most of the social groups who were involved in these wars and who are relevant to the research 
questions, such as the Iraqi Shiites, and their position during the wars, as well as the Halabja 
genocide were also described in this chapter.  
In the next chapter the theoretical background to the research, the main aspects of the theoretical 
framework, and other principles and aspects by which this research was informed are presented 
and discussed.  
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Chapter 3: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, a brief survey of CDA with some of the influential figures in the field is 
presented, along with the main tenets and principles of CDA. The main framework used to 
conduct this research project, Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), with its main principles 
and features, is also discussed. In addition, I discuss the role of discourse in (re)producing 
ideology, and in constructing and representing things, and show how groups can be dominated, 
controlled and discriminated against through the use of discourse.  
 
The role of the news media industry is also looked at in this study because of its acknowledged 
influence on (re)producing ideology. The processes of selecting, framing and gatekeeping the 
news, deciding the news values, the access of the media to various sources of information and 
their relationship with the state-government, among other factors, all influence the way the 
news discourse is produced. Therefore, an overview of all the above concepts: news values, 
news selection, gatekeeping and framing is presented in relation to their role, whether separately 
or in conjunction, in influencing what will become the final news product and in creating 
ideology.  
 
3.2  Critical Discourse Analysis  
Spearheaded by prominent figures such as Gunther Kress, Ruth Wodak, Teun van Dijk, Norman 
Fairclough, and others, critical discourse analysis has been an influential school5 of discourse 
analysis since the late 1980s. The linguistic and philosophical bases of CDA can be traced to 
social theory, earlier discourse analysis, and sociolinguistic and text linguistics (Tenorio, 2011, 
p. 188). CDA advocates are influenced by the Western Marxist approach to language in which 
cultural aspects of social life are taken into account and that considers both “domination and 
                                                 
5 There are various views on whether to call CDA a school or a programme or a movement.  Blommaert (2005, p. 
21) says describing CDA as a school is like standing on ‘thin ice’, as members of the school do not view themselves 
as such. Ruth Wodak (Wodak, 2011), on the other hand, suggests using ‘school’ or ‘programme’ to describe CDA. 
Van Dijk (1995, p. 17) argues that CDA “does not characterize a school, a field or a subdiscipline of discourse 
analysis, but rather an explicitly critical approach, position or stance of studying text and talk”. He adds (2001, p. 
353) that it is “a different ‘mode’ or ‘perspective’ of theorizing, analysis, and application throughout the whole 
field”. 
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exploitation as established and maintained culturally and ideologically” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 
232). They are influenced by Marx’s critique of capitalism, as well as by notion that language 
is a “product, producer, and reproducer of social consciousness” (Fairclough and Graham, 2002, 
p. 201). Similarly, Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist scholar, viewed capitalism as a 
combination of ‘political society’, which represents the domain of coercion, and ‘civil society’, 
which is the domain of hegemony (Fairclough, 2001, p. 232). This view has influenced many 
CDA scholars, who believe that coercion, exploitation and domination are not the only ways to 
exercise power – it can also be done through persuasive discourse (Tenorio, 2011, p. 188). 
   
The ideas of the French philosopher, Louis Althusser are also drawn upon in the discussion. 
Althusser emphasised, (quoted in Wang (2017, p. 23), the fact that “Ideologies are not pure 
illusions, but bodies of representations existing in institutions and practice”. 
He adds that: 
All the State Apparatuses function both by repression and by ideology, with the 
difference that the (Repressive) State Apparatuses function massively and 
predominantly by repression, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function 
massively and predominantly by ideology. 
 
In the late 1970s, the term ‘Critical Linguistics’ was applied and advanced by a number of 
Hallidayan linguists at the University of East Anglia (See e.g. Fowler et al., 1979; Kress and 
Hodge, 1979). Kress and Hodges (1979) assumed the presence of a solid association between 
social and linguistic structures arguing that the social meaning is vital to the existence of a 
discourse, and without it, discourse cannot exist (Wodak, 2011, p. 53). Halliday’s methodology 
is still considered as an important methodology for analysing the relation between social 
meaning and discourse on account of its clarity and its extremely thorough linguistic categories 
(see e.g.  Hodge and Kress, 1988; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). 
 
Since 1979, the approach of critical linguistics has gone through changes, refinement and re-
application by various linguists who come from various backgrounds with the belief in the 
society –language relationship. The existence of this relationship means that all critical 
linguistics research is interdisciplinary in nature: scholars from different research traditions 
have contributed to the development and spread of critical linguistics, to include domains such 
as racism, ethnicity, gender studies, mass media, politics, history etc. (Wodak, 2011, p. 53). 
 
The concept of ‘critical’ in CDA originated from the German Frankfurt School of thought, 
which was one of the main contributors to the formation of ‘Western’ critique of culture 
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production. The Frankfurt School was known for its opposition to the reduction of culture to 
“an epiphenomenal reflection of economy”, pointing out that “cultural processes have their own 
effects on social life, and constitute a domain of struggle” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 233).  
 
More recently, Jürgen Habermas, the German social theorist who is frequently cited by CDA 
scholars, developed a theory of communication, which offers the basis for critique by drawing 
on the criterions of the language in use and rejecting the necessity for suffering and 
discrimination. In this regard, Habermas argues (quoted in Meyer and Wodak, 2009, p. 10),  
that “language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimise relations 
of organised power. Insofar as the legitimisations of power relations... are not articulated… 
language is also ideological”.  
 
Many of the central principles of CDA can be traced to the critical theory of the Frankfurt 
School particularly in the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) (see section 3.3). The aim of 
critical theory, and thus of CDA, is to critique and transform the status quo of society, rather 
than merely describing and explaining it as traditional discourse analysis did. Critical theory is 
“directed at the totality of society in its historical specificity” and it also aims to improve “the 
understanding of society by integrating all the major social sciences” (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, 
p. 6) 
 
A strong strand of CDA has also emerged from Halliday’s linguistics, which has come as a 
reaction to the Chomskyan linguistics which placed an emphasis on grammar and excluded 
social and cultural dimensions; in other words, it came as a counter response to the ‘asocial’ or 
‘uncritical’ paradigms (van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). With regard to the terminology, ‘critical 
linguistics’ and ‘critical discourse analysis’ have regularly been used in an interchangeable way. 
As a matter of fact, the latter has become the favoured term for use by researchers since it 
accurately describes “the theory formerly identified as CL” (Wodak, 2001, p. 1).  
One of the main focuses of CDA is power, and especially the production and reproduction of 
institutional power. CDA’s main objectives is to examine the “opaque as well as transparent 
structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in 
language” (Meyer and Wodak, 2009, p. 10). It also “studies the way social power abuse, 
dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social 
and political context” (van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). Therefore, the main aim of CDA analysts is to 
understand, expose and resist all forms of social inequalities and by doing so engaging the 
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feeble, offering voice to the voiceless, uncovering power misuse, and preparing individuals to 
cure social wrongs (Blommaert, 2005, p. 25). CDA goes further than this, however, with the 
aim of producing as well as conveying the knowledge people require to enable them to self-
reflect to become liberated from oppression: i.e., illumination and freedom. In other words, the 
aim of CDA is not limited to description and providing an analysis of the problem but is also 
to uproot false beliefs and the delusions that occur as a result of power abuse (Wodak and 
Meyer, 2009; Wodak and Meyer, 2015, p. 7).  
Discourse and society are dialectally related and they are mutually constitutive. They work to 
re/shape each other. KhosraviNik (2015, p. 48) argues that this relationship is at work at both 
the micro level, where discourse goes through a process of formation, modification and 
interpretation, and the macro level, at which discourse acts as a form of social practice: i.e., 
when discourse becomes a feature of the hegemonic processes as well as of the ideological 
effects of these processes; as a result, inequality and power abuse might be expressed or 
legitimised through the use of language. For example, at the micro level, talking about racism 
in parliament is a discourse used for interacting in a particular situation; however, at the macro 
level, this type of discourse may act to reproduce racism (van Dijk, 2001, p. 354). Fairclough 
and Wodak (1997, p. 258) state that discourse is viewed as being  
[S]ocially constitutive as well as socially conditioned - it constitutes situations, objects 
of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups 
of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the 
social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse 
is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive 
practices may have major ideological effects - that is, they can help produce and 
reproduce unequal power relations.   
CDA is problem-oriented and focuses on issues of dominance and inequality; thus, it is driven 
by current social problems (van Dijk, 1993, p. 252), which makes it different from other 
approaches to discourse analysis. Furthermore, contributing to a particular school, paradigm or 
programme is not a primary aim of CDA; rather, the aim of CDA is to acquire a deeper 
understanding of social issues by means of an analysis of discourse.  
 
CDA is eclectic in its critical theorisation and analytical methodologies (KhosraviNik, 2010, p. 
55). Wodak (2011, p. 50) argues that it is never the aim of CDA to provide a single theory or a 
specific methodology. Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 5) argue that to offer a particular/single 
theory or to adopt a certain methodology has never been the aim of the CDA research 
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programme. Quite the opposite, it is multifarious, with a variety of theoretical backgrounds 
contributing to it.  
 
3.3 Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) 
Developed at Vienna University by Ruth Wodak and her colleagues, DHA is an influential way 
of studying the self and other representations in discourse. It was utilised initially for studying 
(semi-)public discourse in order to examine the constitution of anti-Semitism stereotypes during 
Kurt Waldheim’s campaign to be elected President of Austria in 1986 (see Wodak et al., 1990). 
Since then, DHA has become concerned with not only the historical dimension of discourses 
but also with subjects such as discourse and discrimination, language barriers in various social 
institutions, discourse and politics, discourse and identity, discourse in the media and 
organisational communication (Martin, 2017, p. 48). 
In line with insights from  Frankfurt School DHA aims were formulated to be pro emancipation, 
autonomy and social acknowledgement. The motivation for this arose from the possibly 
idealistic notion that poor social conditions must be transformed to eradicate dysfunction and 
inequality(Wodak and Reisigl, 2001, p. 34). DHA adheres to the sociophilosophical approach 
of critical theory. Reisigl and Wodak (2001, pp. 32-33) hold that there are three related levels 
of critique 
1.  The aim of ‘text or discourse immanent critique’ is to discover discrepancies and 
contradictions and any issues in the text- internal. 
 
2.  The aim of ‘sociodiagnostic critique’ is to discover and demystify the manipulative 
or other problematic issues that are manifest or latent in the discursive practices. It 
further works on uncovering the intentions that are masked, inconsistent, hesitant or 
‘polyphonic’ of speakers, whether in a written or spoken form, which are also inferable 
from the contextual, political, or social knowledge background.  
In sociodiagnostic critique, CDA analysts do not only rely on the internal structure of the text 
or discourse: historical, contextual, political and social background knowledge is also taken 
into consideration in order to look into the wider context. Therefore, social practices is viewed 
to include the discursive practices as one of its forms (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp. 33-34). 
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3.  The aim of ‘prospective critique’ is to help provide practical solutions to social 
problems. This type of critique was practised by CDA analysts in Vienna in an attempt 
to improve communication in the institutions and to set guidelines for breaking down 
language barriers in schools, hospitals, courts etc., as well as for avoiding inappropriate 
use of language, such as sexist language (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp. 33-34).  
One of the DHA’s distinctive features is that it places emphasis on the historical dimension of 
the issues under investigation. It is concerned with the way discourse is formed and developed 
over time. Likewise, to provide an explanation of the way the discourse is produced, distributed 
and interpreted, DHA engages with “the cognitive relationship between existing diachronic and 
synchronic discourse and discourse topics” (KhosraviNik, 2015, p. 68).   
 
3.4 Discourse and Ideology 
Discourse operates as “a site of ideology” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 158), in that ideology is built 
and embedded in the different forms/meaning of discursive practices through which reality is 
constructed and signified. Such discursive practices, in their turn, serve to have the relations of 
domination produced, reproduced or transformed (Fairclough, 1992, p. 87). In line with this 
position, Thompson (1987, p. 519) suggests that ‘symbolic forms’ as well as other usages of 
language can be ideological, especially those that establish the relations of domination. 
Thompson (1984, p. 131) adds that studying ideology involves investigating how meaning fuels 
dominant relationships. 
Ideologies, according to van Dijk (2006, p. 116), are acquired gradually, not all of the sudden. 
A ‘racist’, for instance, does not become one overnight. People need to go through necessary 
experiences and discourses that will change their ideologies. Conversely, ideologies gradually 
disintegrate when members of a group stop believing in them and decide to leave the group to 
join another group.  
In relation to media effects on the public, Blommaert (2005, p. 163) maintains that ideologies 
cannot be understood without taking into the consideration the distribution of the message, 
discourse and image and how they are mediated by the media. He adds that the mere idea does 
not have an ideological effect by itself; however, an idea may turn out to do so once it is chosen 
by ‘power- regulating’ establishments, like the media, and injected into the system of 
ideological (re)production. Thus, unimportant and trivial events are turned into events of 
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massive significance by mass media. Ideologies operate by controlling the attitude of particular 
groups, and by the fact that journalists have control over the activities of news making, such as 
news selection, writing, editing as well as finalising the final version of the report (see 
Gatekeeping 3.8.4 and Framing 3.8.5). Therefore, media has some form of power through 
selecting, formulating and delivering a particular desired message to the audience. Such power 
could also be further used by the political and economic groups to speak on their behalf or to 
communicate what they want to tell to the public. These journalists are in turn controlled by the 
ongoing context: i.e., the social and the political situation (van Dijk, 2009, p. 195). 
 
 An example of how media can misrepresent events/ people and participate in (re)producing 
ideologies as well as drawing the lines between the in-group and out-group is provided by  Bell 
(1991, pp. 216-22) who examines how news ‘misinterprets’ or ‘misrepresents’ events related 
to climate change. The stories published in news were sent to those (sources) who had been 
cited to check the stories’ credibility and accuracy. A five- point scale was used to measure the 
stories accuracy ranged from 1 ‘absolutely accurate’ to 5 ‘extremely inaccurate’. The results 
revealed that only 29 per cent of the events published were absolutely accurate, 55 per cent 
were slightly inaccurate, while the remaining 16 per cent of the stories were marked as in the 
level of higher inaccuracy.  
3.5 Discourse and Representation  
Through language people make sense of things, construct meaning and create a culture of 
mutual understanding that enables them to arrive at roughly the same interpretation, because 
language works “as a representational system in which signs and symbols are used to represent 
people’s ideas, feelings and concepts” (Hall, 1997, p. 1). Hall (1997) further identifies two 
systems of representation:  
The first enables us to give meaning to the world by constructing a set of 
correspondences or a chain of equivalences between things - people, objects, events, 
abstract ideas, etc. – and our system of concepts, our conceptual maps. The second 
depends on constructing a set of correspondences between our conceptual map and a set 
of signs, arranged or organized into various languages which stand for or represent those 
concepts (p. 19) 
People within the same culture share the same signs and symbols, which are ‘cultural codes’. 
The meanings attributed to words are shared within the same culture (Macdonald, 2003, p. 9).  
Richardson (2007a, pp. 50-51) highlights how significantly the way people are named and 
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referred to impacts the way they are viewed. He provided a few examples from (Clark, 1986) 
who looked at the way sexual violence stories, in particular rape, are reported in The Sun 
newspaper. He argues that in this type of incident there is always someone to hold responsible 
or to be blamed and this is evident from the way they are named in the newspaper. For instance, 
when the man is the person to blame then he is referred to as ‘monster’, a ‘fiend’, a ‘beast’ or 
other references that indicate “sub-humanity, depravity and animalistic abandon”. When the 
woman is the person to blame, on the other hand she is referred to as having ‘led the man on’ 
or as being a ‘Lolita’ or ‘an unmarried mum’, or by using adjectives that describe her physical 
appearance such as ‘busty’, ‘blond’ etc.  
Such words are related to wider social and cultural practices which have a significant part in 
shaping and constructing the way people think. These words do not have meaning in themselves 
but they act as a medium for carrying meaning, operating as symbols to represent the things we 
intend to communicate (Hall, 1997, p. 5). This process is similar to our choice of clothes we 
decide to wear in the morning. Although sometimes we may think that we appear different and 
idiosyncratic, in reality we are following a particular cultural dress practice (Macdonald, 2003, 
p. 10).  
According to Foucault, (cited in Macdonald, 2003, p. 11), reality cannot be captured in our 
interaction. It is through discourse that ideas and concepts can be exchanged about reality.  Also, 
position taking is involved in everything we know and talk about, which in turn works to 
construct the concept we are talking about.   
Therefore, concepts like representation, along with metaphors of ‘distorting lenses’ and 
‘selective filters’, have been used by media critics to replace those of ‘clear mirrors’ and 
"translucent windows" as they argued that media do not offer a real life reflection(Macdonald, 
2003, p. 12). Macdonald (2003, pp. 13-14) argues that the media are not only representing ideas 
and concepts of the real world but are also working to construct them. ‘Race’, for instance, is 
an ideological construct. Although it has no scientific basis in reality it is widely used when 
discussing racial stereotypes, as though they are real racial categories. On the idea of 
representation and construction in the media, Hall (1981, p. 82) states that the product of media 
is an exact portrayal of society, whereby we can understand how the world works. There is also 
an ideological construction the media help to produce in regards to different concepts in life, 
for instance, it provides a definition of race, its problems and its associated imagery that 
influences the public’s understanding of what race is.  
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The notion of construction, according to Macdonald (2003), suggests an interaction between 
what the media do to frame and the way we understand things in the real world.  
3.6 Discourse and Reproduction 
It is argued that ideologies are reproduced/perpetuated through discourse as well as other social 
practices. Generally, reproduction, according to van Dijk (1998, p. 228), gives the sense of the 
ideology as continual or made to continue. The word – ‘production’ – implies “an active, human 
dimension: It is what people do, make happen, while also making something new, creating 
something”, whereas the first part of the word ‘re’, implies the repetitiveness of the process of 
production, because discourse is a social practice and the acts of production are part of everyday 
life (van Dijk, 1998, p. 228).  
Ideologies are reproduced by acquiring new users either by socialisation or other forms of 
sharing representation through “imitation, observation, teaching, training, preaching, 
propaganda”. Ideologies are continually being reproduced (van Dijk, 1998, p. 228). Groups can 
maintain their authority only if they possess the resources to reproduce it economically, 
socially, culturally and, most importantly, ideologically (van Dijk, 1991b, p. 32).  
A system or a group is said to be reproduced historically if it remains unchanged or changes 
very little, as in the case of the press, the English language and racism. The English language, 
for instance, continues to exist because it is reproduced by millions of users who read, write 
and use it in their daily life. The same applies for the press, which continues to be reproduced 
as a cultural or socio-economic institution as long as there are journalists, newsmakers, readers 
and editors (van Dijk, 1991b, p. 33). So is the case for the racism in which its continuation 
depends on the repetitive practices of discriminatory discourse in everyday life, which is also 
influenced to a great extent by the political, social, and other historical contextual elements. 
van Dijk (1991b, p. 33) argues that “by ‘reproduction’ we mean the dialectical interaction of 
general principle and actual practices that underlie the historical continuity of a social system”. 
Similarly, Fairclough (1992, p. 65) states that there is a dialectical relationship between the 
discourse and the social structures. The former has an important influence on the latter and 
contributes to instigating social change or social continuity. Discourse assumes its importance 
because of its effect on the power relations and power struggle. This is because control over the 
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discourse by societal and institutional power-holders means to maintain their own influence and 
power (Fairclough, 1989, p. 39). 
 
The reproduction involves people drawing on orders of discourses and other aspects of social 
structures that they have in mind when they wish to produce or interpret discourse. Fairclough 
(1989, p. 39) adds that: 
Through being drawn upon, these structures are constantly being created anew in 
discourse and practice generally. Discourse, and practice in general, in this sense are 
both the products of structures and the producers of structures. It is this process of being 
produced anew (reproduced) through being drawn upon that I refer to as reproduction. 
But structures may be produced anew with virtually no change […]. Reproduction may 
be basically conservative, sustaining continuity, or basically transformatory, effecting 
changes.  
 
It is the power relations between the social forces and how such relationships develop in the 
social struggle are the determinant factors of the transformatory or conservative nature of the 
reproduction in the discourse. Fairclough (1989, p. 40) adds that discourse orders can carry an 
ideological assumption that can either legitimise or sustain existing relationships of power. 
Therefore, it is expected that there is a transformation of orders of discourse if there is a social 
struggle manifested by the power relations. When there is no struggle or there is a relative 
stability of power relations, this could lead to a conservative reproduction.  
Racism, as an ideology, can be learned, let’s say, by white people through accepting statements, 
such as ‘Black women are welfare queens’, in their everyday conversation, or by reading stories 
in the media in which such phrases are used repeatedly to portray black people, or through 
telling and sharing stories and circulating them among the group’s members, allowing 
inferences and suggestions to be made by the co-participants. Thus, the reproduction process 
“implies socialization, learning, inculcation or adaptation by young or new members, of the 
socially shared representations of a group” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 229). Furthermore, if an 
individual can learn to draw an inference in one context, he or she will be able to do the same 
in another. In other words, the process of reproduction implies a process of generalisation. 
People build mental models and generalise negative attitude schemata about different 
outgroups. However, this type of generalisation from daily experiences or other social 
representations can lead to unacceptable over-generalisation (prejudice). 
The context of the discourse, alongside the social situation, act as a site in which ideologies are 
enacted in social practices. In this regard, van Dijk (1998, p. 230) states that “speech 
participants identify with or willingly or unwillingly (have to) represent the groups and 
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institutions of which they are members, they thus by definition contribute to the use and the 
reproduction of the ideologies associated with these social formations”.  
3.7 Discourse and Access  
One channel through which power, (re)production and dominance can be exercised is the access 
to ‘valued social resources’; for instance, that of media discourse. This access is the privilege 
of some rather than of all (van Dijk, 1996, p. 85). In everyday conversations, individuals usually 
have access to many types of talk, like those of immediate family, friends, acquaintances and 
other relatives. However, access to contexts like those of officials, doctors, managers and the 
media is more constrained. Although people can read news reports, they have no direct impact 
on the way such reports are written or produced (van Dijk, 1995b, p. 12). Access might be based 
on different criteria, such as age, education or class. For instance, men have more access than 
women and whites have more access than blacks, which is a way of discriminating and a form 
of dominance (van Dijk, 1996, p. 86).  
Media discourse is no different, in that it is unequally accessed by everyone, but it is restricted 
by certain patterns of access, as van Dijk (1996) argues that it is those who have are interviewed, 
quoted or  have access to the news have the ability to influence the audience (p. 86). Access to 
the media creates a dominance which in turn can influence the public as it is only those who 
have access who get their voice heard and as a result influence public opinion (van Dijk, 1995b, 
p. 12). Access to discourse and events of communication can be decided by different patterns 
of access and can be controlled by powerful social actors through “setting or selecting time and 
place, participants, audiences, possible speech acts (such as commands or requests), agendas, 
topics, choice of language, style, strategies of politeness or deference, and many other 
properties of text and talk” (van Dijk, 1995b, p. 12). These factors determine who writes to 
whom and under which circumstances, where and why.  
 
Controlling patterns of access to discourse “will be geared towards the control of the minds of 
participants, recipients or the audience at large, in such a way that the resulting mental changes 
are those preferred by those in power, and generally in their interest” (van Dijk, 2008, p. 70). 
As (Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard, 1996, p. 88) point out, “control is much more effective if 
the minds of the audience can also be successfully ‘accessed’”. 
 
 41 
 
For example, the access of the minorities to the mass media can be restricted and can be seen 
as a mode of domination by the white elite (van Dijk, 1996, p. 93). This lack of access of 
minority groups is a result of the fact that only a few members of minority groups work as 
journalists for the major high quality newspapers or television stations. On the other hand, those 
who have a major impact on news production can access sources and write the stories. This 
difference in accessing media organisations between the minority and the majority makes a 
huge difference to the way news reports are produced. The selection of news, giving 
prominence to issues and topics of a stereotypical nature, as well as providing a negative 
representation of the minorities who lack access to the media, can define the minorities (by 
‘define’ I mean that the attributes that are assigned to them will be believed by the public and 
will not be challenged), which ultimately serves the interests of the white elites and their 
institutions. Furthermore, the minority tend to be quoted less than the majority owing to this 
lack of access, and even if they are quoted, only moderate quotations that are in accord with the 
majority points of view and opinions are taken. Or the media tend to quote the extremists, 
radicals or those with bad characteristics among the out-group in an attempt to trivialise and 
ridicule the whole out-group.  
 
3.8 Media Discourse and War Reporting and Practices 
3.8.1 War Reporting  
A journalist’s attempt to remain unaffected by, or to distance him or herself from the horrific 
realities of war “tends to go out the window” quickly, especially when it is the journalist’s 
own country that goes to war, when the moralities of journalism are put to a hard test (Allan 
and Zelizer, 2004, p. 3).  
There are many factors - military, technological, political, among others - by which reporters 
are shaped and which might thus impact on the reporting process in drastic ways (Allan and 
Zelizer, 2004, p. 5). For instance, a journalist’s movement in the conflict zones could be 
restricted, undermined or prevented. Similarly, the sources may refuse to give information, and 
even journalists’ patriotism is sometimes called into question. Furthermore, journalists 
constantly encounter a situation where they need to position themselves in an either with or 
against dichotomy and based on decision journalists make their role is determined, which in 
turn has implications for the way people understand and perceive the war (ibid). There are many 
other factors that could constrain the journalistic behaviour, such as hierarchical structures and 
chains of command, monetary substances, routine methods, time imperatives, news values and 
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other constraints as those caused by government and business which could make more pressure 
on the side of journalism (Zollmann, 2017, p. 22).  
Another important factor is the owners. According to Harcup (2015, p. 18),  the owners set their 
policy for their organisations which in turn put more pressure on the journalists. Herman and 
Chomsky (1988) placed media proprietors at the top of the list of five categories that can be 
deployed to filter appropriate news, limit opposition and ensure the government and powerful 
private entities can convey their message to the public (p. 88). These filters are: 
1. the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant 
mass-media firms;  
2. advertising as the primary income source of the mass media;  
3. the reliance of the media on information provided by the government, business, and 
“experts” funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power;  
4. “flak” as a means of disciplining the media; and 
5.  “anticommunism” as a national religion and control mechanism. 
In the context of war in particular, the overreliance on the politicians’ statements, the third filter 
of Herman and Chomsky (1988), could influence the journalism behaviour  as the . “feedback 
loop” between the politicians and the journalism, according to Lynch and McGoldrick (2005, 
p. 218), serve to create facts as the officials tend to states statements with the intention to have 
journalists reported them. This is where, according to Hackett (2007, p. 2), the journalist 
becomes an unwitting participant in the conflict.  
 
3.8.2 Press- state relationship  
Graber and Dunaway (2017, p. 103) argue that the view that most of the news sources of 
everyday reports are coming from the officials in US government has become well established. 
As a result, the diversity of voices in news stories becomes restricted by journalists deciding 
who to cover and what should go in the news. They add that the media are subjected to 
manipulation because they depend for the most part on information provided by political 
leaders, who may flood the news with self-serving stories, owing to the presumption that they 
have access to precise information that ordinary people do not have (Baker and McEnery, 2005, 
p. 199). A study conducted by Graber and Dunaway (2017, p. 101) reveals that private 
individuals are rarely used as a source of information whether at home or abroad. The study 
also shows that government officials make up the highest percentage of the sources of the main 
stories reported. This dependence on a narrow spectrum of sources inevitably leads to biased 
reporting.  
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In this regard, Bennett (1990, pp. 103 - 6) has also put forward a theory, which states that 
“[m]ass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to “index” the range 
of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic”. According to this 
hypothesis, the non-official voice, i.e., that of the ‘other’ is only included in a news story when 
that voice reflects the official story. In this regard, Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that 
 
… the “societal purpose” of the media is to inculcate and defend the economic, social, 
and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the 
state. The media serves this purpose in many ways: through selection of topics, 
distribution of concerns, framing of issues, filtering of information, emphasis and tone, 
and by keeping the bounds of debates within actable premises. (p. 298) 
 
However, Bennett (1990, p. 122) argues that indexing may differ from one matter to another. 
Therefore, the indexing could be more relaxed to permit different voices to go into the stories 
when the consequences will have less impact on the “corporate economic order” and 
“normative vigilance”. However, these voices could be muted and indexing may be high in 
operations when important decisions are involved, especially military operations or those 
related to foreign affairs, as such factors influence not only corporate economics but state power 
as well.  
 
The state-government relationship has also been expressed through the CNN effect6 which in 
contrast to the deep-rooted view that the government has enormous power in influencing media 
analysis, the media also has an influence in changing the foreign policy (Robinson, 2005).. 
Shaw (1996) states that press reporting of the Kurds escaping Saddam’s regime ensured a safe 
haven for the Kurdish in Iraq and that it brought about the humanitarian intervention in Somalia.  
 
Members of policy-making groups have also expressed their views on the CNN effect, and 
confirmed the belief that the media have from time to time played a role in bringing about 
Western and humanitarian interventions. For instance, the ex-British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair, during the air war against Serbia in 1999, implied that if the media went unchecked it had 
the power to lead governments to intervene (Robinson, 2005, p. 11). By contrast, Wheeler 
(2000, p. 300) argues that the CNN effect has a limit and that the coverage of humanitarian 
issues in both northern Iraq and Somalia was not a decisive or determining factor in causing the 
                                                 
6 The CNN effect is a theory that assumes that the media play a major role in formulating a country’s foreign 
policy and have an influence on decision making (John, 2014).  
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intervention; it was, rather, an enabling one that made the intervention possible through 
preparing and building public opinion. Similarly, Robinson (2005, p. 12) says that the 
implication of this is that the policy maker could intervene without the help of the media, but 
that media coverage can build public support. 
 
Robinson (2005, p. 13) proffered two methods of consent manufacturing. First, the ‘executive’ 
method that highlights the way the content of the news media conforms to the agenda followed 
by government officials. This is exemplified in Entman’s (1991) study, in which he looked at 
the way two tragic events involving the shooting down of two airline flights were framed by 
the US media. The first was a Korean Air Lines flight (KAL) which was shot down by a Soviet 
fighter in 1983, and the second was the Iranian Airbus (Iran Air flight 655) shot down by a US 
navy ship in 1988. 269 passengers and crew were killed in the former and 290 passengers and 
crew were killed in the latter. Entman (1991) found that in both cases, the news was consistent 
with US policy and no criticism or challenge was directed at the US government. The KAL 
incident was portrayed and given more weight, more importance and heightened media 
attention and time than the Iran Air tragedy. The information on the Iran Air incident was de-
emphasised by “reducing its salience and making it harder to discern in the onrush of news” 
(Entman, 2006, p. 23). The second version is the ‘elite’ version, according to which the 
coverage of news media in general comes in line with the powerful political elites interest 
regardless of the position they held (Robinson, 2005, p. 13). 
 
3.8.3 News Values and Selectivity  
News values are the characteristics by which journalists and news organisations decide the 
newsworthiness of events and considerations of what to include, exclude, prioritise or focus on. 
They are the “distillation of what an identified audience is interested in reading or watching” 
(Richardson, 2007a, p. 91). According to Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch (2009, p. 71), the way 
the news is selected, processed and constructed is perhaps is more significant than what actually 
take place. 
News selection is another route to potential stereotyping and ideology, whereby a journalist or 
news organisation tends to select a particular event, and magnify or reduce some aspects as a 
way of representing the event. According to Ndlela (2005, p. 73), “media representations 
reduce, shrink, condense, and select/ reject aspects of intricate social relations in order to 
represent them as fixed, natural, obvious and ready to consume” (Chinball, 1981, p 76). Chinbal 
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adds that news are neither tidy nor ready to pick as if they are fallen apples. It is the journalist’s 
job “to translate untidy reality into neat stories with beginnings, middles, and denouements”, 
which of course is accompanied simultaneously by a process of filtering the unexpected and 
disturbing details. It is worth mentioning that different journalists deal with different aspects of 
the same event, and even write different stories about the same aspect (ibid). 
 Bell (1991, p. 156) lists some news values on which ideologies could be constructed and 
prioritised in relation to a particular society. Only those that are more related to my work are 
explained:  
1. Negativity: This is where the negative happenings become the focus of the news and of 
which the news are made. Instances of negative concepts are wars, conflicts, damages, 
disasters, political events (Bell, 1991, p. 156). For instance, the alleged Iraq’s possession 
of WMDs, the link of Iraq to al Qaeda and the constructed threat of Iraq are considered 
negative news to the US audience as it was constructed as directly related to their 
security. 
2. Relevance: the more relevant and close the news is to the audience’s own life the more 
newsworthy it becomes (Bell, 1991, p. 157). In “Out of sight, out of mind”, Sonwalkar 
(2004, p. 25) draws attention to the wars/conflicts/insurgencies the media have turned a 
blind eye to, nationally or internationally. He says that conflicts are put in focus, given 
coverage and “deemed worthy of sustained coverage by the news superpowers” only 
when such conflicts are perceived by journalists as something to do with ‘Us’, as being 
‘Our’ conflict, because ‘We’ are involved in it, quite unlike the situation when the 
conflict is about ‘them’ and therefore does not affect the interests of Western powers, 
in which case it may not receive any coverage at all.   A conflict/war that does not attract 
much attention, or is considered less important to Western interests, is therefore 
unimportant. While the media beat the war drums when the US decided to go to war 
against Iraq, the tension between the US and North Korea was more serious than that 
between the US and Iraq, and the evidence of North Korea’s capability of building a 
nuclear weapon was more compelling. Yet the focus was on Iraq and the reporting of 
North Korea was overshadowed by it (Boyd-Barrett, 2004, p. 26). 
3. Eliteness: This is where reference is made to elite groups of people, as in the case of 
politicians, decision makers, celebrities etc. (Bell, 1991, p. 157), while ordinary people 
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are ignored. Equally important, references to elite nations are also one of the factors that 
influence newsworthiness; for instance, stories about conflicts and elections, especially 
where elite nations are involved, will be reported extensively whereas some wars go 
unnoticed (John, 1982, p. 78).  
3.8.4 News Gatekeeping and Ideology 
 
Gatekeeping is defined, according to Shoemaker et al. (2001, p. 233) as “the process by which 
the vast array of potential news messages are winnowed, shaped, and prodded into those few 
that are actually transmitted by the news media”.  Confirming this view, David Manning, cited 
in Fourie (2008, p. 237), highlighted the fact that news flows through a series of channels that 
contains gates through which decisions are made that impact the way it is perceived and 
reconstructed. He also pointed out that the news does not go freely or unhampered from one 
gate to another but that it undergoes several influences that decide the final outcome (cited in 
Fourie, 2008, p. 237). Shoemaker et al. (2001, p. 233) describe such gates as ‘decision points’. 
As long ago as the 1950s, McNelly (1959, pp. 102-103) pointed out that there many gatekeepers 
who stand between the real event and the audience where the news can be either selected or 
rejected and shaped before going to the next gatekeeper.  
 
According to Fourie (2008, p. 237), when the international news is being covered, events are 
reported through a correspondent who sends his report to a regional bureau where it undergoes 
a process of change, being shortened before being passed back to the central bureau agency. It 
could also be altered or even merged with another story before it is sent to the country’s national 
bureau, where further changes are to be made. The readers or listeners could also act in their 
turn as gatekeepers through taking some bits of the news and circulating them among other 
people.  
 
The people in the news organisation possess the power to select and (re)shape the news as 
reporters, editors and sub-editors. News gatekeeping depends on likes and dislikes, news 
values, socialisation and approaches to problems, and all these factors influence the decision- 
making strategies regarding what to select and how to shape the news (Fourie, 2008, p. 238). 
Shoemaker et al. (2001, p. 233) state that gatekeeping is not merely a process of ‘in’ and ‘out’ 
choices but rather it is a process by which social realties are constructed. 
 
 47 
 
Gatekeeping could have ideological drives where it works on establishing unequal power 
relations through controlling the discourse access by allowing some discourses and blocking 
others (Wodak, 2001, p. 88). van Dijk (1996, pp. 84- 85) argues that the control could be 
practiced by controlling the actions and the minds of one group by other group and thus 
influencing their knowledge and ideologies. He adds that in the democratic modern societies 
the power abuse and control is not limited to the use of force, threat, or other coercive forces 
but through the persuasive and manipulative power through the control of the discourse access 
(see 3.7). Here, discourse become an essential factor in consent manufacturing (Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988) and it is the role of CDA to unearth such hidden ideologies and power abuse.  
 
3.8.5 Framing in Media Discourse 
Although there is no universal accepted definition for framing, it can be defined in its broader 
sense as the ways through which events and issues are organised in the mass media. Entman 
(2007, p. 164) defines framing as the process of placing some elements of a particular event to 
the foreground on the expense of other elements and building a preferable narrative around it 
to promote a specific understanding. Entman (1993, p. 52) also states that framing involves 
choice and influence; whereby text is communicated in a specific way to highlight particular 
issues by defining them which as a results need evaluation and remedies. With regard to this 
definition, Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005, p. 405) say that the first part highlights the 
importance of the issue through placing more focus on a particular “aspect at the expense of 
others”, which makes it similar to agenda-setting theory. The second part of the definition, on 
the other hand, makes it different from agenda setting in its ability subtly to create realities that 
impact audience interpretation and opinions on a specific public matter. Tankard (2001) states 
that:  
Much of the power of framing comes from its ability to define the terms of a debate 
without the audience realizing it is taking place. Media framing can be linked to the 
magician’s sleight of hand - attention is directed to one point so that people do not notice 
the manipulation that is going on at another point. (p. 97) 
 
The framing strategy works according to a three level agenda. The first function through which 
the framing can be performed successfully is agenda setting. At this level, the problem is to be 
defined, which is to attract both the public and the government; it could thus be a world event, 
a local happening or anything else of interest. The second level of agenda setting is highlighting 
the reasons of the problem so that treatments and required policies are to be taken. The final 
level is priming, which is the final goal: i.e., ‘the intended effect’ (Entman, 2007, pp. 164- 65).  
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The frames work through highlighting the issue which is intended to be the goal or subject of 
the communication to make it memorable and meaningful for the audience by giving it a 
salience through repetition, placement or by linking it to familiar cultural symbols, allowing the 
receivers to process it (Entman, 1993, p. 53). The aspect of placing emphasis and making some 
of the elements salient at the expenses of others in framing is similar to van Dijk (1998: 267) 
‘ideological square’ in which choices are made where the favourable elements are 
‘foregrounded’ or emphasised and the unfavourable elements are ‘backgrounded’(de- 
emphasised). This is usually used to characterise the positive self-presentation where ‘our’ 
positive characteristics are foregrounded whereas ‘our’ negative characteristics are 
‘backgrounded’. On the contrary, their negative characteristics are foregrounded and their 
positive characteristics are backgrounded. Such discriminatory practices, that can include 
referential, predicational and argumentative strategies (see 4.3.1- 4.3.3 ), are carried out by 
means of the speakers’ involvement (see also perspectivization). The selection and giving 
salience is an involvement on the part of the speaker or writer of the discourse. Wodak and 
Reisigl (2001, p. 83) argue that 
 
One way of expressing involvement – as well as detachment – is discourse 
representation. One can represent, for example, racist, nationalist or ethnicist discourse 
by means of direct quotation, indirect quotation and free indirect speech. As already 
noted, indirect speech is, for the most part, an indicator of distance. In comparison, 
direct speech and free indirect speech often express the speakers’ and evoke the hearers’ 
involvement. 
 
The national context has a great influence on the way news is framed by journalists. For 
instance, the coverage of international events is seen to be ‘localised’ by targeting the audience 
in the specific country it is being broadcast in (Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2005, p. 405). 
Clausen (2003) showed how the news coverage of the 9/11 incident around the world was 
‘domesticated’ or ‘localised’ to suit national audiences. Thus, when it came to stories of victims, 
for instance, these were not universal but depended on the origins of the victims: i.e., each 
country reported stories about their own nationals, as in the case of the coverage of Japanese 
victims in Japan.  
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3.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have highlighted the main theoretical background of CDA principles and 
concepts that are relevant to the current study, and shed some light on the historical background 
of the influential figures in and origins of CDA. The main framework, DHA, by which my study 
was informed, was also presented. A short account of some important aspects of news reporting, 
such as news values, gatekeeping, war reporting, news access and the influence they have, 
whether separately or jointly, on producing ideology, and their effect on the news outcome was 
also provided in this chapter. Similarly, it has been shown how some of the CDA concepts as 
discourse access is similar to gatekeeping in the media studies and framing is similar to 
perspectivization or the ideological square in CDA through which power, control and ideologies 
can be exercised. 
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Chapter 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, a detailed description of the methodological framework is presented. The 
chapter is divided into four main sections. In the first section the theoretical framework of the 
DHA along with the DHA methodological strategies that were used to analyse the datasets are 
discussed. In the second section an overview of corpus linguistics is provided, along with the 
main related tools. This is followed by a discussion of the main methodologies used in 
combining CDA and CL, and some of the previous literature on combining these two 
approaches is presented, in conjunction with an assessment of such combinations. The focus of 
the third section is on the integration of CL into CDA; in this section I discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of both approaches and how an integration of the two could be very useful in 
reducing the risk of subjectivity and unrepresentativeness. The chapter concludes with a 
presentation of some of the corpus linguistics software used in this study.  
4.2 Methodological framework and methods of analysis 
Various methods have been used and proposed within the field of CDA to analyse the 
representation of different social groups and the representation of ‘self’ and ‘other’ based on 
race, religion, nationality, gender etc. The choice of methods is strongly influenced by the type 
of data, the political features of the context from which the data were obtained, and by the 
research topic, that might require emphasis to be placed on the “sociological, cognitive, political 
or discoursal aspects of analysis” (KhosraviNik, 2015, p. 105). In this research, the main 
conceptual framework for analysing the discursive construction of Iraq was drawn from the 
Discourse Historical Approach (henceforth DHA) to CDA, which guided my methodological 
approach to conducting the empirical analysis. The main studies where the DHA has been 
developed, described and presented in detail are those of Wodak (2001), Reisigl and Wodak 
(2001), Reisigl and Wodak (2009) and Wodak and Meyer (2016). However, the current study 
was also informed by various theoretical and methodological studies on the media in general 
and on newspapers in particular (e.g.Van Dijk, 1991a; van Dijk, 1992; Fairclough, 1995; van 
Dijk, 1995b; Richardson, 2007a; KhosraviNik, 2015). I also drew on several studies on corpus 
linguistics, such as that of Baker (2006), and on the integration of corpus linguistics and CDA 
e.g., Baker et al. (2013); Baker et al. (2008).  
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The research design follows the principle of interdisciplinarity, according to which different 
theories, methodologies and methods are combined as a way of integration which is aimed at 
reaching an understanding of the research (Wodak and Meyer, 2015, p. 31).  
These theories, methodologies and methods of analysis are interrelated and they influence each 
other. The type of data and the way they are interpreted are dependent on the theoretical 
perspective. Theory is not only important in forming research questions, which in turn guide 
data selection, collection, analysis and interpretation; it should also be dependent on “prior 
interpretation and empirical analyses” (Wodak and Meyer, 2015, p. 14). The relationship is 
“circular and recursive-abductive”, as it moves in a recursive way between the theory and the 
empirical data and the same procedures are repeated many times (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, p. 
95), as shown in Figure 4. This method of triangulation can inform the process of 
conceptualisation and the researcher’s assumptions. It also informs the process of examining 
assumptions at the interpretation stage, which in turn helps the researcher to conceptualise the 
next phase of the study. Methodological triangulation also helps to minimise a researcher’s bias, 
since the aim is to examine texts from different perspectives. A similar effect can be achieved 
by the triangulation of data and theory.   
 
Figure 4 The circular process of empirical research (in Meyer and Wodak (2009, p. 24) 
 
4.3 Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) 
On the level of operationalisation, according to Wodak and Meyer (2015, p. 93), DHA is a 
three-dimensional discourse-analytical approach. The first dimension is the discourse topic, this 
is followed by the second dimension: the five discursive strategies and finally is the linguistic 
means (as types) and the specific, context-dependent linguistic realisations (as tokens).  
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4.3.1 Linguistic Triangulation I: Identify the specific contents or topics of the discourse  
The aim of this macro analysis in the current study was to identify the topics and arguments of 
discourse on Saddam, the Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people, CWs and Halabja employed by the US 
press during the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion. The identification of topics was 
accomplished with the aid of corpus linguistics tools such as collocation, frequencies and 
concordances.  
4.3.2 Linguistic Triangulation II: Investigate Discursive Strategies 
In order to investigate the discursive strategies by which social actors/events/objects were 
represented in particular ways, I followed the five questions proposed by Wodak and Meyer 
(2016):  
1. How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and 
referred to linguistically? 
 
Table 1: Referential strategies (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 33) 
 
Writing about how people are named or referred to in a discriminatory discourse involves the 
use of categorisation devices that serve to mark people as being either in-group or out-group, 
and in which some features are selected and foregrounded in metaphorical or metonymic terms 
that involve a negative evaluation, particularly in the case of the out-group or ‘other’ 
(Blackledge, 2005, p. 21). Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 33) identify some of the devices that 
one may expect to be used and through which the nomination/referential strategy is carried out, 
as indicated in Table 1. The basic form of discriminating against persons or a group of persons 
is by “naming them derogatorily, debasingly or vituperatively” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005, p. 
45). The way people/social actors are viewed in real life is influenced to a great extent by the 
way the news media name them. Choosing one name over another involves an exclusion or 
inclusion from other categories (Richardson, 2007a, p. 49), in doing so the namer could have a 
an interest or a purpose that could be political, social or psychological (Reisigl and Wodak, 
2005, p. 47). Other forms of referential strategy are those adapted from (van Leeuwen, 1996) 
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analytical categories: ‘inclusion’, ‘suppression’, ‘exclusion’ ,‘categorisation’, ‘passivation’, 
‘genericisation’, ‘impersonalisation’, ‘specification’, ‘backgrounding’, ‘collectivisation’, 
‘aggregation’, ‘assimilation’,  , ‘abstraction’ and ‘objectivation’. This list is not exhaustive. 
While some strategies may be more valid in a particular context, others may be more 
appropriate in another (KhosraviNik, 2010). 
 
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, 
phenomena/events and processes? 
The second important aspect of the self- and other-representation is the predicational strategies 
by which persons, animal, objects, events, actions and social phenomenon are linguistically 
assigned particular qualities. The predicational strategies can be used to label social actors in 
an ideological, evaluative and stereotypical way either in a positive or a negative way through 
the use of positive or negative traits whether implicitly or explicitly. (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005, 
p. 45).   
 
Table 2: Predicational strategies (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 33) 
 
4.3.3 Linguistic Analysis III: Examine the Linguistic Means and Linguistic Realisations 
3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question? 
 
Following on from the above brief discussion of referential and predicational strategies, it is 
worth mentioning here that both can be incorporated and integrated into argumentation to serve 
the aims of persuasion (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 34). According to many scholars, 
argumentation is integrated, either orally or in a written form, into our daily lives (Boukala, 
2016, p. 251). Thus (Van Eemeren et al., 1996) define argumentation as 
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a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (decreasing) the acceptability 
of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a constellation 
of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge. 
 
Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 35) argue that the purpose of argumentation is persuasion (Wodak 
and Meyer, 2016, p. 35). Therefore, argumentation can be used to persuade an audience by 
representing ‘self’ as positive and the ‘other’ as negative and by drawing a line between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’. For this particular reason, argumentation is considered one of the five DHA 
strategies, which is manifested mainly through the use of topoi. The interest of Discourse 
Historical analysts in argumentation can be traced back to the second half of the 1980s (Reisigl, 
2014, p. 68). A crucial feature of the DHA analysis of argumentation strategies is ‘topoi’ 
 
Table 3: Argumentation strategies (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 33) 
 
4.3.3.1 Topoi 
 
The concept of topoi has not only been of interest for researchers conducting rhetorical and 
argumentation studies, it has also been the centre of attraction for many discourse studies 
scholars (Boukala, 2016, p. 249). “[T]opoi were meant by Aristotle (1960, 1991) to be a means 
for locating and building argument” (Zompetti, 2006, p. 16).  In the same vein, Kienpointner 
(1997, p. 226) argues that by means of topoi arguments can be located because topoi help the 
one where and how to search for arguments; it is a ‘search formulas’. Kienpointner (2001, pp. 
17-18) further distinguishes two functions of the Aristotelian topoi: the first is the selective 
function, in which they serve primarily to locate and find, within a range of probable arguments, 
a relevant argument; the second function is that of being the “probative formulas which grant 
the plausibility of the step from the argument to the conclusion” (Kienpointner, 2001, pp. 17-
18).  
 
In DHA, the researcher seeks to establish an integrative framework through connecting the 
formal, functional and content-related elements of argumentation. The analysis of the content 
of argumentation schemes is the main focus of DHA (Reisigl, 2014, p. 69). The functional 
approach includes, according to Toulmin’s functional model (cited in Reisigl, 2014, p. 75), 
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three main elements: argument, the claim/thesis and the conclusion rule/warrant. According to 
Reisigl (2014, p. 75), the ‘argument’ is either in favour of or in opposition to the claim or thesis, 
the ‘conclusion’ is the link between the argument and the claim, and finally, the ‘claim’ denotes 
the disagreement, or the subject of the debate, which will be either proved or rebutted.  
 
It is worth noting that it is not always the case that topoi are articulated explicitly; however, 
they sometimes come in the form of a causal, or conditional clause, such as “if x, then y” or “y, 
because x” (Reisigl, 2014, p. 75). Nor, as argued by Reisigl (2014, p. 75), are topoi considered 
to be merely an “abstract, general and formal warrant or conclusion”; they are content-related.  
Reisigl argues that in analysing discourse, more can be revealed through the content-related 
topoi than through formal or functional analysis, since the topoi can uncover stances, ideologies 
and controversies and formal or functional analysis cannot. According to Wodak and Reisigl 
(2001, pp. 77- 80) the analysis of content-related arguments or schemes can be represented by 
any one of the following schemes or topoi, although this list is by no means exhaustive:  
 
Table 4 Topoi (compiled from Wodak and Reisigl, 2001) 
 
 56 
 
Zompetti (2006, p. 20) argues that topoi serve as a ‘decoding system’ that enables a researcher 
to pin down the particular argument that a person is engaged in. Having the classification of the 
topoi as illustrated in the above table in mind can help any person to identify the topoi in any 
arguments; without a knowledge of this type of classification, the topoi may go unnoticed.  
 
4. From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed? 
 
Table 5: Perspectivization, framing or discourse representation strategies (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 33) 
 
By means of the perspectivization, framing or discourse representation strategies, discourse 
analysts first examine speakers’ involvement in or detachment from discourse and then go on 
to examine their position, or stance, from the discriminatory discourse they report, quote, 
describe (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005, p. 45).  Involvement and detachment are expressed by the 
use of free speech and by the use of quotation, either direct or indirect. While indirect speech 
is considered an indicator of distance, direct speech and free indirect speech express the 
“speaker’s and evoke the hearers’ involvement” (ibid., p. 83). KhosraviNik (2010, p. 58) argues 
that perspectivization also includes language choice where a discourse producer decides what 
to choose in a particular situation. However, only the strategic choice is what interests CDA 
analysts not all forms of language where a word choice, on the micro- level, could reinforce a 
particular ideology and vice versa. 
5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, intensified or mitigated? 
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Table 6: Intensification, mitigation (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 33) 
Intensification and mitigation strategies play an influential role in discriminatory discourse, 
since they work either to sharpen the discourse or to tone it down through the use of 
illocutionary force.   
In the previous sections, the overall methodological apparatus of the DHA has been explained. 
However, in the current study, the focus was on the construction of the main Iraqi themes, and 
the selection of which devices and strategies to use was decided by the research questions and 
the type of data obtained.  
4.3.4 Level of Context 
 
In DHA, as well as other approaches in CDA, when analysing any textual data, great emphasis 
is placed on the context. Meyer and Wodak (2009) identified four dimensions of context. The 
first of these is the immediate text-internal (intra-textual); linguistic choices and other pragmatic 
uses of language within the same text are examined in order to determine how they affect the 
interpretation of references (anaphoric or cataphoric elements) (KhosraviNik, 2010, pp. 66-67). 
The second level of context is the inter-textual, which is mainly concerned with the relations 
between texts: i.e., intertextual and between discourses -  interdiscursive elements. The finding 
explicated by the text analysis contributes to the dialogicality among texts, genres and 
discourses as well as to the understanding of discursive strategies (KhosraviNik, 2010, pp. 66-
67). The next level of context is the institutional context (extra-linguistics), or what is also 
referred to as the ‘context of situation’. This level works on explicating “‘discourses in place’ 
in a given society, and account for historical development  of certain discourse topics and public 
memories on specific areas” (KhosraviNik, 2010, pp. 66-67). The context of situation could 
include the place, time, formality, communicative events, ideology, sex or gender, and the 
political and interactive roles of the interactants, education, ethnicity, region, nationality 
(Blackledge, 2005, p. 18). The last and broadest of the four levels is the socio-political context 
in which the discursive practices are embedded. This level works on forming “socio-cultural 
public cognition and the society’s collective ‘old knowledge’” (KhosraviNik, 2010, pp. 66-67).  
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It is concerned with the history of a particular event along with the history of all discourses that 
are associated to this event (Blackledge, 2005, p. 18). 
It must be noted that it is not always the case that discourse analytical study is systematic or 
restricted in terms of order. Linguistic and contextual levels of analysis may move up and down 
and the dialogic relationships operating among the levels are maintained simultaneously.  
The context affects texts at different levels. For example, the reporting of the 2003 war 
propaganda concerning Iraq in the US media was widespread. Thus, on the socio-political level, 
Iraq became a topic for the media to talk about. The media (institutional context) in one country 
might take a particular political or ideological stance and control access to the news and as a 
result represent Iraq negatively, but this might be different from the way the media in another 
country report Iraq (intertextuality). Also, with regard to the immediate text-internal, Iraq was 
referred to in various ways as a ‘threat’, an ‘axis of evil’ etc. However, to understand the 2003 
US-led invasion war in Iraq it is important to understand the socio-political and historical 
context of other previous wars e.g. e.g., 9/11, Desert Storm, the Iraq-Iran war etc. It is therefore 
important to emphasise salient aspects within the levels of context, since they contribute to the 
results of the research.  
Kristeva (1986) observed that intertextuality suggests “the insertion of history (society) into 
texts”, and vice versa. Fairclough (1992, p. 102) subsequently interpreted this “insertion of 
history into a text” as meaning that texts are influenced and structured to a great extent by texts 
that were written in the past, since they are considered as main constituent of history making. 
While ‘the insertion of text into history’ implies that texts respond to, place emphasis on, or 
even modify and rewrite the texts in the past which in turn contribute to the process of history 
making and “contributes to wider processes of change, as well as anticipating and trying to 
shape subsequent texts”. He adds that such inherent historicity character of texts enable them 
in taking major roles in making cultural and social change in the contemporary society 
Fairclough (1992, p. 102) also states that all utterances are made of constituents and ‘snatches’ 
of other utterances said by others. Bakhtin (1986, cited in Fairclough, p. 102) argues that:  
Our speech… is filled with others’ words, varying degrees of otherness and varying 
degrees of “our-own-ness”, varying degrees of awareness and detachment. These words 
of others carry with them their own expression, their own evaluative tone, which we 
assimilate, rework, and reaccentuate. 
In the case of news articles, intertextuality is in operation as the reproduction and reframing of 
the discourses of those in power is constantly taking place.  
 59 
 
Re-contextualisation occurs when an element is transferred to a new context and as a result to 
some extent acquires a new meaning. De-contextualisation happens when elements are taken 
out of their context. This can be seen in the reporting of political speeches in different 
newspapers: extracts from the speeches are used to serve the journalistic purpose of the 
newspaper in question. Each extract will be re- and de-contextualised according to the new 
frames and to some extent may acquire a new meaning (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, p. 90).   
Interdiscursivity is used to deal with the links between discourses by conceiving them as topic-
related; for instance, discourses on the Iraq wars and conflicts frequently refer to topics and 
sub-topics of other discourses on previous wars, such as recalling Halabja, which happened in 
1988, when referring to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.  
4.4 Corpus linguistics: an overview   
Corpus linguistics is a methodology that contains methods designed to study language in use 
(Lindquist, 2009, p. 1). Corpus linguistics, according to McEnery and Wilson (2001, p. 1), is 
“the study of language based on examples of real life language use”. Corpus linguistics is a 
methodology that can be incorporated into different areas of linguistics. Linguistically, a corpus 
is a collection of language texts, usually thousands or millions of words, that are sorted 
electronically (Baker et al., 2006, p. 48). Electronically encoded texts help researchers to carry 
out complex calculations that uncover language patterns that would otherwise require a lengthy 
manual process (Baker, 2006, p. 2). 
 
CL is not viewed as a monolithic field; rather it is a set of different methods implemented on 
naturally occurring data that are saved in an electronic form. While many of the corpus 
linguistics methods are quantitative in nature, in that they take the form of statistical tests carried 
out by means of computer software, a qualitative analysis, where human input is required, is 
also a crucial part of any corpus-based analysis (Baker et al., 2008, p. 274).  
Originally used solely as an approach in English grammar studies, corpus linguistics has 
undergone a thorough renaissance and the scope of corpus linguistics has been broadened 
considerably. Although ‘corpus linguistics’ is a relatively modern term, the field had a history 
before it was properly established and known by its current name. Many studies, according to 
McEnery and Wilson (2001, pp. 2-3), have not been categorised or identified under the umbrella 
of corpus linguistics; however, linguists such as Boas (1940), who had structuralist 
backgrounds, used a methodology that could be classified nowadays as corpus-based. In a 
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reference to an early use of corpus linguistics, Harris (1993, p. 27) describes the approach used 
at that time as using a number of recorded utterances as a corpus.   
According to McEnery and Wilson (2001, p. 3), the corpus-based description harks back to the 
nineteenth as well as the early twentieth century, when diaries of children’s language were used 
in language acquisition research as primitive corpora (roughly 1876-1926, Preyer, 1889; Stern, 
1924). Studies on language acquisition have gone beyond studying diaries to include large 
corpora and longitudinal studies (e.g., Bloom, 1970). McEnery and Wilson (2001, p. 4) add that 
Fries and Traves (1940) were among those linguists who used corpus in second language 
pedagogy research. In this regard, vocabulary lists (Kennedy, 1992) and word counts 
(Thorndike, 1921) were derived from the corpus for foreign learners. However, the number of 
corpus-based studies remained very limited until 1970, when Brown corpus was the first 
computer corpus that had actually been created ten years earlier. The corpus had been created 
in 1960, at a time when generative grammar dominated linguistics studies and any other 
approaches, such as those that used corpora, were not seen as acceptable, so the idea of using a 
machine-readable corpus was not warmly accepted by many linguists (Meyer, 2002, p. 1). 
McEnery and Wilson (2001, p. 24) argue that corpus linguistics has gone through periods of 
neglects and was abandoned in the 1950s owing to a series of criticisms. It was not until the 
1980s onwards that corpus linguistics really started to bloom, with many arguments being put 
forward in its favour and on the side of using corpus linguistics in research.  
 
The use of corpus linguistics methods in (critical) discourse analysis is relatively new (Baker 
et al., 2008). The first to use it were researchers such as Stubbs and Gerbig (1993), Hardt-
Mautner (1995) and Krishnamurthy (1996). However, according to Mautner (2009, p. 36) it 
was Stubbs’s (1996) Text and Corpus Analysis that really took corpus linguistics into a position 
of prominence. Since then, the awareness of its potential usefulness as a research application 
has grown, many studies were conducted that demonstrated the contribution of CL to CDA, and 
more and more analytical concepts and tools were developed. In addition, more software was 
introduced, such as Wordsmith, Antconc, Sketch engine Wmatrix etc. The people who 
developed the combination of CL and CDA research were those with a corpus linguistics 
background, rather than CDA practitioners (Mautner, 2009, p. 36).  
On the discourse analysis side, de Beaugrande (1997) made early references to corpus 
linguistics in two edited volumes. However, Mautner (2009) argues that the appreciation of the 
use of corpus linguistics as a methodology in critical discourse analysis took some time to 
materialise. For instance, whereas CL was not present in the first edition of Wodak’s  (2001) 
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Methods of critical discourse analysis, a whole chapter on it was included in the second edition 
(2009). Since the 2000s, there has been a considerable number of studies that have used corpus 
linguistics methods; for instance, Fairclough (2000) New Labour, New Language, and Oripn’s 
(2005) Corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis: Examining the ideology of sleaze; 
studies in the fields of education (Mulderrig, 2003), grammar (O'Halloran and Coffin, 2004), 
reader positioning (Coffin and O'Halloran, 2005), metaphor (O'Halloran, 2007; Koller et al., 
2008; Taylor, 2008; Cesiri and Colaci, 2011; Semino et al., 2017), newspapers (Johnson et al., 
2003; Baker and McEnery, 2005; Bednarek, 2006) and politics (Partington, 2003; Sotillo and 
Wang-Gempp, 2004) among many other studies.  
4.4.1 Combining CDA and CL  
One of the main criticisms of CDA concerns the risk of subjectivity when researchers are 
choosing texts, or the possibility that they will select unrepresentative texts to prove a point. 
Researchers might have preconceptions about the topics they are investigating. It has been noted 
by Wilson (2003, p. 411), observing a number of studies, that researchers already have 
judgments before they start their analysis which in turn could influence the results.   
The corpus-based approach, by contrast, provides a ‘high degree of objectivity’, since it reduces 
researcher bias by using many statistical measures and by dealing with huge amounts of data, 
and texts are approached either without, or with relatively few, preconceived notions about the 
content (Baker et al., 2008). However, researcher bias cannot be removed completely, since 
although computers work on sorting the patterns, collocates, frequencies and concordance lines, 
and although the results are based on statistical tests, researcher input is still involved (Baker, 
2006). This is because corpus-based analysts depend on qualitative as well as quantitative 
analysis. The analyst works with hundreds of concordance lines that are sorted by a 
concordance programme by which the analyst is informed, and he or she decides where to cut 
off the lines and how to make sense of the concordances; it is the analyst who finds interesting 
patterns and decides which texts or words should be included in the analysis, and also which 
tools of analysis are to be used. Sometimes the analyst needs to expand the concordance lines 
to see the whole context in order to be able to make an interpretation, or he or she may need to 
consult other theories. Researchers might need to use sampling methods to reduce the number 
of concordance lines. Furthermore, many practical studies in corpus linguistics have proved 
that different corpus methods can produce different results (see section 4.4.2). 
CDA practitioners have also been accused of selecting a limited amount of texts or of 
conducting a small-scale analysis. Sometimes it is difficult to suggest the presence or absence 
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of a discourse by single words, phrases and constructions. The construction of a specific 
discourse can best be seen by the cumulative effect of collecting numerous instances of that 
discourse, because “[e]very word is primed for use in discourse as a result of the cumulative 
effect of an individual’s encounters with the word” (Hoey, 2005, p. 13). This is where corpus 
linguistics comes into its own: in enabling the researcher to discover the association between 
words that occur repetitively that might reveal discourses of ideological nature.  
Another useful application of corpus linguistics is that it shows the continually changing 
position of discourse by means of examining the changing frequencies of a particular word 
under investigation diachronically, or by comparing different corpora in different time spans. 
This also makes it possible to see whether a particular word is used more in one context than in 
another and whether the meaning of the word has changed over time (Baker, 2006, p. 15).  
Furthermore, when quantifying the discourses in a large corpus, the tools of corpus linguistics 
make it easier to sort and identify many of the CDA notions. Also, the CDA theory can help in 
interpreting the findings. For instance, many CDA notions such as topoi and topics, referential 
and predicational strategies, can be identified by means of collocates, concordances and 
keywords.  
4.4.2 Assessing Methodologies used in Corpus-based CDA Studies 
It should be noted that there are many different ways of combining CL and CDA, and in the 
numerous studies that have done so one can find a different balance between the two methods. 
Some CDA studies avoid quantitative analysis altogether and focus on the (interpretive) 
analysis of concordance lines. Others derive collocates from the concordance lines manually, 
sorting the concordance lines without using any statistical measures which might miss many 
significant collocates or include those that are insignificant. Some other researchers who 
preferred to conduct a more comprehensive qualitative CDA analysis have used key words and 
collocation as a way of reducing the number of concordance lines. The method selected also 
largely depends on the type of the study and the availability of the data: for instance, a huge 
amount of data might need to be downsized by using collocates and key words. With a small 
amount of data, on the other hand, it may be better to investigate it through studying each 
individual concordance line, because applying collocation tools might not produce many 
collocates, and as a result the findings might not be representative. 
 
Researchers have attempted to see whether the findings are consistent when corpus-based 
discourse analysis is employed by different analysts and also by different analysts using 
 63 
 
different methods. For instance, Marchi and Taylor (2009) study involved researchers who were 
working independently on newspaper article corpora in an attempt to answer the question “How 
do journalists talk about themselves/each other and their profession in a corpus of British media 
texts?” While the results showed that the findings of some researchers were incompatible with 
each other, it also showed that some were complementary and confirmed one another. Similarly, 
Baker (2015) compared five corpus analysts who were working separately on a study the aim 
of which was to uncover the representation of foreign doctors in newspaper articles. The 
findings showed that three of the analysists have shared quarter of the findings especially those 
with the most mentioned constructions of the foreign doctors as having poor English skills, not 
competent etc. However, the majority of the results were only revealed by single analysts 
because they are these results were related to phenomena that are not frequent in the corpus and 
therefore they went unnoticed when using corpus analysis. In these studies, Baker suggests two 
useful strategies that could be employed in the analysis. The first was to carry out a thorough 
search of concordance lines of a particular word and read all the concordance lines, instead of 
taking just an example of the concordances. The other strategy was to triangulate different 
methods.  
Similar to Marchi and Taylor (2009), Baker and Levon (2015) conducted a study in which two 
authors worked independently on a similar set of data to answer the same question “How are 
different types of men represented in the British press?” The first author (Baker) used a corpus-
based approach on a large corpus of approximately 44.1 million words, while the other (Levon) 
conducted a qualitative analysis on a down-sampled set of 51 articles of the same corpus. The 
main aim of conducting such a study was to see whether the large corpus acted against cherry 
picking and to determine whether the two methods of analysis produced different findings. 
Unlike Marchi and Taylor (2009), the findings showed that they were either “complementary 
(different but contributing towards a wider picture)” or they shared the same findings and no 
uncovered or contradictory findings were reported in either approach.  
In another study, Baker and Egbert (2016) attempted to assess ten corpus linguistics methods7 
used by researchers who worked independently on a 400.000 word corpus created for this 
purpose on a question + Answer forum discourse of online web pages in four world English 
varieties UK, US, India and the Philippines and three topic areas to answer a two-part question 
“[i]n what ways does language use in online Q+A forum responses differ across four world 
                                                 
7 The methods are: lexical bundles, collocational networks, semantic annotation, keywords, variations analysis, 
multi-dimensional analysis, pragmatic features, gendered discourses, qualitative analysis of stance and stylistics 
perception analysis.  
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English Varieties (India, Philippines, UK, and US)?. The results showed that the findings of the 
analysis of the ten methods were not the same for all the methods. The findings were 
complementary, whereas some of the findings were agreed on by multiple methods there was 
also a disagreement on others as there is some findings that are only unique to a particular 
method. Baker and Egbert (2016) concluded that using one method alone can cause a researcher 
to overlook a huge amount of information about a particular discourse. They added that “it 
seems that we are only finding a few pieces of a large puzzle with each method”. Therefore, in 
order to discover more pieces of the puzzle it is effective to triangulate a few different methods 
when approaching the same data. 
 
The important conclusion drawn by such studies, as argued by Baker and Egbert (2016), is that 
different research questions and language corpora may require different corpus methods. Of 
equal importance is the fact that researchers should choose the right corpus to answer a 
particular research question. Furthermore, the methods selected should be well suited to 
answering the research question.  
4.4.3 Data selection, collection and description: building a corpus 
The collection and selection of data for the current study were based on four criteria: 
availability, coverage, specific discourse concentration, and periods of time. The availability 
criterion was determined by the availability of US newspapers in the LexisNexis8 database. 
LexisNexis is an online searchable database of news articles that provides access to a large 
archive of newspaper texts. This online database imposes some access restrictions: e.g., the 
number of the articles returned from each search query should not exceed 3,000 articles per hit, 
and only the texts are permitted to be extracted from the original articles; in other words, no 
visuals are available or downloadable. With regard to the coverage criterion, the ‘Major US 
Newspapers’ (see Table 7) were chosen. The reason behind this selection is that the ‘Major US 
Newspapers’ shown in Table 7 are already categorised and named under such label in 
LexisNexis  which makes it easy to access and download. Furthermore, according to 
LexisNexis such newspapers are among the top 50 newspapers in circulation in US9  
 
 
                                                 
8 www.nexis.com  
9 https://www.nexis.com/results/shared/sourceInfo.do?csi=307574 
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No Major US Newspapers 
1 Daily News (New York) 
2 Journal of Commerce 
3 Los Angeles Times 
4 Newsday (New York) 
5 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
6 St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) 
7 Star Tribune (Minneapolis MN) 
8 Tampa Bay Times 
9 The Atlanta Journal-Constitution 
10 The Baltimore Sun 
11 The Buffalo News (New York) 
12 The Christian Science Monitor 
13 The Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, OK) 
14 The Denver Post 
15 The Hartford Courant 
16 The New York Post 
17 The New York Times 
18 The Orange County Register 
19 The Philadelphia Daily News (PA) 
20 The Philadelphia Inquirer 
21 The Tampa Tribune (Florida) 
22 The Washington Post 
23 USA Today 
Table 7: The major US newspapers 
The concentration of discourse on Iraq in specific wars was to be collected, in particular the 
Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion in 2003. In order to avoid irrelevant documents when 
compiling different corpora from different wars/conflicts, different query words were 
developed for each war, as shown in Table 8.  
War/Conflict Key words used  
Iraq-Iran  Iraq! OR Saddam Hussein OR Saddam AND Iran! OR Khomeini  
US-led Invasion Iraq! OR Saddam Hussein OR Saddam AND US OR America! OR United 
States 
Table 8: Query words 
The exclamation mark (!) acts as a wildcard for searching the word variation, because it finds 
the root of words and all the letters that are added to it. For instance, searching for Iraq! will 
retrieve all the articles that contain Iraq, Iraqi and Iraqis. The AND connector is used to look 
for words that are far apart from one another in the same article, whereas OR is used to find 
documents that have either or both of the words linked by the connector OR.  
With the needs of the research questions in mind and using the query words, two large corpora 
were produced, the Iraq-Iran corpus and the US-led invasion corpus.  
Table 9 shows the number of articles retrieved from the query words specified for each period 
for the US corpora and sub-corpora.  
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War/Conflict Period Major US Newspapers Corpora 
Iran-Iraq War 22/09/1980 TO 08/08/1988 11160 articles 
US-led invasion 12/03/2003 TO 01/05/2003 11264 articles 
Table 9: The number of articles retrieved from the UK and US newspapers 
4.4.4 Data limitations 
There are a number of limitations that need to be considered when combining a quantitative 
analysis using CL and a qualitative analysis using CDA. First, many newspapers were produced 
only in a hard copy form, and only a few were archived in a digitalised form; it is only recently 
that the majority of newspapers have started to have an online archive. For instance, when 
compiling the Iraq-Iran war corpus of the major US newspapers, for 1980 only The New York 
Times and The Washington Post articles were found online; it was not until 1986 that the 
Journal of Commerce appeared in the data and the Tampa Bay Times was not added until 1987 
and 1988. The list of digitalised major US newspapers had increased in 2003 to include The 
New York Times, The Washington Post, The Philadelphia Inquirer, The New York Post, The 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri), Daily News (New York), 
Tampa Bay Times, USA Today, The Denver Post, Journal of Commerce, The Daily Oklahoman 
(Oklahoma City, OK) and the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. The list had become even longer by 
2014 with the rise of ISIS terrorist group. However, the number of articles and their coverage 
differed from one newspaper to another; for instance, the number of articles was 1, 6 and 261  
in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Journal of Commerce and The New York Times respectively.  
 
Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the online articles can only be retrieved in the form of texts 
without pictures or videos. In this regard, Moore et al. (2008, p. 4) demonstrated how important 
visuals are in a study when they conducted a content analysis on a sample of British press about 
British Muslims from 2000 to 2008. They found that visuals are used to capitalize on the 
differences between the culture and religion of Muslims and non-Muslims (Moore et al., 2008, 
p. 4). Pictures and videos are part of any story, in that they can reveal much detail as well as 
making sense for the audience. 
   
Downloading the relevant data can also impose a limitation, since there is no single way or rule 
for retrieving the relevant articles. This process depends largely on the researcher’s knowledge 
of and familiarity with the topic under investigation that enable him or her to come up with 
some query words that will access the relevant articles and rule out the irrelevant ones. Word 
variations and different names for the same thing also need to be taken into consideration: for 
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instance, Baghdad, Falujah, Basra, Mosul and other Iraqi cities can refer to Iraq itself, especially 
when they became well known to the US media audience, having been mentioned many times 
in relation to particular events. Therefore, the name Iraq or the name of the capital city Baghdad 
are not always used to refer to the country – sometimes another place in the country is used, in 
which case articles can go un-retrieved. The same thing can be said for individuals and other 
government principles such as Saddam Hussein. Even if careful attention is paid to all these 
possible pitfalls, however, there is no 100% guarantee that the derived articles will refer to the 
Iraq war and conflicts. For instance, Iran and Iraq may appear in the same article but in reference 
to their national football teams or their oil exports, without any mention of a war.  
 
4.4.5 Key Concepts in Corpus Linguistics 
4.4.6 Frequency 
 
The frequency is basically a list that shows all the words in the corpus with their number of 
occurrences (Baker, 2006, p. 51). Frequency is regarded as one of the main and basic concepts 
in corpus linguistics. It can be the starting point of any analysis and can help to identify a 
thought-provoking phenomenon in the corpus. Frequencies can direct the researcher where to 
look for or where to put more emphasis on an investigative pattern. The frequency list of a 
particular corpus can provide a great deal of information on the way the ‘sociological profile’ 
of a particular word is used in the corpus in a particular context (Baker, 2006, p. 47). 
 
 In the context of the current study, the frequency list could shed light on where Saddam, 
Halabja, Iraqi people, CWs and Iraqi Shiites were used the most or the least  in US press corpus 
and in which period. Knowing where they were reported the most or the least or whether the 
frequencies fluctuated could highlight a pattern for further investigation. In Figure 5, for 
instance, the data show that there was an enormous difference in the frequency of how the word 
Saddam was used during the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion, which was owing to the 
high level of reporting during the period of the2003 invasion. Such a difference could bring to 
the attention an interesting finding and in this case reveal how the frequency of reporting 
Saddam changed over the period of the wars; it could also explicate why Saddam had become 
important in this period.  
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Figure 5 Frequency comparison of Saddam in Iraq-Iran War and US-led Invasion 
 
In this respect, Baker accentuates the importance of frequency to discourse analysis, stating that 
“language is not a random affair”, since people have a choice when selecting words, and the 
choice of particular words over others can reveal the intentions of the speakers; this is why 
frequency is so important (Baker, 2006, pp. 47- 48).  
 
4.4.7 Concordances  
 
A concordance is the list that shows the lines where the word under investigation in a corpus 
occurs.  The search word appears in the middle of a concordance; it is usually known as a node, 
and is surrounded by words to the right and to the left revealing by that a bit of context10. The 
search word is usually defined as a ‘key word in context’ (KWIC). The search word can take 
the form of a single word or multiword phrases and can sometimes be accompanied by tags or 
wildcards. Furthermore, concordances can be alphabetically sorted one or more places to the 
right or the left, allowing more linguistic patterns to be revealed (Baker et al., 2006, pp. 42-43). 
The alphabetical sorting can bring to the attention similar patterns before and after the search 
word that could go unnoticed when only human observation is used, especially in a very large 
corpus. The main purpose of concordances is to find patterns of interest to the researcher in the 
language used in the corpus. Such patterns could be established through repetitions around the 
key word in the context in the whole corpus, whether using similar words or synonyms, or 
quasi-synonymous words or phrases. 
 
                                                 
10 The context can be further expanded in different ways depending on the software used. For instance in 
Wordsmith the whole context can be accessed through double clicking the concordance line, or by pressing F8 to 
obtain a fatter context or even by pulling down the line of interest to give a wider or fatter context.  
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4.4.8 Collocation 
Important aspects of a word’s meaning can be identified through its association with words with 
which it tends to co-occur frequently, when these aspects are not contained within the word 
itself (McEnery and Hardie, 2012, p. 123). As Firth (1957) puts it, “you shall know a lot about 
a word from the company it keeps” (cited in Baker, 2006). When a word tends to occur near 
other words regularly, such co-occurrence is called collocation.  
In many instances, the patterns in the concordances are not clear. For instance, when 
concordances are sorted one place to the right or left, collocates might appear close to the node. 
However, sorting words two, three, four, or five places to the right or left can reveal more 
collocates that are near each other. Different spans can produce different collocates. The 
relationship between the words should be statistically significant. Therefore, different statistical 
tests have been devised. The first of these is the Mutual Information (MI) test, which examines 
“all of the places where two potential collocates occur in a text or corpus”; the higher the MI 
scores are the stronger the collocation. However, in this type of test, high scores are given to 
words of a relatively low frequency (Baker 2006: 102). Therefore, other statistical tests have 
been proposed: for instance, z-score, MI3, log-log and log-likelihood. Each of these tests has a 
different focus. Whereas in Log-likelihood and MI3 the main focus is on the grammatical 
words, log-log places the emphasis on the lexical words, although, as in the MI test, low-
frequency words are given the importance. The use of statistical techniques is dependent on the 
interests of the researcher and the purpose of the study: “high frequency function words (Rank 
by frequency, low frequency content words (MI, Z-score, log-log, observed/expected), or a 
mixture of both (MI3, log-likelihood) (Baker 2006: 102).  
4.4.9 Software Review 
The choice of suitable CL software is mainly dependent on the aims of the study and the tools 
required to achieve these aims. Different software can serve different purposes, as illustrated in 
the following sections. Furthermore, there are many factors that can limit the choices of the 
researcher, such as the size of the corpus, tasks, functionality, availability, guidance and 
language.  
 
4.4.10 WordSmith Tools 
 
The WordSmith Tools software was used in this study for the reason that I am more familiar 
with it and its functionality than with other tools, and because it allows more searches on 
different words to be carried out in more than one window. It is described by its developer, 
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Mike Scott, as a “suite of software” and as “a Swiss army knife with its various 
components…[that] offers a number of different tools for different jobs” (Scott, 2001, p. 47).  
 
Furthermore, WordSmith Tools is “organic software!” (Scott, 2010, p. 4) in the sense that it 
changes over time. There have been many versions; since the first Version 1.0 launched in 1996. 
Its developer, Mike Scott, continued changing it to accommodate the needs of users through 
adding more features and improvements. The current Version is 7.0 . Along with the ongoing 
updates for this software there is an online step-by-step screenshots guide for each tool with its 
usage. Together with this guide, there is access to Q & A platforms designed by the developer 
on Facebook11 and Google+12 open platforms called WordSmith Tools that allow users to 
interact or ask the developer or other online users questions.  
 
The main reason for using it, however, is, the fact that when I tried other software applications 
such as Antconc and Wmatrix, owing to the huge amount of data used in this research, they 
crashed and froze. These applications only really work for corpus files no larger than one 
million words each (Laviosa et al., 2017). Since my research was using corpora containing 
millions of words each, WordSmith Tools was the obvious choice, since it can handle up to 20 
million words easily. 
 
4.4.11 UCREL Semantic Analysis System (USAS) 
When semantic annotation and semantic tagging is required, it is better to use Wmatrix, in 
which a Semantic Analysis System (USAS) that annotates the words automatically is 
integrated. WordSmith does not have this feature, so the grammatical and semantic tagging had 
to be done separately before conducting the analysis (Laviosa et al., 2017). After deriving the 
collocates of the search word in question, the collocates are then compiled in a text document 
to be made ready for automatic semantic tagging. To achieve this purpose, Wmatrix313, an 
online software tool that allows corpus analysis and comparisons to be made, was used. USAS 
semantic tagging categorises words into one of 21 major discourse fields, as shown in Table 
10, expanding into 232 category labels. These fields in turn are subdivided into more fine-
grained subdivisions (Archer et al., 2002, pp. 1-2).  
 
                                                 
11 https://www.facebook.com/groups/wordsmithtools/ 
12 https://groups.google.com/forum/?hl=en&fromgroups#!forum/wordsmithtools 
13 Wmatirx3 does not run more than 1,000,000 words. For this reason, only the collocates were derived through 
WordSmith for the research work; these were then compiled in a text file to be run through USAS in Wmatrix3.  
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Table 10: USAS Category System (from Archer et al., 2002, pp. 1-2) 
 
4.4.12 Sketch Engine 
In this online corpus linguistics software application, the word sketch is used to give an overall 
idea of the whole corpus. This sketch provides a summary of one page of the collocational and 
grammatical behaviour of the search word. In this summary, the collocates are categorised 
according to their grammatical relationship with the search word. For instance, the search word 
can act as a subject or object of the verb as a modifier of the word, or it can come with a 
conjunction, preposition etc. (Kilgarriff et al., 2014, p. 2). According to Kilgarriff et al. (2014, 
p. 2), “A word sketch negates the need for reviewing hundreds and thousands of examples found 
in the corpus one by one. Everything is displayed in a compact time-saving format”, as shown 
in Table 11, below.  
 
 72 
 
 
Table 11: Word Sketch for Saddam 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter the main methodological framework adopted for this study, DHA, was described, 
along with the main strategies of this method. This was followed by highlighting the procedures 
of selecting the corpora and a description of the corpora used in the research. The last section 
provided an overview of corpus linguistics with its main tools and the software employed in 
this study. The next chapter will provide the first analysis chapter of the five themes under 
question in the Iraq-Iran war which make up the basis for making comparison with their 
counterparts in the other subsequent chapters.  
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Chapter 5: DISCOURSE ON IRAQ-IRAN WAR 1980-1988 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores the discursive construction, in major US newspapers, of the main themes 
in question  in the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran: namely, Saddam, the Iraqi people, the 
Iraqi Shiites, Halabja and the CWs, with the aim of answering the first research question: How 
are these themes discursively constructed during the Iraq-Iran war?  Furthermore, this chapter 
along with the subsequent chapters 6, 7 and 8 aim to contribute to revealing the differences 
between the reporting of the Iraq-Iran war and the reporting of the US-led invasion in the US 
major newspapers in relation to the above themes.  
 
In order to explore the construction of the main themes in the war, an integrative combination 
of CL and DHA to CDA has been employed. Through the CL techniques, the collocates14 were 
derived for each of the query words: Saddam, Iraqi people, Iraqi Shiite, Halabja and Iraq’s use 
of CWs. These were then categorised according to their semantic meaning to pinpoint the main 
thematic patterns so that a further examination, designed to highlight the predicational and 
nominational strategies used around the query words (nodes), could be carried out. This is 
followed by presenting the main recurring predicational and nominational themes, which 
demonstrate how the five themes are used and constructed in the US press corpus.   
5.2 ‘Saddam’s’ themes  
Before examining the way Saddam was reported and constructed in the US press, the word 
frequency of Saddam in the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) period was derived. The frequency list 
is a helpful starting point for getting an idea about the word distribution in the whole corpus. 
The word frequency highlights where the words are used the most or the least during the war 
period. Thus, if the frequency is proportionally increased, this probably tells us more about it 
than those with a lower frequency, the increase in frequency could reveal something of 
importance in the press data, for instance if there is an increase of the query word like Saddam 
in a particular period rather than other it is possible that it tells us that the coverage of Saddam 
in this period has increased as a results of the increased reporting on Saddam. This increase 
could be an event or something of importance that led to this coverage. Thus, in Figure 6, below, 
                                                 
14 Sometimes there are only small frequencies of the search word. Therefore, deriving the collocates will not be 
effective as there will be very few collocates derived. In this case, only concordances lines for the search word are 
examined.  
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which shows the frequency of Saddam between 1980- 1988, the fluctuation in the frequency of 
the query word is apparent. 
 
 
Figure 6 The frequency of Saddam in the Iraq-Iran War 
 
It is interesting to note from the line graph above that the frequency of Saddam was at its highest 
level in 1980. The rise, having examined the concordances lines of Saddam, was due to 
reporting the confrontational discourse between Iraq and Iran and to some border skirmishes 
between the two countries which was developed into a full-scale war, with the Iraqi army 
attacking Iran. The frequency plummeted in 1981 to rise again in 1982, the year when the 
Iranian army entered Iraqi soil with the intention of overthrowing Saddam. The frequency then 
went up and down over the next few years, during which the US press reported the Iranian calls 
to remove Saddam regime which continued throughout the war period and at some points these 
calls were toned down by the Iranian side. Another notable change also occurred in 1987 and 
1988, when the second largest increase can be found which is owing to the use of the collocates 
in relation to Saddam’s removal.  
Having calculated the frequency, the collocates of Saddam were then derived in the whole 
corpus. To achieve this, following Baker et al. (2013, p. 37), a statistical measure15 of a 
significance threshold was considered that combines a mutual information score (MI) ≥ 3 with 
a log-likelihood score, which should be at least ≥ 6.63. The window span is restricted to +/-5 
around the node (the query word).  
After deriving the collocates in the whole corpora, they were then categorised according to their 
semantic fields based on the most salient meanings they expressed in the context: for instance, 
religious-related collocates of Saddam such as ‘atheist’, ‘infidel’ and ‘nonbeliever’ were 
grouped together and put under the Religion label as shown in Table 12 . This categorisation 
was done automatically by loading the collocates into a Wmatrix3, web-based corpus analysis 
                                                 
15 The reason for using this combination of statistical measures, according to Baker et al. (2013, p. 37), is that it 
works on “extracting collocations that are both lexically interesting and statistically significant” 
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tool used to carry out the semantic tagging with 21 major discourse fields (see section 4.4.11). 
Semantic tagging helps to highlight the broad themes and topics as well as the overused 
semantic meanings in the corpus as shown in Table 12.  
 
Semantic categories  Saddam’s Collocates  In power  overthrow, overthrown, strongman, overthrowing, leader , ordered, dictator, king, ruler, leadership, victory, autocratic, power, supervised, presided, depose, ousted, deposed, toppled, topple, toppling, topples, fall, removal, removed, uproot, ousting, ouster Speech acts referring, vowed, proclaimed, announced, reference, persuading, apologized, wooed, welcomed, quoted, demanded, declared, urging , sworn, suggested Violent/Angry feud , threatens, outraged, threatened Warfare, defence and the army; weapons war, army, embattled, aggressor, invaded, launched Social Actions, States And Processes visiting, rallying, visited, nurtured,  Formal/Unfriendly foe, unfriendly Danger gamble Law and order abrogated, rule, punish, punishment Religion  infidel, Sunni, atheist, secular, godless, Yazid, cult, holy Disease crazy Government president, government, regime Crime crimes Wanted wants, urged, ambitions Arts and crafts pictures, posters, portrait, portraits, arch Help support, supporting Time: Beginning  initiated Politics socialist Miscalculation misjudged, miscalculated Speech: Communicative speech, reiterating, appeal, reiterated 
Table 12 Semantic categories of Saddam's collocates in the whole period 
 
However, a disclaimer needs to be made here: sometimes words that belong to the same 
semantic meaning were labelled differently when they were loaded into the WMatrix online 
software. For instance, words such as ‘overthrow’ were tagged as being In power label, whereas 
‘deposed’ and ‘ousted’ are labelled as Giving; possession. However, they can be placed in the 
same category according to the context to mean overthrowing Saddam. Therefore, the 
researcher’s input is present in this categorisation. Similarly, sometimes two different words 
that do not belong to the same semantic meaning could form a semantic theme. The 
categorisation of the collocates according to their semantic meaning is largely dependent on the 
context. Therefore, it is important to expand the concordance line for each collocates. These 
categorised collocates will be studied according to their themes, for instance, overthrow/ 
 76 
 
overthrown, topple/toppled/ toppling, ouster /ousted, depose/ deposed can constitute a theme as 
shown in section 5.2.1.  
Figure 7 shows the main discourses on Saddam based on the collocates categorisation and their 
expanded concordances lines.    
 
Figure 7 The encapsulation of widespread discourses on Saddam in Iraq-Iran 
 
5.2.1 The theme of Saddam’s overthrow 
From Table 12 above, it can be clearly seen how collocates such as overthrow, depose, topple, 
removal and oust are used frequently with their spelling variation across all the years in the 
corpus. The frequency of these collocates varies in different years, referring to different topics 
in relation to the construction of the figure of Saddam. Thus, before the invasion of Iraq and 
during the war, such collocates were used to signal Khomeini’s attempts to export his revolution 
through calls for the Iraqi people in general and the Shiites in particular to revolt against the 
Ba’athist regime and overthrow Saddam as shown in the concordance lines in Table 13.  
 
Khomeini began calling on the Shiites in Iraq, […], to  overthrow  President Saddam  
Khomeini's persistent calls for the  overthrow  of Saddam Hussein 
Iraqi Dissidents Form 'Supreme Council' […]to work for the  overthrow  of Iraq's President,  
At the start of the invasion, Tehran radio broadcast an appeal by 
Khomeini in Arabic to Iraq's Shiites to join the Iranian forces and  
overthrow  Saddam  
Khomeini appealed strongly to Iraqis to join forces with the invading 
Iranians and. 
overthrow  Saddam Hussein 
Al Dawa […] received strong support from Iran and was dedicated to the  overthrow  of Saddam Hussein  
Table 13 Concordances of overthrow 
Prior and at the beginning of the war, the period was portrayed in the US press as one of 
confrontational discourse between the two countries, who had gone to war through words before 
the real war began. For example, according to The New York Times, October 7, 1980, Iraqi 
officials described the Iranian rulers as ‘a clique of ignorant vile liars’, ‘racist Persian tyrants’ 
 77 
 
and ‘Zionist stooges’. The views on Iraqi officials expressed on Iranian radio and television 
were similar, where they were described as ‘the enemies of God and Islam’ and ‘a bunch of 
atheist charlatans’, as well as Saddam’s invasion being described as an attempt to defend ‘the 
throne of the Iraqi Shah, the Zionist American stooge, Saddam Hussein’. In these examples, 
each party resorted to attack the ethos of his rival to construct him as bad character through 
attaching negative attributes to the enemy. It is worth mentioning that the common discourse 
between Iraq and Iran in their conformational discourse was the focus on the words of religious 
and historical nature as will be shown in the subsequent sections (5.2.2 and 5.2.3) . Looking at 
the above predications as well as drawing on the analysis in 5.4, ‘Persian’, used by Iraqi 
politicians,  is an ideologically prejudiced loaded word that conjure up collective memories of 
centuries of historical and religious enmity that is circulated and continuously fed in the minds 
of many Arab. Similarly, Iran saw to disassociate Saddam from being a Muslim and attributing 
an atheist- like words to Saddam as will be seen in subsequent sections.   
 
As the war continued, the ousting of Saddam became one of Iran’s repeated demands, along 
with the call for him to pay war reparations and to return all the occupied territories, as well as 
for him to be named as the aggressor, this being one of Iran’s conditions for a cease-fire. 
However, in the last years of the war the demand for the overthrow of Saddam was reported by 
the US press as having been toned down or even disappeared by Iranian officials as shown in 
the table bellow.  
 
Iran was no longer seeking the overthrow  of Saddam Hussein as a condition for making peace 
Tehran did not insist on the overthrow  of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein as a condition 
Table 14 Overthrowing Saddam as a condition  
 
5.2.1.1 The topoi of the threat of Iranian- style government 
Through these collocates a fear of toppling Saddam and of a hypothetical Iranian victory was 
explicated and constructed in the US press. The possibility of a spread of the Iranian 
fundamentalism or the Shiism that would destabilise the Middle East, coupled with the fear that 
other Iranian-style governments would be installed in Iraq or other countries, was viewed as a 
threat to both US interests and those of the Gulf countries as illustrated in Table 15. 
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Predicational strategies of Saddam 
 
Predication of 
overthrow/ 
overthrown, depose, 
ousted, , toppled, 
topple, toppling, 
topples 
 
Iranian- style government 
- the installation of an Islamic fundamentalist government similar to the one in Iran 
led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
- install a carbon-copy Islamic republic in Baghdad. 
- establish a government in Baghdad sympathetic to his Islamic revolution 
threat to the Gulf and US 
- could endanger pro-western Arab sheikdoms along the gulf 
- the border between the Arab world and the Islamic but non-Arab East would 
effectively disappear. 
- could threaten the stability of the Persian Gulf region and have far reaching 
consequences for the United States, the Soviet Union and other nations. 
threat of Shiism expansion 
- The revolutionary impulses of the Shia branch of Islam would sweep again down 
the western shore of the Persian Gulf and into the Levant. Even before the Iranian 
thrust across the Shatt al Arab 
 
Table 15 Predicational strategy representing the fear of overthrowing Saddam by Iran 
 
In predicational terms, Iran victory was discursively constructed negatively because it was seen 
as  a ‘fundamentalist government’, a danger to the ‘pro- western Arab Sheikdoms’, a ‘non-
Arab’ country that could establish an Iranian- like government next door to Arab countries and 
as a result threaten their stability by spreading Shiism into the Gulf countries. 
 
5.2.1.2 Topos of Threat of an Iranian or Iraqi Victory 
 
In addition to the constructed fear of an Iranian victory in section 5.2.1.1 neither an Iraqi nor an 
Iranian victory was desired by the US in this war. Any victory had been constructed to be a 
threat and danger for the entire region. However, an Iranian victory was viewed being as far 
more dangerous to U.S. interests and that of the Arab countries, and to the stability of the region 
than an Iraqi victory. Although the notion of an Iraqi victory was seen to be far-fetched and 
impractical, Iraq was viewed as representing a conventional strategic threat and playing the role 
of local bully for the Gulf States. Furthermore, it was seen to be a threat to Israel, whose fears 
stemmed from the fact that an Iraqi victory would give it a stronger voice among the Arab 
countries, enabling it to form alliances among them and uniting them against Israel.  
1. Israeli concern stems from general fears that an Iraqi victory over Iran would give 
it a stronger voice in Arab councils, pulling such moderates as Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia toward less flexible policies. In addition, an Israeli diplomat said, closer 
Jordanian-Iraqi ties raise the possibility of Iraqi troops being stationed in neighboring 
Jordan or perhaps even an Iranian attack on Jordanian targets near the frontier with 
Israeli-occupied territory.  
The Washington Post, October 10, 1980 
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2. Most of the smaller Gulf sheikdoms have bad enough memories of Iraqi bullying 
and subversive tactics in the ‘60s and ‘70s to stifle any desire for an Iraqi victory. 
The Washington Post, July 24, 1988 
On the other hand, an Iranian victory was constructed as an ideological threat that could upset 
the whole Gulf region, because it would spread the fundamentalist religion that could ‘sweep’ 
the Arab countries of the Middle East, as well as destabilising the region by inciting the Shiites 
of other Gulf States, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, to revolt. Therefore, the victory 
of ‘Khomeinism’ is represented in the news as ‘contagious’, and as a ‘tide’ that could ‘open the 
floodgates’ and unleash a ‘surge’ of Islamic fundamentalism in the Gulf.  
3. France was not alone in fearing that an Iranian victory over Iraq would send a shock 
wave down the gulf. 
The New York Times, July 22, 1987 
 
4. An Iranian victory could spread Khomeini's fundamentalist revolution all along the 
Arab side of the gulf, toppling friendly, stable regimes as far as Saudi Arabia and 
placing more than half the world's oil reserves in potentially hostile hands. As a victor, 
Iraq would probably be the local bully, but an Iranian victory could upset the strategic 
balance in the Middle East. And it’s Iran, not Iraq, that is closer to winning. 
 
St. Petersburg Times (Florida), July 5, 1987 
 
5. The Americans have been worried that an Iranian victory could cause trouble for the 
Persian Gulf oil producers such as Saudi Arabia, which have supported Iraq. “A 
victory by a radical Iran would be a major setback for U.S. interests in the region,” Mr. 
Murphy said in Congressional testimony on Aug. 15. 
The New York Times, August 26, 1986 
 
5.2.2 The theme of Arabisation and Islamisation of the war  
 
One of the main recurring referential themes in the discourse on the Iraq-Iran war in the US 
press is the portrayal of the way the two adversaries constructed each other through the use of 
topoi of history to serve their own propaganda through propagating the names of early Islamic 
and Arabic events and figures, as well as other related terminologies. The line in Iraq is 
presented as being nationalistic and religious, playing upon the historic enmity between Arabs 
and Persians and dwelling unceasingly on the leadership of Saddam. By contrast, the theme in 
Iran is completely religious. The battle is portrayed as being for Islam and against an irreligious 
government. These ideological factors and the vitriolic propaganda were viewed in the US press 
as being used by each side against the other to achieve their war purposes. Figure 8 represents 
the main discourses on Arabisation an Islamisation which was derived from Saddam’s 
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collocates infidel, Yazid, holy and Qadisiyya and through a more in depth examination of their 
concordances lines.  
 
Figure 8 Discourses on Arabisation and Islamisation 
 
The US press also portrayed each side as demonising the other  and that the main legitimising 
force in the war for both sides has been drawing on Islam and de-legitimising of the other as 
non- believer. For Iran such claims were seen as a continuation of Khomeini’s successful 
revolution against the Shah and therefore, Saddam and his regime were referred to as ‘Infidel, 
the atheist Saddam Hussein. Furthermore, The New York Times, October 20, 1980, shows how 
the war of words in the two countries was taken to another level, moving to mosques in Tehran 
and Baghdad, where Muslim clergymen, broadcasted live and condemned Khomeini in 
Baghdad. The clergymen were quoted as calling Khomeini ‘an imposter who is seeking to lead 
the Moslem people of Iran astray’. At the same time, in the Iranian capital, the worshippers, 
quoted in the press, repeated after an ayatollah a prayer asking God to ‘strike down this infidel, 
Saddam Hussein, and send him to the burning fires of hell’. 
 
Thus, when the war broke out it had already been viewed and presented by Iran as not mere a 
self-defence of territorial or material things but rather as a spiritual conflict - as a war between 
Islam and blasphemy. This was articulated in the reporting of Khomeini’s speech:  
 
6. You are fighting to protect Islam and he is fighting to destroy Islam. At the moment, 
Islam is completely confronted by blasphemy, and you should protect and support 
Islam. You should resist. Defense is something which is obligatory to all. Every person 
should defend Islam according to his ability. They have attacked Islam and we have 
to defend Islam. There is absolutely no question of peace or compromise and we shall 
never have any discussions with them, because they are corrupt and perpetrators of 
corruption and we will not have any discussions with such people. Otherwise, so long 
as they have weapons in their hands, our weapon is faith, our armory 
The New York Times, October 1, 1980 
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According to this extract, Iran shows that Islam is represented by Iran. Thus, invading Iran is 
not just invading a geographical place: it is an attack on Islam, and since Saddam invaded Iran 
he is therefore an infidel and represents blasphemy. For Iran, the war is constructed as being 
between the good (Iranians) who have to ‘protect’, ‘support’ and ‘defend’ Islam against the evil 
(Saddam) who wants to ‘destroy’ Islam and has ‘attacked’ it. Also, the Iraqis are portrayed as 
being ‘corrupt and perpetrators of corruption’; therefore no ‘peace’, ‘compromise’ or 
‘discussions’ are to be had with them. 
 
For Saddam Hussein, it seemed more convincing to throw the same accusations of being un-
Islamic back at Iran than to prove his fidelity. Therefore, many references were made focusing 
on the ethnic strain between Arabs and Persians and evoking the glory of early Islam, 
symbolised by the Qadisiyya battle. Thus, the war was called ‘Saddam's Qadisiyya’, in 
reference to the battle in 636 A.D in which Arabs, under the flag of Islam and led by Sa’d bin 
Abi Waqqas, defeated the Sasanian Empire and conquered the Persians, led by Rostam b. 
Farrokh-Hormzod, the Iranian commander. From then on, according to Lewental (2014), 
Qadisiyya came “to represent a synecdoche for the conquest of Iran as a whole” (p. 892).  
7. the Iraqi leader personalized the struggle, calling it "Saddam's Qadissiya" after a 7th 
century Arab victory over the Persians at a battle near Baghdad.  
The New York Times, July 15, 1982 
The discourse of Islamism and Arabism was also exploited by Saddam and other Iraqis, and 
Iraq radio, through what Wodak and Reisigl (2001, p. 50) term as ‘ethnification’, ‘linguificatin’ 
and ‘religionisation’ i.e. Self- Othering strategy via Arabic language and the religion of Islam, 
disassociating Iran from both Islam and Arabism. The religionisation was done through 
Saddam’s denouncement of Khomeini’s regime as ‘a non-Islamic revolution’ stripping him 
from being Muslim. The ‘linguificatin’ and ‘ethnification’ strategy was represented in 
Saddam’s statement, quoted in The New York Times September 28, 1980 edition, that ‘the 
Koran was written in Arabic and God destined the Arabs to play a vanguard role in Islam’, 
where he emphasised Iraq’s pan-Arabism by showing that the Koran is written in Arabic rather 
than the Persian language, and rebuts  Khomeini’s pretensions to world Islamic leadership. It is 
worth mentioning that similar results were found by KhosraviNik and Sarkhoh (2017) study on 
the self- other representation of the perceived Arabic identity and a Persian one on social media 
which showed that both Arabic language and Islam were pivotal constituents of the Arab 
collective identity of legitimacy. On the Iran side, KhosraviNik and Zia (2014) showed how the 
Persian identity, nationalism and the anti- Arab discourse were employed in Iranian Facebook 
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discourse in relation to legitimising the name of Persian Gulf vs the claims of Arab use as Arab 
Gulf.  
 
In the same vein, Saddam referred to the Iranian in racial stereotypically names, according to 
The Washington Post, September 28, 1980, as "al ajem". ‘[a]l ajem’, which is according to 
Adib-Moghaddam (2007, p. 66) a term that is often used in a pejorative sense, and often used 
to describe non-Arab nationalities, in particular the Iranians, to mean ‘illiterate’, and which then 
acquires another connotation, in distinguishing ethnically and geographically the Iranians from 
Arabs, as well as giving Arabs superiority over the Iranians within the domain of Islam. 
 
Similarly, the US press shows that the war was referred to as ‘jihad’ or a ‘holy war’ by both 
countries to legitimise the self and to question the legitimacy of the other religious orientation. 
The press viewed Saddam as portraying himself as waging a holy war and thereby constructing 
himself as the true upholder of Islam and the defender of the Arab counties. This move was 
viewed as an attempt to rally the Iraqi people as well as the public opinion in the Arab countries 
around him. On the other hand, Khomeini viewed Saddam as a Sunni leader who ‘was not a 
true believer’ and thus Iran had launched the holy war into Iraq ‘to enforce Islamic law’ as seen 
in example 8 below. Table 16 shows the predicational strategies representing Saddam as 
utilising the discourse of Islamisation through the use of collocates holy war 
 
Predicational Strategies of holy war representing Saddam  
Holy war Legitimisation 
 - was intended to legitimize the conflict and to portray Iraq as the true defender of 
Islam, thus challenging the authority of Ayatollah Ruhollah 
 Populism 
 - to bolster public opinion at home and to cultivate new allies in the Arab world 
 Islamism  
 - by proclaiming the conflict a Moslem holy war, or jihad , to reimpose true Islan [sic] 
on the "herjectic" mullahs who rule Iran. 
 - against the Iranians because of their alleged transgression from what he has 
interpreted as the "true" word of Islam's founder, the Prophet Mohammed. 
 - Hussein proclaimed […] to restore true Islamic practice in the land of the 
revolutionary ayatollahs. 
 - to question the legitimacy of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who is a leader of the 
smaller Shiite faction of Islam 
 - to ''defend the ideals'' of the Prophet Mohammed.  
Table 16 the predicational strategies representing Saddam through the use of collocates holy war 
 
8. Iran’s chief justice said his country has launched a holy war into Iraq to enforce Islamic 
law and called on the Iraqis to “annihilate” the government of President Saddam 
Hussein, the Islamic Republic News Agency reported. “We are Moslems and we want 
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to enforce the decrees of the Koran,” Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili said in a sermon at 
Tehran University. 
The Washington Post July 24, 1982 
  
On the other hand, the US press has also showed how Iran also capitalised on the religion 
through drawing on Shiites history through the use of the story of Karbala16 which is believed 
to touch the heart of Iranian faith. A strategy used by Khomeini to mobilise and encourage his 
population to fight. Such stories “remained at the heart of the Shiites collective consciousness, 
to be reinvented for any number of immediate political ends” (cited in Mitchell, 2012, p. 56). 
This story is viewed by one scholar as the “[S]ymbol of [J]ustice [V]ersus [T]yranny in the 
ideological makeup of the devout Shi’i” (Ram, 1996, p. 70).  
 
9. Iranian Shiites who sacrifice themselves on the battlefield believe they are following 
in the footsteps of Hussein, grandson of the prophet Mohammed. It was at 
Karbala in A.D. 680 that Hussein, his infant son, and 72 companions were 
massacred by vastly superior forces supporting a rival claimant to the caliphate. 
Hussein’s legend helps instill a potent religious motivation among Iran's Revolutionary 
Guards that is not found in the secular Iraqi Army. The Revolutionary Guards believe 
they must right the injustices done to Hussein and his father Ali by “liberating” the holy 
Shiite cities in Iraq and overthrowing the “godless” regime of President Saddam 
Hussein. Iranian attacks on Iraq in September and October were codenamed Karbala 
I, II and III. Iranian tanks are daubed with the slogan “to Karbala”.  
The Washington Post, October 29, 1986 
The Karbala paradigm has become a living reality which happened once in the dawn of Islam 
and continued in the consciousness of Shiites to influence their destinies: “it is not symbolic 
but rather a direct expression of reality” (Ram, 1996, p. 70). As an Iranian scholar puts it: “What 
happened to Hussein thirteen centuries ago is repeated today whenever and wherever Shiites 
live and find themselves oppressed” (Chelkowski, 1989). There is also a well-known saying 
among the Shiites that “every place is Karbala and every day is Ashura” (Campo, 2009, p. 423). 
This is why some of the battles were codenamed Karbala I, II and III. Therefore, the Karbala 
paradigm is pictured as a struggle between the injured self and the oppressive other, a fight 
between oppressed Hussein who is on the God side and, a tyrannical Yazid who is on the dark 
side. 
                                                 
16 The place where the third Imam, Hussein bin Ali, and his followers were martyred during an uneven battle that 
took place on the tenth day of Muharram (the Muslim month) in 680 AD. The Imam’s suffering at the hands of 
the Ummayad caliph Yazid ibn Mu’awiya had come to be a symbol of injustice that was committed against the 
grandson of the prophet Mohammed (PBUH ) (Ram, 1996, p. 69) (See also 0) . 
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In continuation with the religious construction, the US press also highlighted another way of 
Iran portraying Saddam through likening him with one of the most hated figures in the Shiites 
history, Yazid  as shown in Table 17, who is regarded by Shiite Muslims as the leader of the 
false Caliphate that slew Imam Hussein, the rightful successor to the Prophet, in the desert at 
Karbala. Khomeini’s Saddam-Yazid metaphor is an attempt to represent Saddam negatively 
through making an association by guild with Yazid who is already well known in the mind of 
Shiites.  
 
Table 17 Saddam- Yazid concordances 
 
5.2.3 The theme of Saddam’s Pan-Arabism/ Nationalism 
It has been shown in the above section of this chapter how the war was portrayed as being 
religious by both sides of the conflict. According to the press, Saddam had also always appeared 
determined to become ‘a military voice’ and power in the region. This was realised through 
Saddam’s collocates as ambition/s, leader, leadership as shown in the following concordances 
Table 18. 
Although Saddam Hussein has yet to achieve the 
sort of clear-cut battlefield victory in Iran he 
sought to enhance his  
ambitions  to make Iraq a major Arab military force, 
the border war between Iraq and Iran appears to 
have as much to do with President Saddam 
Hussein's. 
ambitions  to be the leader of the Arab world as it does 
with the few miles of disputed territory 
Its 280,000-man military force - the principal 
base of President Saddam Hussein's  
ambitions  for regional leadership - is the largest in the 
Persian Gulf. 
another major factor is Saddam Hussein's own  ambitions  to establish his nation of 12.5 million people 
as the major power in the Persian Gulf region 
-- once dominated by the late shah of Iran 
Table 18 Saddam's ambition 
Similarly, Saddam was viewed by the US press as having ambitions for regional leadership or 
Pan-Arabism. This was done through references to the pan-Arab Gamal Abdel Nasser, the 
Egyptian president, showing Saddam as being ‘a longtime admirer’ of Gamal, or to the fact that 
Saddam ‘has long coveted’ his (Nasser’s) role and through claims that he ‘dreams of being the 
successor of Nasser’ and ‘regards himself as the new Nasser’. 
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10. Behind that goal, however, lay the naked ambition of Saddam, as the 42-year-old ex-
gunman and lawyer is popularly known. He is determined to wrench the pendulum 
of Arab political power away from Cairo toward Baghdad by offering a modern 
version of Gamal Abdel Nasser's pan-Arab crusade. 
The Washington Post, September 28, 1980 
Furthermore, for Saddam to become a pan- Arab was a move that was constructed to be at the 
expense of the Egyptian leader, Anwar Sadat, when the Arab countries decided to isolate Egypt 
over Sadat’s peace agreement with Israel at Camp David in 197817, which shocked all the Arab 
world and caused strains in the inter- Arab countries relationship as Israel is seen by Arab 
countries as an occupier of an Arab country Palestine. Therefore, any settlement with Israel was 
seen to be at the cost of Palestine.   The press showed that his accord boosted Saddam and gave 
him a more influential role in inter-Arab politics and in calling for an Arab summit in Baghdad 
as well as he was portrayed to be utilising the anti- Israel discourse to achieve his ambition as  
regional power 
11. After the 1978 Camp David peace agreement he called Arab League leaders to Baghdad 
to condemn the accords, and thereby to underscore Iraq’s ideological purity in the 
“rejectionist” front opposing ending the Arab-Israeli conflict short of Israel’s virtual 
capitulation.  
The New York Times, September 28, 1980 
12. The attack has brought reality to Saddam’s attempt to project Iraq as the Arab world’s 
dominant military power now that Egypt has taken itself out of the war with Israel by 
signing the Camp David accords.  
 
The Washington Post, September 28, 1980 
 
Furthermore, the US press viewed Saddam as ambitious to be military voice in the Gulf through 
appearing to be calling for a solution to Arab issues as well as getting close to the Arab countries 
to create alliances and demanding that Iran return the three islands to UAE, Abu Musa and the 
Greater and Lesser Tumbs, claimed by Iran in 1971 under the Shah’s rule 
13. He helped to end the conflict between the two Yemens. He took charge of Arab 
preparations for last fall’s Havana conference of countries that call themselves 
nonaligned and was chosen to succeed Fidel Castro as head of the movement when it 
meets in Baghdad in 1982.  
The New York Times, September 28 
14. In addition, Iraqi diplomats have been telling various foreign governments that the 
return of the islands -- Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs -- are among three 
key conditions for the end to the fighting. The other two were reported as Iranian 
recognition of Iraqi sovereignty over the vital Shatt-al-Arab waterway and over other 
disputed border areas. 
                                                 
17 Camp David accords are the agreements brokered by the US president Jimmy Carter that were signed by the 
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin held on September 17, 1978 
(Quandt, 1986). According to Telhami (1992) this accord ended the hostility between the two countries that lasted 
for three decades who have fought four wars and established the peace foundation between the two countries.  
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The Washington Post, September 25, 1980 
Saddam’s ambition was also portrayed through showing Saddam’s alleged determination to 
become the Shah’s successor as the strongman in the Gulf. This was done through the use of 
phrases like ‘to succeed the late Shah’, to play the ‘Persian Gulf policeman’, ‘to be the Shah’s 
successor as policeman of the Persian Gulf’  
15. He also seems determined to succeed the late Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi as the 
region’s strongman. The Shah, with plentiful oil and United States backing, forced 
Iraq into a secondary role. 
The New York Times, September 28, 1980 
 
16. …another major factor is Saddam Hussein’s own ambitions to establish his nation of 
12.5 million people as the major power in the Persian Gulf region -- once dominated 
by the late shah of Iran -- as well as to project himself as the leader of the Arab world 
as a whole. 
The Washington Post, October 7, 1980 
 
5.2.4 Saddam’s personality cult theme 
Personality cult is defined, according to Pao-min Chang (cited in Pisch, 2017, p. 63), as an 
elevation of a person’s status artificially through building, circulating and propagating his 
godlike image. On the other hand, from the point of view of religion, personality cult is viewed, 
according to Ǻrpad von Klimó (cited in Pisch, 2017, p. 63) as  “a sum of symbolic actions and 
texts which express and ritualised the particular meanings ascribed to a particular person in 
order to incorporate an imagined community”. In the same vein, a more widely acknowledged 
definition of personality cult put by Heller and Plamper (2004, pp. 22-23) as the excessive 
glorification in a godlike manner of a political figure through the use of media. The common 
characteristics among these definitions is the manufactured image of a particular person through 
elevation, glorification, and rituals. Figure 9 shows the main discourse representing the 
personality cults. These discourses were highlighted through Saddam’s collocates cult, pictures, 
posters, portrait, portraits along with their concordances which explicated and highlighted 
more related discourses.  
 
Figure 9 Discourses on Saddam's personal cult 
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The elevation and the creation of god-like image of Saddam was portrayed in the US press as 
incorporating the pre- Islamic ancient Mesopotamian history in creating and building his 
personality cult. Therefore, he was seen as aspiring to be viewed as Nebuchadnezzar through 
drawing comparisons between the ancient Mesopotamian leader and himself.  This was realised 
through huge posters and banners that, according to The New York Times, February 4, 1988,  
“shows King Nebuchadnezzar offering tribute to Mr. Hussein and promising to fight on his 
side”.  
Another notable argument used by the US press to construct Saddam’s personality cult is 
through what Wodak and Reisigl (2001) name as ‘religionisation’ or ‘religionyms’ which were 
realised through the predication linguistic means of portraying Saddam playing on the historical 
and religion enmity and figures, as mentioned earlier,  as well as through identifying himself 
with the war through naming it with his personal name as seen in the Table 19.  
Predicational strategies of Saddam in relation to Saddam’s Qadisiyah 
 - depicted the war as his personal Qadisiyah, 
 - the war is Hussein's own personal crusade 
 - has made the war his greatest claim to Iraqi, and Arab, fame and leadership, so much 
so that it has been officially dubbed "Saddam's Qadisiyah," a reference to the 
decisive 
 - the new war is called "Saddam's Qadissiya" to suggest that President Saddam Hussein 
is headed for an equally epochal victory over Iraq's enemies in what is today the 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
 - the Iraqi leader personalized the struggle, calling it "Saddam's Qadissiya" after a 7th 
century Arab victory over the Persians at a battle near Baghdad.  
Table 19 Predicational strategies of Saddam in relation to Saddam’s Qadisiyah 
 
Saddam’s personality cult is also represented in the US press through the collocates pictures, 
portraits and posters. The predicational strategies of these collocates were constructed 
negatively (see Table 20) through the use of body meronyms referring to Saddam’s specific 
body fragmentation as ‘mustache and toothy grin’, the use of spatialisatin as in ‘everywhere’ 
or ‘inescapable’, ‘his portrait on everything’, ‘scarcely possible […] without encountering a 
photograph’ in a reference that such pictures/ posters are unavoidable. The negative 
representation has even included telling jokes as illustrated in the following table: 
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Predicational Strategies representing Saddam personal cult through pictures/ portraits   
 - poses are plastered everywhere 
 - President's penchant for plastering his portrait on everything has become a joke: Question: 
''What's the population of Iraq?'' Answer: ''Twenty- eight million. Fourteen million Iraqis 
and 14 million pictures of Saddam.'' 
 - His mustache and toothy grin are inescapable 
 - Yet no aspect of Iraqi life is too insignificant for his attention 
 - It is scarcely possible to walk the streets here for more than 20 feet without encountering 
a photograph or larger-than-life poster of Saddam 
 - His photos are everywhere, showing him kissing babies, checking on public services. 
 - his visage adorns nearly every vertical surface in a variety of guises 
 - There is no escape from Mr. Hussein's picture, which adorns construction fences, offices, 
hotel lobbies, immigration booths at the airport, gas stations, buses and shop windows. 
Twelve-foot-high cutouts stand before some ministries. 
Table 20  Predicational Strategies representing Saddam personal cult through pictures/ portraits   
 
Saddam’s personality cult were seen also through the government-controlled television station 
and in the press, where ‘No word of criticism’ was allowed, or their not allowing ‘any rivals to 
emerge’:  
17. At least half of every evening news show is taken up with film of Saddam Hussein--
greeting gold donors, grimly surveying battle sites or receiving foreign visitors. 
The Washington Post, August 2, 1983 
18. His other protection is that by skillfully using the media, he has projected an 
overwhelming image of himself and not allowed any rivals to emerge.  
The Washington Post August 2, 1983 
19. No word of criticism of the “leader President,” as Mr. Hussein is often called, creeps 
into the state-controlled press […] Mr. Hussein’s image dominates television, greeting 
visitors, talking with children and exhorting troops, and vocal groups appear most 
evenings to sing rhythmic ditties praising his prowess.  
The New York Times, November 23, 1983 
Saddam’s personality cult was also shown in the US press as being practiced through a series 
of coercive procedures followed by his party or other security circles who arrested anyone who 
spoke critically of Saddam. Also, people were encouraged to join the party to show their loyalty, 
and if they did, they obtained privileges. 
 
20. The president's principal source of power is the Mukhabarat or secret police, which is 
led by his half-brother, Barzan Tikriti. The police have an extensive network of 
informers, and private citizens who have spoken critically of the government have been 
arrested at night and disappeared, according to responsible sources living here. 
The Washington Post November 23, 1982, Tuesday 
 
Furthermore, as part of his personality cult Saddam was seen in a variety of apparel: he 
sometimes appeared dressed in the Bedouin costumes, Kurdish clothing, the traditional clothes 
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of the Iraqi peasant, ‘wearing an Arab headdress or smoking a cigar’, ‘in the formal regalia of 
a field marshal’, or wearing ‘a red-checkered turban’. He was also constructed to portray 
himself as a religious man through praying ‘a Shiite mosque’. This variation is seen as 
deliberately balanced, aimed at mobilising a strong consensus among the disparate elements of 
Iraq’s social structure. 
 
What is more, Saddam’s personality cult was compared to the North Korean Kim Il Sung and 
to Stalin’s one and his rival Khomeini.  
 
Predicational Strategies of  Saddam’s personality cult 
 - President Hussein, whose personality cult is second only to that of North Korea's Kim 
Il Sung. 
 - President Hussein, whose personality cult rivals Stalin's 
 - built around himself a personality cult that approaches the one surrounding his mortal 
enemy, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian leader. 
 - Posters showing him in uniform, holding a baby, smoking a cigar, grave in a business 
suit are everywhere. This is a cult of personality Stalin might have envied 
Table 21 Predicational Strategies of Saddam's personality cult 
 
5.2.5 The theme of Zionism and imperialism collusion 
Both countries are viewed in the US press to use anti- Semitism words accusing each other of 
their cooperation with Zionists or acting as a tool in the hand of Zionists or America. The US 
press showed how the Iranian officials viewed Saddam as being incited by the superpowers. 
This is perceived through phrases such as ‘the Zionist American stooge, Saddam Hussein’, ‘the 
puppet and mercenary Iraqi Government’, ‘an American puppet’, ‘puppet Baathist regime of 
the infidel Saddam’, ‘a puppet Satan of the great Satan’ and ‘puppet of the Great Satan’. 
Through the use of these phrases, the press shows how Iran employed this discourse to mobilise 
the Iranian people through portraying Saddam and the USA/ Zionism as being in the same front 
that wants to attack Islam. The religious discourse was also employed as a way of mobilising 
the Iraqi Shiites to revolt and overthrow Saddam.  
21. we shall continue the fight against the world criminals, led by America, as firmly as 
possible. When the puppet Baathist regime of the infidel Saddam has, at the 
incitement of the superpowers, imposed an aggressive war on the Moslem nation of 
Iran, we regard it our duty to go to the assistance of the proud fighters and valiant 
youth and actively participate in the field to teach a lesson to all America's puppets. 
The New York Times, November 4, 1980 
 
22. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who has variously described President Hussein as “an 
atheist” and “a puppet satan of the great satan,” meaning the United States, has 
been calling on the Shiite majority in Iraq to rise up and overthrow their leader. 
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The New York Times, November 20, 1980 
 
On the metaphorical use of ‘great Satan’ in example 22, Dabashi (2015) explains “[t]here is 
scarcely a phrase more pointed and piercing than “the Great Satan” when Iranian authorities - 
beginning with the late Ayatollah Khomeini and now Ayatollah Khamenei - use it as a code-
name for the United States”. He adds that this is first used by Khomeini after the Iranian 
Revolution (1977-1979) and since then it has become a “cornerstone of the ruling ideology” in 
Iran which was later reiterated on many occasions. “As an absolute metaphor of the enemy, 
‘The Great Satan’ is embedded in the Islamic Republic”. According to Dabashi, this metaphor 
is explained by Khomeini as being a way of showing that Iblis is the chief of all other Satans in 
the entire world and that what Iblis does is seduce people and ‘beguile’ them. The US not only 
seduces but also murders people. This metaphor, according to Dabashi (2015), since it was first 
employed by Khomeini, “has had a domestic function: to denounce and repress the forceful 
temptation of seductions “within” the Islamic Republic - forces that want and plot to open up 
to the US […]”.  
 
By the same token, the press showed how Iran viewed Saddam was viewed by Iran as doing an 
‘imperialist service’ to the Americans; backing Iraq was also seen as part of an international 
conspiracy against the revolutionary Islamic government. In addition, the US support of Iraq 
was viewed by Iranian officials as ‘an effort to force the hostages' release’, ‘an effort to force 
the captive Americans' release’, ‘to gain the hostages' release.’18 
 
23. He reiterated oft-expressed Iranian charges that the “superpowers” were backing Iraq 
in an attempt to overthrow Iran’s Islamic Government. Mr. Bani-Sadr 
The New York Times, January 10, 1981 
 
5.3 The theme of Iraq’s Shiites 
In an earlier section, it was shown that the war was attributed partially to religious causes. This 
was partly in reference to the Iraqi Shiites when they were called by Iran to revolt. As shown 
in Figure 10, the total number of references to the Iraqi Shiites/Shiites of Iraq is relatively small; 
therefore, all concordance lines were investigated, rather than just the collocates, in order to 
discover the main topic and the themes  and how they were talked about.  
                                                 
18 The Iranian hostage crisis broke out in 1979 when some Iranian students attacked the American embassy in 
Tehran, taking 60 embassy staff hostage with the support of the revolutionary government. The hostages were 
released in 1981 (Hodge and Nolan, 2007, p. 363). 
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Figure 10 The frequency of Iraqi Shiites in the Iraq-Iran War 
 
In predicational terms, Iraq’s Shiites were constructed in the US press in terms of their 
prosperity and of their political representation in the Iraqi government in comparison to the 
Sunnis. This comparison was usually accompanied by numbers/percentages showing the ratio 
of Shiites to Sunnis among the population, in order to demonstrate how Shiites are 
underrepresented in the government: for instance, concerning the fact that although Shiites 
make up the ‘majority’ or ‘60 percent’ of the population, they are ‘impoverished’, ‘less 
influential’, identified with ‘the plight of the poor and the oppressed’, ‘hold little power’, ‘have 
long resented being ruled by Sunni’, and have ‘little representation’. On the contrary, Sunnis 
are depicted as being ‘more prosperous and politically powerful’, or as ‘leading members’ of 
society. Shiites are generally viewed as a disadvantaged group in contrast to the Sunni Muslims 
as shown in Table 22. 
 
Discursive 
Strategy 
Categories 
 Underrepresented 
 - While Shiites are over half of Iraq's population, they have traditionally been 
powerless. 
 - The country's Shiite Moslem majority, ruled by an elite of minority Sunni 
heritage and secular ideology, offers equal ambiguities. 
 - Between 55 and 60 percent of its population is Shiite, yet the rulers are of the 
Sunni minority. The Shiite majority has long resented the economic, 
political and social domination of the Sunnis. 
 - The Shiites are by no means barred from top positions in government, and 
Saddam Hussein--perhaps anticipating the Iranian invasion and a possible 
threat 
 - Although half of Iraq's population is Shiite Moslem, President Hussein and top 
leaders in his regime are Sunni Moslems. 
Table 22 The marganalisation of Shiites 
 
Furthermore, the predication of Iraq’s Shiites shows that Iran had targeted them as a potential 
group that could be mobilised to overthrow Saddam. At war, or even before war broke out, both 
countries were pouring a steady stream of speeches at their people – and across each other’s 
borders - over the state-run radio and television stations, aiming to mobilise them. Since Iraq’s 
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Shiites constitute the majority of the population in Iraq, Khomeini was counting heavily on an 
eventual uprising in the predominantly Shiite areas of southern Iraq to bring down Saddam.  
 
Discursive 
Strategy 
Categories 
 Target of calls 
 - Iran's official radio, meanwhile, broadcast the appeal by Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, apparently aimed at fellow Shiite Moslems in Sunni-
dominated 
 - Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has repeatedly threatened to "export" his 
Shiite Islamic revolution into neighboring Iraq, where the government is led 
by Sunni Moslems. 
 - Ayatollah Khomeini began calling on the Shiites in Iraq,  
 - Iraq, with a Shiite majority controlled by President Saddam Hussein's 
secular Baathist regime, has been a prime target for the export of 
Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution. 
 - At the start of the invasion, Tehran radio broadcast an appeal by Khomeini 
in Arabic to Iraq's Shiites to join the Iranian forces and overthrow 
Saddam Hussein's secular Baathist government. 
Table 23 Appeals to the Iraqi Shiites 
 
However, the Shiites were constructed as being ‘unmoved’, or it was argued that they showed 
‘no signs of unrest’, and this behaviour was attributed to reasons such as they were ‘more 
motivated by Iraqi and Arab nationalism’, or felt ‘more Arab and Iraqi than Shiite, more a part 
of Iraq than Iran’ as seen in the following table:  
 
Discursive 
Strategy 
Objective Categories 
  Shiites alignment  
  - While the Iraqi Shiites consider themselves Arabs and do not identify with the 
Iranians, 
  - . Many Iraqi Shiites seem repelled by the excesses of Khomeini's Islamic rule 
and have responded to the war more as Arab nationalists than as the Iranians' 
fellow believers. 
  - "I think the Iraqi Shiites feel more Arab and Iraqi than Shiite, more a part of 
Iraq than Iran," said an Asian diplomat 
  - So far, however, the Shiites have shown no signs of unrest, U.S. officials say. 
These officials and other specialists say that Iraq's Shiites are motivated by 
Iraqi and Arab nationalism as much as by sentiments of Shiite solidarity. 
Persian Iran is a historic enemy of the Arabs 
  - While the Iraqi Shiites consider themselves Arabs and do not identify with the 
Iranians, 
  - They say they are fighting Iran to head off what they said is Ayatollah 
Khomeini's effort to export his fundamentalist Shiite revolution to Iraq and 
neighboring Arab nations, which have Sunni majorities 
Table 24 Shiites national and religious alignment 
 
In contrast to this, the predications of the Shiites in the US press also suggest that the Shiite 
silence might be ‘due to a government crackdown’.  
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5.4 The theme of Iraqi People 
In a similar way to the Iraqi Shiites, the Iraqi people were constructed as a key player in the war 
from the Iraqi side as well as the Iranian side, as the two countries were racing their discourse 
toward the Iraqi people. On Saddam’s side, Saddam used national, historical and religious 
discourse to urge them to continue fighting against Iran. On Iran’s side, the discourse was a 
religious one. 
Figure 11 shows the frequency of the ‘people of Iraq’ and ‘Iraqi people’ in the eight-year war 
corpus. Owing to the low frequency of query words, the concordance lines were examined for 
main topics and themes, as shown below.  
 
 
Figure 11 The frequency of Iraqi people in the Iraq-Iran War 
 
The Iraqi people were constantly being encouraged through Iran radio broadcasts to rise up and 
oust Saddam.  
24. Ayatollah Khomeini urged the Iraqi people to “rise up” against the “blasphemous 
regime” of President Hussein. Additional Iranian radio broadcasts said hundreds of 
Iraqi soldiers had surrendered.                                                           
  The New York Times, July 15, 1982 
 
On the other hand, The New York Times quoted some of Saddam’s speech on the day of Prophet 
Mohammed’s migration (Hijrat) from Mecca to Medina to show how he linked Khomeini with 
his pre-Islamic 7th century Persian ancestors who resisted the proselytising Arabs. Saddam 
viewed the struggle in the good and evil dichotomy: the good (Iraqis) who fight for their 
‘freedom’, ‘humanity’ and ‘justice and peace’ on the behalf of the earth against the evil (Iran) 
that represents ‘treachery and injustice’. Furthermore, the press shows how Saddam pictured 
the struggle as being historical, not new, and that it goes in time to the prophet claiming that it 
is inherited. In addition, ‘we [Iraqis] are the legal heirs of our great forefathers who migrated 
with their great prophet to defend the ideals of the message of Islam’, and therefore, the Iraqi 
people as well as the Iraqi forces are fighting ‘against a clique linked by inheritance, thoughts 
and activity to the Persian Empire that was destroyed by Islam’. 
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5.5 The theme of Halabja 
One of the main and frequently used patterns with which Iraq is collocated is that of the Iranian 
accusation that Iraq used chemical weapons in Halabja. This theme is pictured through the use 
of collocates such as accuse, accusations, assert, charges, said, say, claims and reported.  In 
contrast to the accusations, Iraq’s response to the accusations of Iranian and US officials varied 
from not commenting, denial and admitting it, to justifying the chemical attack.   
25. Iraq said last week that its forces had long ago abandoned Halabja and did not 
consider the area important. 
26. Iraq has denied all previous charges that it has used chemical weapons. 
The New York Times March 24, 1988, Thursday 
27.  Baghdad has offered no formal comment on the latest accusation. 
The New York Times March 24, 1988, Thursday 
28. Iraq admitted publicly for the first time today that it has used chemical weapons 
against Iran in the Persian Gulf war, but it claimed that Iran used them first. 
The Washington Post. July 2, 1988, Saturday  
29. Iraqi officials no longer deny using such weapons  
The Washington Post, March 24, 1988, Thursday 
30. Tariq Aziz, said Iraq would not hesitate to use every weapon in its arsenal to combat 
Iranian invasions. 
The New York Times April 2, 1988, Saturday 
In the following instances, the US press does not express its stance towards Iraq’s use of 
chemical weapons in Halabja and its role is limited to reporting, however, illustrating and listing 
sources and details that back up and support the story of Iraq’s use of the weapons helps to give 
more weight to the Iranian version and the claims regarding the story. Therefore, reporting 
Iran’s invitations to the UN to investigate the situation, taking Western correspondents to 
Halabja to see the casualties, sending casualties to European and American hospitals to prove 
the charges, as well as citing Iraqi prisoners’ and survivors’ testimonies give credibility to Iran 
and confirm Iraq’s use of such weapons.   
 
31. Meanwhile, Iranian War Ministry officials presented 28 Iraqi Army officers in a 
separate news conference, including two officers who said they had witnessed Iraqi 
warplanes drop chemical bombs on Halabja on March 16. Brig. Gen.  
The Washington Post March 25, 1988, Friday 
 
32. Western correspondents taken to Halabja by the Iranians last week reported seeing 
hundreds of dead civilians unmarked by wounds.  
The Washington Post March 30, 1988, Wednesday 
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33. according to Iranian officials, a half-dozen Kurdish victims of Iraqi chemical attacks, 
to land at John F. Kennedy International Airport. The victims were to be taken to St. 
John's Episcopal Hospital in Queens, according to an adviser at the U.S. mission for 
Iranian affairs.]  
The Washington Post March 30, 1988, Wednesday 
 
34. Halabja survivors said in interviews that they were certain the gas attack was 
launched from an Iraqi warplane  
The Washington Post March 24, 1988, Thursday 
 
In addition, Iraq’s use of chemical weapons is explained in terms of Iraq defending itself against 
Iranian offensives when capturing Iraqi cities or strategic locations in Iraq. This pattern is 
constructed using phrases such as ‘to prevent a further advance’, ‘an effort to halt the Iranian 
advance’, ‘to blunt Iranian assaults on Arab lands’ and ‘to repel a thrust along the southern front 
by Iranian forces’.   
 
35. The motives behind Iraq's action seem to have been to prevent a further advance on 
an important hydroelectric plant near Iraq’s major oil fields and to issue a blunt 
warning to Iraq’s 3.5 million Kurds of what they might expect if they joined forces 
with Iran. 
The New York Times, April 10, 1988 
 
36. Iraqi officials no longer deny using such weapons and argue privately that they are 
used to blunt Iranian assaults on Arab lands. In 1984, Iraq used mustard gas 
extensively to repel a thrust along the southern front by Iranian forces who 
threatened to cut a strategic road between Baghdad and the southern port city of Basra 
The Washington Post, March 24, 1988 
 
37. Evidence is plentiful that the Iraqi Army was here in strength. The gas attack came 
during a large military offensive by Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Kurdish 
guerrillas, who have penetrated 30 miles into Iraq and are now dug in along the shore 
of Lake Darbandi Khan, where a dam serves as a major hydroelectric power source for 
northeastern Iraq 
The Washington Post, March 24, 1988 
 
Another prominent pattern by which Iraq’s use of chemical weapons was reported and viewed 
is that of the stances of the US and the UN toward such use. Therefore, the event is ‘denounced’, 
‘decried’ and ‘condemned’ by the US, and is reported as appearing ‘to be a particularly grave 
violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol against Chemical Warfare’.  
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38. The Reagan administration yesterday condemned as a “particularly grave violation” 
of international law the recent Iraqi use of chemical weapons that reportedly killed 
hundreds of civilians and soldiers in northern Iraq last week 
The Washington Post, March 24, 1988 
 
39. The United Nations has accused Iraq of using chemical weapons in the past, and Mr. 
Kerr said the recent course of the Iran-Iraq war suggested that toxic gas had been 
used in the land conflict with Iran when it seemed that Teheran's forces were on the 
point of major successes.  
The New York Times, March 24, 1988 
 
40. The administration has sought to head off their use by applying diplomatic pressure 
to the Iraqi government in private and supporting three U.N. resolutions of censure.  
The Washington Post, March 24, 1988 
 
41. State Department spokesman Charles E. Redman said the reported gas attack by Iraq 
against its Iranian-occupied city of Halabja “appears to be a particularly grave 
violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol Against Chemical Warfare”.  
The Washington Post, March 24, 1988 
 
Having looked at examples 38- 41,  it is clear that although the US press reported its government 
stance on the use of chemical weapons (CWs) against the Kurds in Halabja and against the 
Iranian forces, neither the US press nor the government adopted a strong stance or negative 
references, predications or other argumentative strategies to demonise/criminalise Iraq in 
general, or Saddam in particular, to stop such uses of CW. However, the use of CWs was drawn 
on heavily and capitalised both in terms of frequency and negativity/demonisation in later wars 
with Iraq, such as the 2003 US-led invasion, by the US press and the US officials who argued 
for an intervention to disarm Saddam of the WMDs (see Chapter 7). CWs or WMDs were one 
of the main pretexts for the invasion of Iraq along with Saddam’s human rights violations.  
 
 
5.6 The theme of Chemical Weapons (CWs) 
One of the important themes that is always referred back to in the later Iraq’s wars and conflicts 
is Iraq’s use and possession of CWs in the Iraq-Iran war. Thus, to see how the CWs are talked 
about in this period, the frequency of the phrase ‘chemical weapons’ was calculated in each 
year of the conflict as shown in Figure 12 which shows that the first appearance of the phrase 
was in 1983 and its usage then increased in number dramatically in 1984 and then the reporting 
of CWs continues till 1988 when CWs were actually used in Halabja.  
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Figure 12 The Frequency of Chemical Weapons in the Iraq-Iran war 
However, the frequency calculates all the mentions of CWs in the US press whether they are 
related to Iraq or other countries as seen in Table 25 which shows the main topics in relation to 
CWs. Since I am interested in Iraq’s use of CWs only the concordances lines of Iraq, Iraq’s, 
Iraqis, Iraq’s where they are collocates to CWs are investigated.  
Year Main topic 
1983 Soviet Union used CW against Laotians and Cambodians 
1984 Accusing Iraq of using CWs, US seek a worldwide ban on CW, Regan’s proposal for an 
international CW treaty on CWs ban, control of the export to Iran and Iraq of certain 
compounds that could be used I the manufacture of CWs, Iranian threaten to manufacture CWs 
if Iraq repeat used CWs again, Iraq deny the accusation, US condemnation of Iraq’s us of CWs, 
conversation with Iraq to dissuade Iraq from using CWs, Iraq used CWs in Majnoon Island 
against Iran 
1985 Iraq used CWs, US provided evidence that Iraq used CWs, US condemned Iraq use, US concern 
of the spread of CWs in the  world nations, Middle Eastern countries as well as countries are 
believed to possess CWs or trying to acquire it as Syria, Egypt, Libya, Thailand, Burma, China, 
Taiwan, North Korea, Vietnam, Iran seeks to develop CWs, Egypt received Soviet chemical 
weapon training. 
1986 Syria and CWs development, US efforts and talks to ban CWs, Middle East countries develop 
CWs, US controls on eight compunds used to manfacture CWs to Syria, the concern of the 
spread of CWs, Iraq accuse Iran of using CWs against its soldiers.  
1987 Iraq use of chemical weapons, US efforts to ban CWs, fear of spread 
1988 Halabja gassing, seeking a worldwide ban on CWs 
Table 25 Main topic on CWs in the US press 
Having examined the concordances lines of Iraq, Iraqis, Iraq’s, they showed that in general, the 
US press’s reporting of chemical weapons is characterised by citing different and competing 
opinions of accusation, denial and confirmation by officials/institutions of third party states, as 
well as by those who were involved in the conflict. However, the press’s stance can also be 
seen in its weighting of one story over another through citing the comments of professionals in 
one story to validate a certain version of events or give it more credence. Although the media 
do not explicitly state whether Iraq used CW in some instances, there are, however, many 
indications that suggest so. The Iranian charges of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons were given 
credence in the US press by showing Iran’s insistence on flying the casualties to hospitals in 
different parts of Europe for medical treatment and by doctors who had been treating some of 
the stricken Iranian soldiers and who confirmed that they had been subjected to gas.  
42. Thirty-three Iranian soldiers were treated in Western Europe yesterday for lung 
ailments and severe skin burns apparently caused by chemical weapons used by Iraq 
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in last week’s fierce battles on the marshlands of the Persian Gulf war’s southern 
battlefront. Medical specialists in West Germany told Reuter that the Iranian soldiers 
appeared to be victims of mustard gas, which was used widely in World War I and has 
been banned by the Geneva Conventions on warfare. Iran’s ambassador to Austria, 
Mohammed Kiriarishi, told news agencies in Vienna that the injuries were caused by 
rockets fired by Iraqi planes in air raids east of the Tigris River last Friday.  
The Washington Post, March 23, 1985 
 
Looking at the above example, the word ‘apparently’, according to Collins dictionary, is used 
“to refer to something that seems to be true, although you are not sure whether it is or not”, 
which gives more weight to the Iranian story’s version of the event. This is further backed by 
the medical specialists’ confirmation of the use of CW and the Iranian ambassador’s description 
of how the incident happened and who was behind it. This forms a complete story indicating 
one doer, which is Iraq, with the Iraqi voice missing. In this regard, Johnson-Cartee (2004, p. 
162) states that  “in their efforts to define the situation, select a news frame, and then build upon 
that news frame, reporters seek evidence whether in the form of expert testimony, written 
reports, public records, or eye witness accounts, that affirms their approach to the story”. In 
addition, framing the news involves a process of selection and giving salience to aspects that 
define the problem, as well as promoting a particular interpretation of events (Entman, 1993, p. 
52).  
Furthermore, the US press’s stance is also realised through the construction of the Iraqi response 
to Iraq’s CWs attacks as seen in the following Table 26. Implicitly, the term “deny”, for 
instance, means, according to the online Cambridge Dictionary, “to refuse to admit that you 
have any connection with something or someone” which appears to imply that the claim of the 
use of CWs is in fact true giving by that a credence to Iranian story. The act of denial was also 
constructed to be done “repeatedly” questioning Iraq’s credibility. Similarly, the US press 
shows Iraq’s incredibility in relation to the use of CWs through directing the reader to draw 
inference that Iraq used the CWs without saying it explicitly as in: ‘Iraq neither confirms nor 
denies’ and Iraq ‘frequently rejected the accusations without denying them’ in which the phrase 
rejected could be neutral whereas adding ‘without denying them’ is an indirect way of saying 
that Iraq used these weapons. Similar words are ‘avoid’ and ‘did not contradict the claim’ all 
infer that Iraq used such weapons.  
  Iraqi responses 
 1984 Iraq has repeatedly denied using chemical weapons in the war, 
 1984 Iraqi leaders, from President Saddam Hussein down, have frequently rejected the 
accusations without denying them 
 1984 Iraqi officials have generally avoided direct denials of the allegations concerning the 
use of chemical weapons. 
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 1984 the Iraqi defense minister did not contradict the claim but turned the charge around, 
accusing the United States of hypocrisy because it employed napalm and 
 1984 Iraq's Defense Minister denounced the United States today for charging that Iraqi forces 
had used ''lethal chemical weapons'' 
  Iraq has denied that it is using chemical weapons and offered to cooperate in any 
investigation 
  Iraq no longer denies using chemical weapons, and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, who 
is in New York this week, has twice this year acknowledged Iraq's policy of employing 
them. 
  Iraq neither confirms nor denies using chemical weapons, and it defends the relocation 
of Kurds, claiming it is necessary to protect civilians from military activities near the 
border 
Table 26 Iraq's responses to CWs attacks 
The conviction that Iraq was using chemical weapons is also constructed through the citation 
of reports and other sources accusing or confirming Iraq’s use of such weapons through verbs 
like confirmed, used or resorted, which are sometimes accompanied by phrases that reveal their 
certainty about the statements: for instance, ‘overwhelming evidence’, ‘incontrovertible 
evidence’, ‘evidence was strong’, ‘available evidence’, ‘reports’ and ‘a study’. Furthermore, 
such statements usually come from sources that enjoy credibility in the global community, like 
the United Nations, the United States, American intelligence, or other individuals who give 
credence to the statement, using terms like ‘Western European physicians’, ‘doctors’, and 
‘experts’: 
 
 Year Predicational strategies of CWs representing Iraq 
  The United States has announced that it has evidence of Iraqi use  
  Administration was also quite confident that it had evidence to support recent charges of 
Iraqi use of chemical weapons. 
  The United States said ''available evidence''  
 1985 American officials conclude that Iraq is once again using chemical  
 1985 the United States had received confirmation of such use from Western European 
physicians who treated Iranian victims. 
 1986 A team of experts appointed by the United Nations reported today that Iraq had used 
chemical weapons  
 1985 The United States has concluded that Iraq again used chemical weapons  
 1985 A State Department spokesman said the administration reached its conclusion on the 
basis of reports issued by doctors who examined Iranians sent recently to West German 
hospitals and on "other indications available to us" that he refused to disclose. "Based on 
this preliminary evidence, we conclude that Iraq used CW, 
 1986 Administration experts said intelligence reports showed that Iraq had recently used 
mustard gas. 
 1986 The administration, basing its opinion on eyewitness reports and intercepted Iraqi 
military messages, had condemned Iraq for allegedly using chemical weapons to settle 
scores with the Kurds for their siding with Iran. 
 1985 The United States had received confirmation of such use from Western European 
physicians who treated Iranian victims. 
 
Table 27 Predicational strategies of CWs representing Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war 
Sometimes the citation of the sources of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons shows the frequency 
of the number of times Iraq used such weapons; for instance, through the use of the present 
perfect ‘Iraq has continued’, which expresses the notion that the action started in the past and 
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continues in the present (a repeated action), or through phrases such as ‘at least three occasions 
last year, ‘on many occasions’, ‘on some occasions’ or ‘again’.  
43. Department spokesman Alan Romberg said the United States has received reports that 
Iraq has continued to use chemical weapons since the U.S. announcement. 
The Washington Post, March 28, 1984 
44. A team of experts appointed by the United Nations reported today that Iraq had used 
chemical weapons “on many occasions” against Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf 
war. Mustard gas was the agent most commonly used by the Iraqis, but nerve gas was 
also used “on some occasions,” according to the report, written by the experts and 
published today under the name of Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. 
The New York Times, March 15, 1986 
It is equally important to note that, although the press shows that the US and UN condemned 
the use of CWs, there were also many reports in which the press is critical of the US and the 
UN responses to Iraq’s use of CWs. The press accuses both the US and the UN of being lenient 
and ‘sympathetic’ towards Iraq, acknowledging the use of CWs in the Iraq-Iran war but without 
naming Iraq as being the user, or even suppressing proposals of formal condemnation, at least 
in the first years of the chemical attacks. The Reagan administration was also accused of 
following a ‘zigzag, and contradictory, policy’ toward the imposition of sanctions. The press 
also criticised Regan’s policies in response to the crisis for being ambivalent as well as for 
opposing any proposal for condemning Iraq use of CWs. 
 
45. Instead of its wishy-washy position, the Reagan Administration should take the moral 
high ground, roundly denouncing Iraq for this violation of its obligations and using 
every legal means at its disposal to put a halt to it 
 The New York Times, April 5, 1984 
46. U.S. officials were muted yesterday in their reaction to Iran's latest charge, saying 
they had no evidence Iraq had used chemical weapons in the recent fighting and 
repeating a blanket denunciation of their use without naming Iraq. 
The Washington Post, March 23, 1985 
47. It was the third United Nations investigation of chemical warfare in the five-and-a-
half-year-old Iran-Iraq war and the first time that Iraq was named for using chemical 
weapons. 
48. The United States intervened twice at the United Nations, first to prevent an 
emergency meeting to end the war of the cities and later to oppose a formal 
condemnation of Iraq for its use of chemical weapons. 
The Washington Post, April 24, 1988 
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In line with this, it was shown in the press through quoting official statements that Iran had also 
resorted to the use of CWs. However, a distinction was made between Iraq and Iran in regard 
to their use of CWs: whereas Iraq was said to have used them in the early years of the war, it 
was ‘no earlier than 1987’ when Iran used them. There were also instances where the press 
contradicted the official statements with regard to Iran’s use of CWs by providing conflicting 
evidence or by stating other opinions: for instance, showing that although CWs were used by 
Iran, this was not to the same extent in comparison to when such weapons were used by Iraq.  
49. U.S. and U.N. investigative teams have concluded that Iraq was first to use chemical 
weapons, perhaps as early as 1982. U.S. reports say Iran’s first use came no earlier 
than 1987. 
The Washington Post, July 2, 1988 
50. [State Department officials] acknowledge that there is considerable evidence that Iraq 
used chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians in Halabja, but quickly add that Iran 
is now using such arms as well, although Iran’s use is not believed to be anywhere 
near the scope of Iraq’s. 
 The New York Times, June 22, 1988 
51. U.S. officials say Iran may have first used such weapons against Iraqi forces in 
Tehran's early 1987 "Karbala-5" offensive. 
The Washington Post, April 5, 1988 
 
52. They assert that Iran fired chemical artillery shells during the battle for the Iraqi border 
town March 15-17. “There is ample reason to believe both had a hand in it,” one 
Pentagon official said. “It wasn't a one-way show.” Iran has denied repeatedly that it 
used chemical weapons at Halabja. Reporters who visited the town a few days after use 
of chemicals there gave no indication that Iran had also resorted to them. Iran does 
acknowledge a chemical warfare capability, however, and there are reports that its 
Revolutionary Guards are pressing the government to use it. 
The Washington Post, April 5, 1988 
53. He added, “There are indications that Iran may also have used chemical artillery shells 
in this fighting.” It was not clear what “indications” the United States had obtained 
of Iranian use of such shells and Redman would not elaborate. A U.S. official said 
the evidence collected by U.S. intelligence agencies of purported Iranian chemical 
warfare was far less convincing than the startling evidence of Iraqi chemical attacks 
provided by television cameras that filmed scores of dead Iraqi Kurds in the northern 
Iraqi border town of Halabja.  
-  Topoi of threat/ danger of CWs spread 
The threat of the spread of the CWs was one of the main topoi constructed in the US press 
whether through reporting what officials says or through the press expressing their own views 
in this regards. The threat was a combination of criticising the US tilt towards Iraq and 
expressing the concern of the spread of CWs in the region as a result of this silence. The US tilt 
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toward Iraq was seen to be on the expenses of CWs spread that was metaphorically likened with 
the statement: ‘'the genie is out of the bottle . . . arms control is down the drain.’ 
 
54. State Department sources say that the Administration has held conversations at a high 
level since late 1983 in a fruitless effort to dissuade Iraq from using chemical weapons. 
They conceded that the issue is difficult for them, for the Administration has sought to 
shore up Iraq against the possibility that Iran might win the war, with far-reaching 
implications throughout the Persian Gulf. But an even larger issue is at stake. As a 
thoughtful official warned last week, if full-scale chemical war develops, ''the genie is 
out of the bottle . . . arms control is down the drain.'' 
The New York Times April 5, 1984, Thursday 
55. The report came amid growing international concern that the use of chemical weapons 
in the Iran-Iraq war may become widespread. 
The New York Times April 2, 1988, Saturday 
 
56. The deafening silence of governments on Iraq's use of chemical weapons has provoked 
serious concern among defense experts. A major thesis that emerged from the annual 
conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies here last weekend was 
that wars in the third world are not likely to diminish if the East-West conflict wanes, 
but increase in scope and intensity as sophisticated weaponry spreads. 
The New York Times September 14, 1988, Wednesday 
 
The topoi of threat, represented through the use of CWs, the threat of becoming “widespread” 
or the “genie” out of the bottle, the fear of other countries to acquire CWs, Israel’s fear of a 
potential future chemical attack, is further merged with the topos of responsibility where it is 
seen that it is the US and the world community responsibility to halt or authorise an international 
ban on such weapons.   
57. Rabin has met with other top administration officials, including Defense Secretary 
Frank C. Carlucci and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, to discuss what Israeli 
leaders now regard as the new primary threat to their security -- the possibility Arab 
states will use missiles carrying chemical warheads against Israel in a possible future 
conflict. Rabin said that because Iran and Iraq have used missiles against each other's 
cities indiscriminately during their war, there is a "growing change of attitude" about 
using missiles in the area and Middle East nations are engaged in an arms race to obtain 
surface-to-surface missiles. In addition, the failure of the world community to halt 
the repeated use by Iraq of chemical weapons has lead to the "international 
legitimization" of chemical use in modern Middle East warfare, Rabin said. 
 
The Washington Post June 29, 1988, Wednesday 
 
58. The use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war should intensify efforts to establish 
a global ban on gas weapons, according to a resolution introduced in the Senate on 
Tuesday. The threat of widespread chemical war increases as additional countries 
acquire a chemical capability, said Sen. George Mitchell, chief sponsor of the 
resolution. The United States should exert every effort to halt the spread of 
chemical technology and should step up its efforts to negotiate an international an on 
chemical weapons, 
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Journal of Commerce April 14, 1988, Thursday 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to examine the ways in which Saddam, the Iraqi Shiites, the Iraqi 
people, CWs and Halabja were constructed in the US press in the Iraq-Iran war. The 
investigation of Saddam has shown that the press reported the confrontational discourse of 
Saddam and Khomeini and the way they constructed each other, it also showed how through 
such discourses the two parties positioned themselves as well as the course of events in the war. 
Therefore, Saddam was constructed as engaging in a ‘holy’ war through playing on the 
historical enmity between the Arabs and the Iranian to move his own people as well as those in 
other Arab countries, and identifying himself with Islamic and other historical figures. In 
addition, he was constructed as an ambitious leader who had been for a long time seeking to 
play the role of the Pan-Arab Gamal Abdel Nasser, and become a political and military voice 
in the region. Furthermore, in the Iraq-Iran war Saddam was never dehumanised or criminalized 
with strong evaluative attributes and wordings as in the later wars as well as he was not linked, 
as a person, with the use of CWs used in Halabja or against Iran. 
 
With regard to the Iraqi Shiites, they were constructed as marginalised and underrepresented in 
the Iraqi government, and as disadvantaged, although they represent the majority of the Iraqi 
population, in comparison with the Iraqi Sunnis. Furthermore, they were consistently viewed 
as being an important card in the war. Khomeini, for example, wanted the Iraqi Shiites to be 
the Trojan horse that would overthrow Saddam. Saddam was also constructed as inciting them 
through religious and Arabist themes to be able to continue the war. Similarly, the Iraqi people 
were also targeted to be mobilised by both parties using the same strategies targeted the Shiites 
through the focus on the historical and religious enmity between the two countries.  
In relation to the use of CWs, the reporting varied from reporting the first years of use of these 
weapons, to accusations and claims regarding their use, to taking an implicit stance through 
weighting the Iranian version of stories by citing statements by Iranian officials that were 
packed with the testimonies of casualties, experts, reporters and other people who would have 
a high level of credibility in the eyes of the public. In addition, the press is also critical of the 
US and UN stance, particularly in the first years of the CW attack, accusing them of following 
a zigzag policy and being overly sympathetic towards Iraq.  
Furthermore, a victory by neither country was welcomed, as any victory was constructed as 
being a threat to US interests and the region. This was particularly the case with Iran: an Iranian 
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victory was constructed as having the potential to destabilise the Arabian Gulf countries and 
their allies through spreading the Iranian revolution. Furthermore, the continuous use CWs by 
Iraq amid the silence of the US is constructed to be a threat that could cause the spread of the 
CWs in the Gulf region. 
 
The results obtained from the analysis by applying the CDA and corpus linguistics theories 
have explicated and highlighted the US press practices during the Iraq-Iran war when the US 
government was not involved directly in the war. In this case, the press tended to give all parties 
involved in the war a voice and access to the press and allows conflicting and opposing opinions 
in its reporting, as this is not a case of  an ‘Us-them’ war but it was their war. However, Iraq in 
general and Saddam in particular was an ally to the US in the Iraqi-Iran war, which explains 
the way the US press constructed Saddam and other themes. Although Saddam Hussein was 
constructed negatively he was not demonised or criminalised with strong evaluative attributes 
and wordings as in the later wars. He was also not linked and associated, as a person, with the 
use of CWs used in Halabja or against Iran. This construction comes in line with Keeble’s 
(2004) argument that it is only after the Iraq-Iran war that Saddam was demonised. Moreover, 
the suffering and the victimisation of Iraqi people and Iraqi Shiites were backgrounded and paid 
no or little attention and this was not problematized. 
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Chapter 6: US-LED INVASION: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SADDAM 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an account of the discursive construction of several themes. 
These themes included Saddam, the Iraqi people, Iraqi Shiites, CWs and Halabja during the 
Iraq-Iran war. The purpose was to set the scene for this and the subsequent chapters. Each theme 
would be compared with its counterpart during the US-led invasion to see how it was reported 
in each period and whether there were any differences in the reporting. The aim of this chapter 
is, therefore, twofold: first, to explore the discursive construction of Saddam in the US-led 
invasion, and then to compare it with the construction during the Iraq-Iran war to show the 
reporting differences between the two conflicts.  
In section 6.2 the methods used to obtain and examine the themes relating to Saddam are 
presented. This is followed by a discussion of the Saddam themes themselves: vilification in 
section6.2.1, criminalisation and Hitlerisation in section 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 respectively, the link 
to al Qaeda in section 6.2.4 and the threat of Saddam in section 6.2.5. The differences in the 
reporting of these themes in the two periods are discussed in section 6.3.  
 
6.2 Saddam’s themes 
In order to see how the word frequency for ‘Saddam’ was distributed over the seven weeks 
(Week 0 - Week 7)19, the number of times the word appears was calculated (see Figure 13). 
From Figure 13, it can be clearly seen that the discourse on Saddam increased in size in Week 
0, reaching a peak in Week 1. Another increase can be seen in Week 4, in which the highest 
frequency of all weeks is recorded. In this section the main increases and decreases in the 
frequency of ‘Saddam’ are explained by means of collocates as will be seen in this section.  
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Week 0-Week 7 is the period from 12/03/2003 to 01/05/2003. I numbered the first week ‘0’ to indicate that the 
war had not yet started, while Week 7 is when Bush announced that the mission had been accomplished. 
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Figure 13 Frequency of the use of ‘Saddam’ during the US-led invasion 
 
In view of the large number of collocates that occurred, in order to see how Saddam was talked 
about in those weeks, only those collocates with five frequencies and above were selected. The 
collocates were derived for each week and had their concordance lines checked for more context 
to identify the main semantic topics, with the exception of week 7, as there were no collocates 
of statistical significance in this particular week, as shown in Table 28 
Week Saddam’s Collocates 
Week 0 Saddam, anti, cling, comply, confrontation, defiant, disarm, disarmed, 
disarming, Hussein, oust, ousting, poses, pro, refuses, remove, removing, 
rid, sons, strongman, ultimatum, unconditional 
Week 1 wage, undermine, ultimatum, topple, survived, strongman, sons, ruthless, 
rid, removing, remove, removal, regime, pro, president, possesses, 
overthrown, overthrow, ousting, oust, numbered, minions, loyal, 
lieutenants, leave, leader, inner, importance, Hussein, henchmen, footage, 
expired, exile, elite, doomsday, disarming, disarm, dictator, depose, 
defiant, deadline, anti  
Week 2 Saddam, dictator, Fedayeen, grip, Hussein, loyal, loyalists, oust, ousting, 
overthrow, overthrown, paramilitary, portrait, president, pro, regime, 
reign, removing, rid, scrawled, topple, uprising 
Week 3 Saddam, airport, alive, anti, ashbal, attributed, canal, consists, cousin, 
Fedayeen, Hussein, loyal, loyalists, Majeed, militia, oust, overthrow, 
palace, palaces, posters, pro, regime, rid, sons, topple, toppled 
Week 4 Saddam, ace, alive, ancestral, anti, belonged, birthplace, bronze, chanted, 
collapse, collapsed, crumble, crushed, dead, deposed, dictator, 
dictatorship, downfall, enclave, escaping, fall, Fedayeen, Firdos, foot, 
giant, glad, gleefully, gone, hate, hates, henchmen, hey, hiding, 
hometown, husayn, Hussein, likeness, loyal, loyalist, loyalists, mural, 
murdered, murderous, nightmare, oust, ousted, ousting, overthrow, 
overthrowing, persecuted, portrait, post, posters, pro, prop, purportedly, 
Qusai, Qusay, regime, reign, remnants, repression, rid, routed, rule, slum, 
slums, smacked, sons, spades, statue, statues, statute, stronghold, 
strongman, tearing, thug, Tikrit, Tikriti, topple, toppled, toppling, tore, 
tyrant, Uday, whereabouts  
Week 5 Saddam, Hussein, statue, ousted, toppled, deposed, toppling, spades, 
slum, henchmen 
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Week 6 Saddam, Hussein, birthday, toppled, deposed, anti, dinar, interrogators 
Table 28 Collocates of Saddam in US-led invasion 
 
An examination of the collocates and their concordance lines in Weeks 0 and 1 revealed that 
the discourse was mainly about the build-up to the war and the war itself. In Week 0 Saddam 
was depicted as posing a threat, possessing WMD and not complying with UN resolutions. He 
was given a final opportunity to comply when the UN passed a new resolution demanding 
immediate and unconditional disarmament and when he was issued with an ultimatum by Bush: 
get out of Iraq or face war. The main focus in week 1, on the other hand, is on the launch of the 
US invasion. As shown by the collocates, the facts of the build-up to the war and the war itself 
explain the increase in the frequency in weeks 0 and 1, when there were many mentions of and 
references to Saddam.   
In week 3, the spotlight was on the battle for Saddam’s international airport, which ended with 
the US capturing it, and speculations regarding Saddam’s fate and whether he had survived the 
bombings, as well as the search for his whereabouts and his palaces. Week 4, in which the 
highest frequencies were found, has been seen as the turning point in the war, with the symbolic 
toppling of the forty-foot high bronze statue of Saddam in Baghdad, an historic event which 
indicated an end to his tenure. Weeks 5 and 6 also contain reports about the toppling of Saddam 
and the search for his whereabouts.  
Figure 14 shows the main discourses on Saddam, from one week prior to the US-led invasion 
until the moment Bush announced ‘mission accomplished’ in week 7. The categorisation of the 
discourse themes (see sections 6.2.1- 6.2.5) was accomplished by categorising the collocates 
automatically and manually using Wmatrix, according to their semantic meaning in context: for 
instance, all the collocates that had a crime-related meaning were put under the theme of 
criminalisation (see section 6.2.2) and similarly for the rest of the themes. Owing to space 
limitations, only some of the themes in Figure 14 are explained.  
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Figure 14 Encapsulation of the widespread discourses on Saddam in the US-led invasion 
 
6.2.1 The Theme of the Vilification of Saddam  
 
One of the strategies to justify the war on Iraq employed by the US press was to present the war 
as a binary event involving opposites. This was done by dividing the world into two camps, i.e. 
“[T]he placement of one thought or thing in terms of its opposite” (Burke, 1969, p. 403). The 
use of such binaries, according to many studies, functions to “engender and reinforce unequal 
relations among objects”; the two positions do not have a “peaceful coexistence”, but operate 
as a “violent hierarchy” (Derrida, 1981, p. 41) or as a “struggle for predominance”. The two 
positions are juxtaposed – one is the right position, the other is the wrong one (Carr and Zanetti, 
1999, p. 324) . 
Therefore, one of the ways in which Saddam was vilified is through the good/evil binary. The 
‘(e)vilification’ of Saddam was carried out through an ‘outcasting’ process, by which 
“individuals and/or groups are systematically marked and set aside as outcasts - based on the 
dichotomisation and mutual antagonism of out-groups (‘them’) and in-groups (‘us’)”, (Lazar 
and Lazar, 2004, p. 227). Such a dichotomy “promotes ‘satanisation’ of the enemy…and a 
legitimisation of unlimited escalations of violence to the point of extermination of the evil 
Other” (Cited in Cherry et al., 2015, p. 32). Through this strategy, the enemy’s moral order is 
deconstructed and stripped of everything good until it becomes an ethical responsibility to put 
an end to such an evil. 
Once a binary discourse had been established through linking both Iraq and Saddam to ‘terror 
states’ and categorising them as evil, the usage of this discourse of vilification increased and 
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was deployed in a memorable way, maximising the wrongdoing of the ‘other’ and ensuring a 
successful social circulation among the people. The vilification was accomplished through a 
lexical reiteration of the word evil itself or other words of same nature, or through defining evil 
through a series of criminal actions committed by Saddam:  
59. In his State of the Union speech, Bush promises to liberate the Iraqi people and catalogues 
what happens to Saddam's enemies: "electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on 
the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues and rape. If this is not evil, then 
evil has no meaning."  
Daily News (New York) March 20, 2003, Thursday 
60. But Saddam Hussein represents a marriage of evil with technology. He has already used 
poison gas. He has developed biological weapons. He once was developing a nuclear 
weapons programme and maybe still is. 
The Washington Post, March 20, 2003 Thursday 
Similarly, in extract 61 below, the world has been divided into two camps. There is the good 
American camp, whose aim is to liberate the Iraqi people and make humanitarian efforts, and 
the evil camp, represented by Saddam’s savage rule, under which the Iraqi people have suffered 
and been terrorised. This method creates a collective illusion: audiences are guided to think in 
a particular way by the realities that are constructed for them in the press. They are given little 
opportunity to develop and arrive at their own conclusions. In this regard, Edelman (1971, p. 
65) says that in times of uncertainty, confusion and anxiety people become impatient to be 
provided with explanation and political order that explains the nature of the threat and polices 
that encounter such a threat. 
61. In Iraq, the lines between good and evil are clear. Americans should have no doubts 
about this undertaking. This war is one of history's great humanitarian efforts. We 
are in the process of freeing an entire country from one of the world's most savage 
regimes. That will become even more apparent when Iraqis see that it is safe to hail 
the Americans as their liberators without fear of being shot in the back by 
Saddamites.  
Daily News (New York) April 7, 2003, Monday 
The justness of America is also shown in the deployment of binaries on the ‘sunny’ side in 
contrast to the dark side, with Americans obviously being on the side of right, which is the 
sunny side and implying that Iraq is on the dark side as shown in example 62. 
62. A lot of people feel guilty for enjoying the war. After all, some terrible things are 
happening. But worse things would happen if America failed to rid the world of 
Saddam. This time, right and might are on the same side. And there is something 
undeniably enjoyable about being on the sunny side of an uneven struggle 
between good and evil. 
Daily News (New York) March 30, 2003, Sunday 
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Furthermore, the war was not constructed as being a religious war - the ‘Crusaders and Jews 
against a Muslim ruler’, as Saddam and Osama bin Laden wanted to depict it. It was 
constructed a war solely against Saddam, because of his wrongdoings and the threat he posed 
to the international community by possessing WMDs. It could be argued that the distinction 
between Islam, Arabs and Saddam was made in order to isolate Saddam and to ensure that any 
Muslim or Arab sympathisers were not given a religious cause to rally round or any reason to 
see the war as a holy undertaking. 
63. Also, we mustn't forget that some of the countries supporting us against Saddam 
Hussein are, indeed, Arab and Muslim. Fanatics like Osama bin Laden would love 
nothing better than to be able to cast the campaign against Hussein as a religious war, 
the 'Crusaders and Jews' against a Muslim ruler. This, they must not be allowed to 
do: Hussein's religion (or lack of it) has nothing to do with his reign of terror or his 
accumulation of weapons of mass destruction. Our quarrel with Saddam Hussein is 
because he is simply an evil and dangerous man who threatens the peace and 
security of the world - especially his predominately Muslim neighbors in the 
Middle East.  
The Denver Post March 20, 2003 Thursday 
Some ‘Arabs and Muslims’ were classified as being supportive of US actions against this evil, 
and this gave additional weight to the idea that the war was being fought against Saddam alone. 
All the differences between Arabs, Muslims and the US were erased in order to show that they 
formed a united front and were facing the same enemy who was threatening his “Muslim 
neighbors”.  
 
6.2.2 The Theme of Criminalisation: An ‘Other’ Saddam  
 
One important theme that emerged from the predicational strategy employed in the US press is 
the criminalisation of Saddam by reporting his constructed past and present political 
wrongdoings. This sort of criminalisation, according to Lazar and Lazar (2004, p. 231), triggers 
and ensure a moral responsibility on the part of the world leading countries to act against the 
wrongdoings of the perpetrator.  
 
The simplest way of criminalising Saddam was through the use of crime-related lexicals, as 
reflected in the US press’s use of collocates such as ‘genocidal’, ‘murderer’, ‘murderous’, 
‘thug’, ‘brutality’, ‘torture’, ‘savagery’, ‘his many crimes’, ‘his gang’, ‘his two murderous 
sons’, ‘exterminated by Saddam’, ‘slaughtered by Saddam’, ‘persecuted by Saddam’, ‘atrocities 
committed by Saddam’.   
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The criminalisation was also realised through what Fowler (1991, p. 85) calls an ‘over-
lexicalisation’ strategy, in which the excessive use of quasi- synonymous words is employed. 
The criminal actions attributed to Saddam were therefore referred to repeatedly in the press 
discourse, with synonymous or near-synonymous lexicals, whether in the form of verbs, nouns 
or adjectives, being used.  These collocates can either be found appearing one after another in 
a single sentence, paragraph or article, or in different articles in different newspapers – this has 
a cumulative effect, creating an association between Saddam and criminal or demonic acts in 
the reader’s mind.  
64. The men had been jailed, beaten and had their houses burned to the ground under Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein's brutal regime. 
The Washington Post March 21, 2003 Friday 
65. The whole family was horribly persecuted by Saddam Hussein, with many members 
murdered or disappeared.  
The Philadelphia Inquirer April 2, 2003 Wednesday 
 
Another criminalisation technique is to refer to actions from a range of time frames in order to 
suggest that the threat is continuing. In our context, the first of these was Saddam’s past actions:  
66. This man Saddam Hussein has tortured and brutalized his people for a long, long 
time. We had reports the other day of a dissident who had his tongue cut out and 
was tied to the stake in the town square, and he just bled to death.  
The New York Times March 28, 2003 Friday 
 
The second method is to imply that the actions or wrongdoings are habitual:  
67. "It's not personal," one Bush aide says. Rather, the president's passion is motivated by 
his loathing for Saddam's brutality, aides say. He talks often about his revulsion for 
Saddam's use of torture, rape and executions. He is convinced that the Iraqi leader 
is literally insane and would gladly give terrorists weapons to use to launch 
another attack on the United States. 
USA TODAY April 2, 2003, Wednesday 
 
68. His brutal regime has reduced a country with a long and proud history to an 
international pariah that oppresses its citizens, started two wars of aggression 
against its neighbours and still poses a grave threat to the security of its region 
and the world.  
 
The Washington Post March 17, 2003 Monday 
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Lastly, projected actions are referred to:  
69. The world must face facts: It's not in the cards. His cruel power is based on his 
access to chemical, biological and - he hopes - nuclear materials. He has used 
poison gas with no compunction. And he's friendly with a world of America-
hating terrorists aching to get their hands on those evil weapons. From Iraq. From 
North Korea. From whoever will sell them, along with what's left of their souls. The 
brutal reign of Saddam Hussein must end. 
 
Daily News (New York) March 18, 2003, Tuesday 
70. The goal is to end Saddam's brutal reign and dismantle Baghdad's weapons of mass 
destruction programs before chemical, biological or nuclear weapons could be used 
against the United States or its allies 
USA TODAY March 17, 2003, Monday 
The criminal actions were also depicted through the narration of horrific stories about civilians, 
in a strategy that van van Dijk (1995a, p. 156) refers to as ‘concretization’ where the enemy 
wrongdoings are accentuated by describing such dreadful acts in concrete, and in detail, 
visualisable and memorisable words (see example 71-72). By means of this strategy, the 
audience can be linked to the experience of the victims. Some stories by exiled Iraqis who had 
fled from the Saddam regime were cited, some were by Iraqi civilians who had suffered under 
the regime, and some were stories about those who did not make it and consequently were 
murdered. The stories were about children, woman and old men as well as young people. Many 
such stories appeared in the press both before and after the invasion to construct a narrative 
describing Saddam’s cruelty and atrocities against his own people as well as to drum up public 
support for the build-up and the invasion phases of the war.  
71. Kubba, […] can tell harrowing stories about his treatment at the hands of Hussein's 
secret police: electric shock torture, daily beatings, cigarette burns. "To force 
confessions, Saddam's henchmen torture children in front of their parents," Kubba 
said. "They rape wives in front of their husbands. They dip people in acid." 
Kubba says his family was targeted because they were politically opposed to Hussein, 
who became Iraq's ruler in the 1970s. He said his father died of brain damage from 
torture and that some friends were executed. He escaped the country in 1979 only 
because a government clerk mistakenly stamped his passport. 
St. Petersburg Times (Florida) March 24, 2003 Monday 
72.  "It looks a bit too much like Nazi Germany to me," said Capt. Pete McAleer, 
commander of Echo Company of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, whose patrol 
found the small compound. Across Iraq, coalition troops are finding glimpses of past 
horrors - suspected torture chambers, secret police headquarters, Iraqis who reveal 
scars that record the cruelty of Saddam Hussein's rule. At a prison in Basra, Iraqis 
showed journalists a white stone jail known as the "White Lion" where they claim 
Saddam's secret police for decades tortured inmates with beatings, mutilations, 
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electric shocks and chemical baths. "They did unthinkable things - electrocution, 
immersion in a bath of chemicals and ripping off people's finger- and toenails," 
resident Hamed Fattil told British reporters. Outside the jail, a man showed 
Associated Press Television News his mangled ears - he said Iraqi police cut them 
off.  
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) April 10, 2003 Thursday 
The criminalisation of Saddam was also constructed by linking him to the actions of other 
individuals. Saddam was seen as being responsible for things those around him had done. This 
is what Wodak and Reisigl (2001, p. 53) term ‘relationalisation’ and sociativisation’, i.e. the 
construction of individuals based on their relations/association to each other. Example terms 
include; ‘militia’, ‘paramilitary’, ‘forces’, ‘Paramilitaries’, ‘squads’, ‘thugs’, ‘loyalist(s)’, 
‘jihadists’, ‘mujahid’, ‘bodyguards’, ‘followers’, ‘sympathisers’, ‘his brutal regime’, ‘his most 
brutal henchman’, ‘a brutal cousin of Saddam Hussein’, ‘Saddam's brutal loyalists the 
Fedayeen’, ‘his thug sons Uday and Qusay’, ‘his thugs, ‘Saddam's henchmen torture children’, 
‘his cousin’ and ‘chemical Ali’20. 
Some of these collocates have an obviously negative, crime-related meaning when their literal 
meaning is examined. ‘Thugs’, for instance, is defined by the Cambridge English Dictionary as 
“a man who acts violently, especially to commit a crime”, and ‘henchman’ is defined as 
“someone who does unpleasant or illegal things for a powerful person”. Some of the other 
words used in this case can only be defined from their context. The term, ‘Jihadists’, on the 
other hand, has acquired a negative representation in general, and in Saddam’s case the term 
jihadists had already been framed negatively in relation to those who attacked the World Trade 
Centre on 9/11; it therefore followed that jihadists (specifically Saddam’s jihadists) were 
plotting to attack the United States as can be seen in examples 73 and 74 below.  
73. A search of an abandoned training site in Hindiyah, east of Karbala, turned up what 
was described as an unusually large amount of chemical protection gear. The site 
appears to have been used to train Palestinians and other non-Iraqis seeking to join 
Saddam's jihadists. At a nearby agricultural compound, coalition forces found 
several 55-gallon barrels, which tested positive for nerve agents, including sarin and 
tabun, as well as blistering mustard gas. 
 
The New York Post April 8, 2003, Tuesday 
74. The Irish Times Dublin There is no answer to the reality that the United States and 
Britain have won their war on Saddam Hussein and his "jihadists." Deplorable 
                                                 
20 Chemical Ali is a nickname used for Ali Hasan al-Majid, Saddam’s cousin, who used chemical weapons (CW) 
in Halabja against the Kurdish population. He was captured by the coaltion forces in August 2003 and presented 
for trial over the use of CWs (Garrett, 2017, p. 49).  
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though it was, and doubtful its legitimacy, in the crude calculus of war casualties the 
death and destruction is far less than envisaged. 
The New York Times April 11, 2003 Friday 
 
Relational identification was also used through a referential strategy that named any individual 
or group of individuals who resisted the invasion a ‘Saddamite’ or ‘Saddamites’ - derivative 
adjectives of the noun Saddam – those who believed in a ‘Saddamism21’ ideology. These 
referential strategies came to stand for everything negative, and all the constructed criminal acts 
and Saddam’s wrongdoings could be reduced to just these words. They acquired even more 
ideological connotations after the fall of Saddam Hussein and came to be used frequently by 
ordinary people or politicians to exclude, mute and accuse other people, rivals and politicians 
simply because they opposed their views. They even accused protestors who were asking for 
changes in the government of being ‘Saddimist’ as a way of silencing them.  
75. No Saddamite sleeper cells have sprung into action. 
Daily News (New York) March 26, 2003, Wednesday 
76. That explains why Syria has recently opened its border to Saddamite recruits heading 
for the front and why it has been acting as a conduit for Iraqi military resupply. 
Daily News (New York) April 2, 2003, Wednesday 
 
Furthermore, the differentiation between ‘We’ and the other-within was made. To that end, the 
US was lionised as a liberator of the Iraqi people which had the humanitarian aim of freeing the 
Iraqis from a ‘savage regime’. The other-within distinction was made by categorising the Iraqi 
people into those who needed to be liberated on the one hand, and  ‘Saddamites’ on the other; 
the latter were demonised by describing them as ‘shooting people in the back’ - the inference 
being that they were cowardly and not prepared to fight face to face.   
77. This war is one of history's great humanitarian efforts. We are in the process of 
freeing an entire country from one of the world's most savage regimes. That will 
become even more apparent when Iraqis see that it is safe to hail the Americans as 
their liberators without fear of being shot in the back by Saddamites.  
Daily News (New York) April 7, 2003, Monday 
                                                 
21 Saddamism or (Saddamiyaa) is a political ideology that developed after Saddam Hussein assumed power in 
1973. It was a different form of Ba’athism that called for an Iraq-centred Arab world united under Saddamist 
Ba’athism and eschewing the old Nasserism (Bengio, 1998) 
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In the same vein, it was shown how the Iraqi people had suffered under the Saddamite 
ideology, referred to as ‘Saddamite Stalinism’:  
78. After more than 30 years of Saddamite Stalinism, the people of Iraq are like battered 
children. They have been taught blind obedience to an abusive father and to love the 
hand that beats them. 
Daily News (New York) April 6, 2003, Sunday 
Moreover, the objective of the war was viewed as being not just the removal of Saddam, but 
the dismantling of all manifestations of Saddamism. This was reflected in the calls for the 
replacement of the old Iraqi currency that carried pictures of Saddam, and some of the 
institutions of the Iraqi state.   
79. "Whatever it is, it will not be a currency that has Saddam Hussein's picture on it," a 
senior official said. "We want to make the point that this is not going to be Saddamism 
without Saddam. You have to visibly kill some institutions."  
The New York Times March 15, 2003 Saturday 
80. "This war was a challenge to the entire Arab system, which is why so many Arabs 
opposed it. The war to liberate Kuwait from Iraq in 1991 was outpatient surgery. This 
war was open-heart surgery." But this open-heart surgery will succeed in toppling 
both Saddam and Saddamism only if we are successful in creating a healthy Iraq -- 
an Arab state where people can find dignity, not just by saying no to the West, but by 
building a decent, tolerant, modernizing society that they can be proud of, an Arab 
state where people can speak the truth and that other Arabs would want to emulate.  
The New York Times April 13, 2003 Sunday 
 
6.2.3 The Theme of Hitlerisation 
 
The Saddam-Hitler metaphor was used during both the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1991 and 
the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. At first, this analogy was used to signify the brutality of the 
Iraqi regime in invading another country and annexing it. This was reported as being just what 
Hitler did when he invaded Czechoslovakia. This metaphor was subsequently used more 
emphatically in 2003 to describe the Iraqi regime and its brutality against its own people. It was 
also part of a shift from depicting Iraq as a local bully threatening its neighbours, to a pariah 
state and WMD carrier that posed a grave danger to the US and the entire world (Berman, 2004, 
p. 106). 
 
One of the functions of this metaphor is to personalise the struggle by drawing a distinction 
between the enemy leader of the country and the (neutral) people of that country. Lakoff and 
Johnson (2008) say that people and places can become symbols for actions and policy positions. 
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Hitler, therefore according to Reynolds (2015) has become synonymous, to much of the world, 
to totalitarian dictatorship, evil and symbol of oppression and racism.. Through the 
‘Hitlerisation’22 of an enemy leader, the conflict is not only “personalized and the individual 
demonised, but it also introduces the concept of 1930s appeasement”. Action becomes required 
in the face of an aggressive and dictatorial protagonist. The war in such cases becomes reduced 
to a fight against a single individual. As Lakoff (2013, p. 3) states, the “nation” is then “a 
person”: the fight is constructed as being against a person rather than against a group or a 
country or a particular people.  
 
In the first Gulf War, for instance, as Popp and Mendelson (2010, p. 207) point out, Bush and 
Saddam were represented as duellists facing off against each other, and Saddam was depicted 
as ‘the personification of evil’. In terms of the visual discourse, the images of Saddam were 
also manipulated to make him look more Hitler-like by shortening his moustache. Saddam’s 
appearance as Hitler served both ideological and propaganda purposes, as Hitler had already 
been transformed into a symbol of evil and threat. Using such labels serves to direct negative 
emotions towards the individual in question (Keeble, 1998, p. 73). The same can be said about 
Stalin, who also became an icon of evil.  
 
The analogy between Saddam and Hitler or Stalin was discursively built up in several ways in 
the US press. The simplest method of doing this was by quoting people who had referred to 
Saddam as ‘the Hitler of the 21st century’, or as ‘a modern-day Hitler’, and made comments 
such as ‘he is as dangerous as Hitler was’, ‘We are dealing with Hitler revisited’ and ‘Hitler No. 
2’. 
 Another way of building up the analogy with Hitler and therefore adding to the negative image 
of Saddam was to compare his actions to Hitler’s tactics in the Second World War: for instance, 
Saddam’s creation of an army of children known as ‘Ashbal Saddam’ or ‘Saddam’s Lion Cubs’ 
by taking youngsters from their families and forcing them to join training camps where they 
killed animals and were taught to use firearms.  
81. The Lion Cubs are cohesive and well-trained," said Peter Singer, a military analyst 
at the Brookings Institution. "[…]. "My guess is that we will see them follow the 
model of the Hitler Youth in '45," he said. 
The New York Post March 28, 2003, Friday 
82. But experts said U.S. forces can expect more organized and dogged resistance from 
the Cubs, similar to the Hitler Youth in the waning days of World War II. 
                                                 
22 I used the term Hitlerisation to refer to the is strategies used to demonize a person though making an association 
of that person with Hitler’s wrongdoings, evil or any other bad characteristics. 
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"Ambushes, sniping, hit-and-run tactics are the most likely things we'll see," Singer 
said..  
Daily News (New York) April 3, 2003, Thursday 
 
The cruelty and brutality of Saddam’s actions and behaviour were frequently compared with 
those of Hitler and Stalin:  
83. I watch TV clips of this guy Saddam and I see a Hitler, but one who hasn't the 
knack to fire up his people like the head Nazi did. 
Daily News (New York) March 23, 2003, Sunday 
84. "You have a man who is an unsufferable dictator, who has a human rights record 
only eclipsed by Hitler or Stalin. All those facts haven't changed." 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 18, 2003 Tuesday 
85. As with Stalin and Hitler, the very brutality of the Iraqi leader has helped create 
a bizarre mystique -- a culture that mixes fear and adulation. 
The Washington Post March 28, 2003 Friday 
Furthermore, Saddam’s probable end was compared to the deaths of other dictators like 
Mussolini who was captured and killed by anti-fascist partisans. Comparisons were also made 
with Hitler’s end by reporting that Saddam had ended up running away and hiding in bunkers. 
This put Saddam in the position Hitler found himself in when he committed suicide and 
therefore Saddam was expected to do the same.  
86. Mr. Hussein appeared to set the stage for a situation similar to that which 
confronted Hitler in 1945, when the might of the Soviet Army bore down on the 
German dictator in a bunker near the Reichstag in Berlin, provoking his suicide. 
The New York Times March 19, 2003 Wednesday 
Saddam was also likened to Stalin, Mussolini and even Mao through establishing associations 
and connections based on their charisma and their totalitarian systems of government.  It was 
also alleged that Saddam had a great admiration for Stalin, as shown in the fact that he had 
apparently read many of Stalin’s books, or by describing Saddam’s criminal record and 
comparing it with that of Stalin: 
 
87. the clock would run down for Mr. Hussein and the totalitarian system of government 
he has built here on a model he took from Stalin . 
 The New York Times March 20, 2003 Thursday 
88. Already those forces have been bombarded with hours of allied radio broadcasts and 
by millions of leaflets proclaiming the futility of fighting for Saddam Hussein, whose 
charisma, like that of his hero Stalin, is his cruelty.  
The Washington Post March 21, 2003 Friday 
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89. Known to admire Josef Stalin, Saddam has tortured thousands and his wars have 
killed more than 1 million. 
The New York Post March 20, 2003, Thursday 
The attitude of the Iraqi population under Saddam was also compared with that of the Germans 
under Hitler and the Russians under Stalin, which was ‘one of complete, unquestioning 
subservience’; these people were described as being ‘cowed by their charismatic leaders’. The 
Iraqi army and other forces were also constructed in the same way as the armed forces of Hitler 
and Stalin; they were used to drive other forces into the battlefield and ensure that any 
unauthorised retreat or surrender faced serious reprisals. 
 
90. The Iraqi system is reminiscent of the political commissars Joseph Stalin used to 
intimidate and galvanize the Soviet army during World War II, with political 
troops often taking positions behind the regular army in battle and shooting any 
laggards. Hitler used a similar system, with SS and other Nazi Party units stiffening 
the will of a professional military that had increasing doubts about the war.  
The Washington Post March 28, 2003 Friday 
Other historical references to World War II were made through comparing the battle of Baghdad 
to the battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943). The city was besieged by the German army and the 
battle fought for the city resulted in the Germans being defeated with enormous human losses 
- some 1.5 million soldiers and civilians died (Hinton, 2009, p. 48). A fear that Baghdad could 
turn out to be a ‘Mesopotamian Stalingrad’ or a ‘modern Stalingrad’, a ‘Baghdograd’ was 
expressed in the press. There was an expectation that Saddam would use tactics similar to those 
that Stalin used against the Nazis and that American forces could encounter resistance from 
thousands of volunteers willing to fight to death for Saddam; it was argued that this could cause 
thousands of civilians to die. 
 
91. The other major fear is that U.S. forces could be bogged down in an urban battle that 
could turn Baghdad into a modern Stalingrad 
The Washington Post March 16, 2003 Sunday 
92. That would create what one military analyst warned could become a 
"Mesopotamian Stalingrad " -- referring to the World War II battle in which Soviet 
defenders fought heavily armed German invaders to a stalemate in the streets of 
Stalingrad and turned the course of the war. 
USA TODAY March 13, 2003, Thursday 
 
The toppling of the statue of Saddam in Firdoos Square in Baghdad was constructed as a historic 
moment and a turning point for the Iraqi people, which was then compared to the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989. Omaar (2004, p. 193) states that the statue had no importance in itself, that 
it had only been erected a year previously and that the toppling had no direct connection to 
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Saddam’s ousting from power. The removal of the statue became a key reference point, 
however, partly because it happened in front of the TV cameras. The event was immediately 
classified as an historic moment, but this classification needed an explanation: why was such a 
seemingly simple activity classed as historic? To that end, a direct association was made with 
the Berlin Wall: 
“[T]he imagery of the fall of the Wall is, […], a specific reference point or snapshot of 
history, that in this case comes to stand for liberation. And it is not strictly that it operates 
as a signifier of liberation that can be applied to other events as a lens that colours in a 
specific way” (Manghani, 2008, p. 60) 
 
93. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld compared the collapse of Mr. Hussein's 
regime to the fall of the Berlin Wall and said Mr. Hussein had taken his place "in the 
pantheon of failed dictators." 
The New York Times April 10, 2003 Thursday 
94. Several equated the incident with another significant moment in history. "One can't 
help but think of the fall of the Berlin Wall when looking at the images of 
Baghdad," House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) said in a statement. 
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution April 10, 2003 Thursday 
95. Then a scene reminiscent of the fall of the Berlin Wall began to unspool - and the 
Iraqis, like the East Germans before them, found some courage. Somebody produced 
a sledgehammer and pounded at the massive marble pediment. Somebody else tossed 
a rope around Saddam's neck to bring him down. Everybody cheered. 
Daily News (New York) April 10, 2003, Thursday 
 
In this regard, there has been an abundance of critics writing on the visual framing of the 
toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue23. Some accounts, such as that of Fisk (2003), refer to 
this moment as “the most staged photo-opportunity since Iwo Jima”.  Similarly, Rall (2003, p. 
228) states that the image of toppling the statue is fake. He adds that US military staged the 
toppling for the advantage of the journalists who were staying in Baghdad’s Palestine Hotel 
across the street where the fall of the statue took place. He adds that the TV have exaggerated 
the size of the crowds. In the same vein, John Loengard, a critic and photo editor quoted in 
(Friend, 2007, p. 299) was sceptical about this event. He states, “we remember the war by what 
took place in front of the hotel in Baghdad where all the press was hunkered down”. Other 
                                                 
23 On April 9th, 2003, following the entry of US troops into the Iraqi capital of Baghdad and after Saddam lost his 
grip on the capital, a crowd of people gathered around the statue of Saddam in Firdoos Square and attempted to 
pull it down using sledgehammers, but they failed. After those futile attempts, a group of US marines succeeded 
in bringing it down with the assistance of a crane amid the crowd’s chants and jubilation. Onlookers started 
throwing stones, shoes and other objects at the statue before it fell completely. After it fell, a crowd of people 
stepped onto the statue and dragged the head and other parts into the streets, slapping them with their shoes. 
Although this was a brief occurrence, it has been a very controversial moment for many analysts and critics.  
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accounts noted that the photos were taken from close range or that they were cropped tightly to 
avoid showing the real numbers in the jubilant Iraqi crowd. The intention was to show the world 
that the Americans were liberators and how the Iraqis cooperated with the American soldiers, 
which was interpreted as a sign of welcome to those American troops.  
 
6.2.4 The Theme of the Link with Al Qaeda 
 
The construct of social identity was evident in the media discourse both in the build-up to and 
during the war, with sharp differences being drawn between ‘Us’ (positive self-representation) 
and ‘Them’ (negative other-representation). As  Bucholtz and Hall (2004, p. 383) state, in self-
representation “salient differences are set aside in favour of perceived or asserted similarities 
that are taken to be more situationally relevant”. In the context of this research, the differences 
within the same nation-states/political parties/allies were either put into the background or 
ignored, and unity and understanding were brought to the fore; by contrast, the differences 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ were brought to the foreground and emphasised. This strategy works 
on an ideological level, because when the differences are erased, they render “some persons or 
activities… invisible” (ibid.). Furthermore, realities that are “inconsistent with the ideological 
scheme either go unnoticed or get explained away” (ibid.). As a result, social identities end up 
being created through language (ibid.). Identity in this case “is a process not merely of 
discovering or acknowledging a similarity that precedes” certain situation, but also a matter of 
“inventing similarity and downplaying difference” (Bucholtz and Hall, 2004, p. 371). 
 
Erasing the differences between Iraq/Saddam and al Qaeda and attempts to link them by 
highlighting their wrongdoings, their presumed similarities, and the hypothetical connections 
between them was one of the important strategies used in the US press. Iraq/Saddam and al 
Qaeda were painted in a single brushstroke and constructed as being a united enemy of the US. 
This hypothetical connection was one of the main justifications for the US invasion. Linking 
Iraq to the war on terror against al Qaeda that was already in progress meant that there was no 
need to present further argument in favour of attacking Iraq.  
 
Table 29 shows the number of times Saddam and Iraq occur as strong collocates with the 
following entries: Qaeda, Osama, terrorists, terrorist, terrorism, terror.  
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Table 29: The Collocates of the Link to Al Qaeda 
 
Equation of the enemy is realised by 1) showing that both Saddam and al Qaeda share the same 
goals, such as attacking the United States, 2) using a discourse where the wrongdoings 
committed by Saddam are linked to similar wrongdoings by al Qaeda, and (3) constructing Iraq 
as being a threat through harbouring and training al Qaeda members. 
 
96. [Al Qaeda leader] Osama bin Laden and [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein both 
are threats to our country and threats to our world. We have to treat them the same 
way."  
The Washington Post March 21, 2003 Friday 
 
97. Several links between al Qaeda and Iraq have been reported previously. * In 
northern Iraq, an al Qaeda-affiliated group called Ansar al Islam is allegedly plotting 
suicide attacks on U.S. forces and has allegedly experimented with chemical 
weapons. Two members of an Afghanistan-based al Qaeda cell were killed this week 
in a shootout between U.S. 
The New York Post March 28, 2003, Friday 
 
In the above examples Osama bin Laden and Saddam are both positioned in the same 
conceptual category and are given equal status with regard to the threat they posed. The use of 
the connectors ‘and’, ‘both’ and ‘the same way’ have erased all differences between the two 
entities and both are viewed as posing the same degree of threat to the US and the rest of the 
world.  
98. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose the 
moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest.  
The New York Times March 18, 2003 Tuesday 
99. The United States launched airstrikes on the stronghold of vicious Islamic extremists 
with ties to al Qaeda in northern Iraq - aiming to sever the "sinister axis" between 
Saddam Hussein and international terrorists in the early hours of the war 
The New York Post March 23, 2003, Sunday 
 
Similarly, in examples 98 and 99 above phrases such as ‘his terrorist allies’ and ‘sinister axis’ 
construct the notion that there is a strong relationship between Saddam and the terrorists.  
 
 122 
 
The link between al Qaeda and Iraq/Saddam was elaborated further through references to the 
role each played in complementing the other, as Hodges (2011, p. 79) states. Thus, whereas 
Saddam was seen to play the supporting role of ‘harbouring’, ‘supporting’, ‘contributing’, 
‘giving intelligence’, or ‘training and sponsoring’, al Qaeda played the role of recipient or 
beneficiary of Saddam’s support, as seen in the following examples:  
 
100. Bush says Saddam is harboring "Al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq."  
Daily News (New York) March 20, 2003, Thursday 
101. Washington has accused Saddam of supporting terrorism.  
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 14, 2003 Friday 
102. Conroy, 30, of Apalachin, N.Y., reminded the soldiers of what happened Sept. 
11, 2001, and told them Saddam "contributes to terrorism directly and indirectly, and 
that's why we're here."  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution March 19, 2003 Wednesday 
103. I believe that the many indirect links -- such as intelligence contacts, and 
agreements and training between Osama bin Laden's group and Saddam Hussein's 
government -- are too numerous to dismiss. 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 23, 2003 Sunday 
104. Finally, he said the United States must defend itself from the threat of Iraq-
sponsored terrorism.  
USA TODAY March 18, 2003, Tuesday 
105. Bush said Iraq has supported terrorists, including the al-Qaeda network 
blamed for the Sept. 11 attacks, and will not disarm so long as Hussein retains power.  
Philadelphia Inquirer March 18, 2003 Tuesday 
106. Last week, the President said Saddam Hussein and his weapons "are a direct 
threat to this country, to our people and all free people." Bush added that Saddam has 
"trained and financed . . . al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations." 
Philadelphia Inquirer March 12, 2003 Wednesday 
107. "Over the years Iraq has provided safe haven to terrorists such as Abu Nidal, 
whose terror organisation carried out more than 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries 
that killed or injured nearly 900 people, including 12 Americans," Bush said. 
The Washington Post April 16, 2003 Wednesday 
 
The use of the present perfect tense in the last three examples (105-107): ‘has supported’, ’has 
provided safe haven’, and ‘has trained and financed’, indicates that the actions refer to an 
ongoing process, without referring to a specific time frame. The implication is that such support 
has been continuous until the time of reporting. These arguments, analogies and characteristics 
were drawn from earlier situations on which judgment had already been passed and which had 
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become common knowledge in the minds of the public (Capps, 2001, 209). Establishing a link 
with Abu Nidal, whose name has already been closely correlated with terrorism, builds on a 
precedent and therefore strengthens the association of Saddam with terrorists.  
 
6.2.5 The Theme of Threat 
 
Throughout the corpora the word ‘threat’ is a collocate with ‘Iraq’ and ‘Saddam’. ‘Threat’ is 
mentioned 205 times, with Iraq and Saddam Hussein being depicted variously as an ‘urgent 
threat’, a ‘direct threat’, a ‘terrifying threat’, a ‘real and imminent danger’, and with arguments 
that they ‘posed an immediate threat’, as suggested in the following examples:  
 
108. And Kristin Kelly, a senior, said: "A few weeks ago, I would have said that I 
was against the war. Most of all, I would have condemned the haste. But Saddam has 
one of the most disgusting records of human rights abuses. His use of chemical 
weapons is even more indiscriminate. Saddam is a threat to his own country, and a 
terrifying threat to us." 
The New York Times March 16, 2003 Sunday 
109. He said that in going to war against Iraq -- what some have called America's 
first preventive war -- the country was responding to a real and imminent danger, 
the threat that Saddam might deploy weapons of mass destruction at home, in 
the region, or in the cities of America. "Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly, 
yet our purpose is sure," Bush said.  
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 20, 2003 Thursday 
 
The threat of Saddam was also constructed in the press as being actualised indirectly by a third 
party: namely, terrorists, who were being provided by Saddam/Iraq with a ‘safe haven’, ‘support 
and training’ or who were ‘plotting suicide attacks’ against the US.  
110. The Bush administration has portrayed Ansar as a link between al-Qaeda and 
Saddam Hussein, saying the Iraqi president has provided support and training to the 
group.  
Philadelphia Inquirer March 23, 2003 Sunday 
This sense of the topos of threat serves to create, within the in-group, feelings of fear and 
insecurity, while at the same time vilifying the out-group. In this regard, van Dijk (2005, p. 85) 
states that the discourse on terror following the 9/11 event became the main argument for 
introducing more rigorous security policies, which in turn provide added legitimacy for going 
to war. Since Iraq had already been linked to international terrorism, no further justification 
seemed to be required. Both the US and Iraq/Saddam have been depicted as affecting the future 
of the world, but the way the danger of each is constructed is different. The ‘Other’ is 
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constructed as having a deliberate choice, as indicated by the notions ‘poses […] danger’, 
‘brutal states’, or ‘deliver catastrophe to our country and our world’. The US, on the other hand, 
is depicted as the agent that will prevent this catastrophe from happening to Iraq’s neighbours, 
the wider world and the USA itself.   
Iraq and Saddam were also constructed as being a threat to the entire world, through the use 
of phrases like ‘is a threat to the whole’, ‘danger to the world’ and ‘world faced a dual threat’.  
111. The similarities were not a coincidence. Bush says Iraq poses the same danger 
to the world and the United States as Osama bin Laden's network. 
USA TODAY March 18, 2003, Tuesday 
112. Holding Saddam Hussein accountable [or] may well lack the moral courage." 
2: "The Bush administration has made great strides [but] more than anything the 
international community has shown it lacks the moral courage to confront a leader 
that is a threat to the whole world. 
 The Philadelphia Inquirer MARCH 13, 2003 Thursday 
113. Blair said the world faced a dual threat from "brutal states like Iraq" and from 
terrorist groups. "My fear, deeply held, is that these threats come together and 
deliver catastrophe to our country and our world," he said.  
Daily News (New York) March 21, 2003, Friday 
 
What is most notable here is the concept that Iraq/Saddam poses a threat to neighbouring 
countries and to US citizens residing in those countries. 
114. Bush said, "Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of 
miles -- far enough to strike Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and other nations -- in 
a region where more than 135,000 American civilians and service members live 
and work." 
 The Washington Post March 18, 2003 Tuesday 
 
115. These weapons were deemed a threat not only to Iraq's neighbors, but also 
to the United States, particularly if Mr. Hussein were to make them available to 
terrorists, as President Bush suggested in his State of the Union message. 
The New York Times April 18, 2003 Friday 
  
The topoi of threat and fear were widely used in the 2003 war by both the US press and 
politicians to influence public opinion and affect the course of the war against Iraq. Many 
empirical researchers view this strategy, “as a kind of argument used to threaten a target 
audience with a fearful outcome (most typically that outcome is the likelihood of death) in order 
to get the audience to adopt a recommended response” (Walton, 1996b, p. 304; Walton, 2000, 
p. 1), or, as Witte puts it, as “a persuasive message that attempts to arouse the emotion of fear 
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by depicting a personally relevant and significant threat and then follows this description of the 
threat by outlining recommendations presented as effective and feasible in deterring the threat”.  
According to Witte, Sampson and Liu (cited in Walton, 2000, p. 1), the threat usually consists 
of “some terrible consequence or harm that will befall the individual for not adopting the 
recommended response”. The following extracts contain examples of how the sense of danger 
was used and implied in the US press:  
 
116. We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In one 
year or five years the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be 
multiplied many times over. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist 
allies could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest. We 
choose to meet that threat now where it arises before it can appear suddenly in our 
skies and cities. 
The Washington Post March 18, 2003 Tuesday 
117. As he has argued repeatedly, Bush said the greatest danger of leaving Saddam 
in power is that he will make his weapons of mass destruction available to terrorists 
for attacks on the U.S. "Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course 
toward safety," Bush vowed. "Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late 
to act, this danger will be removed." 
Daily News (New York) March 18, 2003, Tuesday 
 
In the above two arguments, Bush argues on the side of going to war by depicting Saddam and 
Iraq as a threat and positing that deciding not to take action, or ‘inaction’, as in  example 116, 
or ‘leaving Saddam in power’, as in example 117, would have dire consequences. The strong 
possibility that Iraq could ‘inflict harm’, that it ‘could choose the moment of deadly conflict’, 
as in 116, or that its forces could ‘appear suddenly in our skies and cities’, or that Saddam could 
‘make his weapons of mass destruction available to terrorists for attacks on the US’ as in 116 
is emphasised. Action needed to be taken to ensure that these things did not happen, as shown 
in the phrases ‘We are now acting’, ‘We choose to meet that threat now’.  
 
In conjunction with the topos of threat, the topos of history was also used to legitimise the 
invasion. This is because history has popularly been claimed to provide ‘guidance’: people 
study examples from the past and emulate them in the present. From the perspective of 
discourse and representation, history is invariably used by people claiming to have learned 
lessons from the past, that it has given them guidance, and that history gives meaning to the 
contemporary events, actors and processes (Forchtner, 2014, p. 19). Events and personages 
from the past have consistently been used to justify actions and construct identities in the 
present.  
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One of the more widely used topoi of history as a teacher is called the ‘rhetoric of judging’ 
(Forchtner, 2014, p. 29), in which past wrongdoings committed by an out-group (them) are 
linked to present actions, with the claim that they are similar to the present and should therefore 
be avoided. This rhetoric involves excluding ‘Our’ past wrongdoings - or putting them in the 
background or silencing them - and problematising the ‘Other’ through their past so that their 
actions can be delegitimised.  
 
118. For more than a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient 
and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war. That regime pledged to 
reveal and destroy all of its weapons of mass destruction as a condition for ending the 
Persian Gulf War in 1991. Since then, the world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy 
[…] Our good faith has not been returned. The Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a 
ploy to gain time and advantage. It has uniformly defied Security Council resolutions 
demanding full disarmament. Over the years, U.N. weapons inspectors have been 
threatened by Iraqi officials, electronically bugged and systematically deceived. 
Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraq regime have failed again and again because we are 
not dealing with peaceful men.  
The New York Times March 18, 2003 Tuesday 
 
119. Saddam Hussein has proven he is capable of any crime. We must not permit his 
crimes to reach across the world. Saddam Hussein has a history of mass murder. He 
possesses the weapons of mass murder.  
The New York Times March 17, 2003 Monday 
 
In the above extracts, many linguistic means are utilised to represent the in-group and the out-
group. With regard to nomination and predication strategies, the in-group is depicted through 
the use of the deictic expressions ‘we’ and ‘our’, as well as through the use of many good 
attributes, such as ‘patient’, ‘honorable’, ‘diplomacy’, ‘our good faith’, and ‘peaceful efforts’; 
the in-group is also represented as being victims of danger and the use of weapons. In contrast, 
the other is represented through negative ideological anthroponomy, whether explicitly or 
implicitly, in words such as ‘pledged to reveal and destroy’ weapons but he did not, ‘ploy’, 
‘defied’, ‘threatened’, ‘bugged’, ‘deceived’, ‘we are not dealing with peaceful men’, ‘capable 
of any crimes’, and ‘mass murder’. In this case, history serves as a teacher that draws attention 
to mistakes made by the out-group in the past; the implication is that in order to avoid such 
mistakes being made in the future an intervention is required that will disarm Saddam and 
eliminate the threat. 
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Figure 15: Rhetoric of judging (adapted from Forchtner, 2014)  
 
In contrast to the rhetoric of judging, where ‘Our’ wrong past is excluded and ‘their’ wrong 
past is emphasised and linked to the present, a self-critical rhetoric strategy is also utilised to 
achieve the same purpose: i.e., legitimising the war. This type of rhetoric is called the ‘rhetoric 
of failing’, in which the enemy - ‘them’ - is convicted by their wrong past in the present. 
However, the lesson to be learned in the present is no longer directed at the out-group but more 
at the in-group, to which it acts as a warning that the same actions should not be repeated.  
 
120. Bush carefully reviewed the vote in Congress and several United Nations 
Security Council resolutions that he said formed the legal basis for an attack on 
Saddam's regime. He expressed disappointment that the United Nations had 
failed to agree on a new resolution but concluded: 'The United Nations Security 
Council has not lived up to its responsibilities so we will rise to ours.' At worst, 
the U.N.'s current paralysis risks reducing the modern international organization to 
the same impotence that its predecessor, the League of Nations, suffered after the 
1935 Abyssinian crisis when Italian dictator Benito Mussolini attacked what was by 
then the only independent state in Africa. The League imposed only tepid economic 
sanctions against Italy, which Mussolini ignored. By the time that Adolf Hitler 
superceded the Duce as Europe's most fanatical aggressor, the League was a mere 
debating society. We would hate to see the same fate befall today's U.N., but the 
record is not good.  
 
 
 
Actions linked to the League of Nations are here identified as lessons the United Nations should 
have learned. Notably, after Abyssinia was invaded by Mussolini in 1935, no real action was 
taken against this invasion by the League of Nations which only imposed economic sanctions 
against Italy following an appeal for help by the Abyssinians. The sanctions were not effective 
and did not contain materials that could be vital and influence Italy such as oil; if oil had been 
included this could have made major effect on Italy. Two members of the League - France and 
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Britain - did not want to have their naval power atrisk in the Mediterranean by provoking 
Mussolini (Britain had two naval bases in the area). The French Prime Minister - Pierre Laval 
- and the British Foreign Secretary - Samuel Hoare - met to try to end the war and came up with 
a plan according to which two large areas of Abyssinia would be ceded to Italy and the ‘corridor 
of camels’ would be given to the Abyssinians. Furthermore, the southern part of the country 
was to be allocated to Italian businesses. This plan was accepted by Mussolini, but there was 
an outcry in Britain. The British government was believed to have betrayed the Abyssinian 
people, the Foreign Secretary had to resign and the plan was dropped. The plan had shown that 
two members of the major European were ready to appease and negotiate with Mussolini who 
invaded another country. With regard to the case under study here, in the above extract a 
reference is made to the United Nations’ failure to agree on a new resolution to oppose Saddam 
Hussein’s regime and, by repeating the mistakes made by the League of Nations in the past, its 
failure to live up to its responsibilities. 
 
 
Figure 16: Rhetoric of judging (adapted from Forchtner, 2014) ) 
6.3 Saddam in the two wars 
 
A simple comparison of the numbers and frequencies of the occurrence of the word Saddam in 
the two wars (see Figure 17) reveals a significant difference between them, especially if we 
consider that the Iraq-Iran war lasted for eight years whereas the US-led invasion lasted only 
around six weeks. The frequency of references to Saddam in the US-led invasion is significantly 
higher than that in the Iraq-Iran war. The reason for this difference may be attributed to the fact 
that Saddam was viewed as the focus of the struggle in the build-up phase as well as during the 
war in the 2003 US-led invasion. Therefore, Iraq as a state was represented by his person. 
Saddam was the focus of propaganda and he was demonised, represented as possessing WMD, 
and constructed as being a threat who therefore should be toppled. The discourse on Saddam 
continued even after he was overthrown and the US was trying to locate his whereabouts. 
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During the Iraq-Iran war, on the other hand, Saddam was not the focus in the American press 
discourses: the war was between two countries – as opposed to personalities - and the nature of 
US involvement was different from that in the US-led invasion. In general, the role of the press 
in that conflict was to report what each side - Iraq or Iran - said about the other.  
 
Figure 17 Frequency of references to Saddam 
 
In the Iraq-Iran war Saddam was represented as drawing mainly on national and religious 
identities in order to capitalise on the historic enmity between the Arabs and the Persians. This 
was done by making references to historical and religious figures to urge his people to continue 
fighting. He also encouraged the other Arab countries to support him in that war and began to 
build his personality cult. Furthermore, he was constructed as having ambitions for regional 
leadership and as being a supporter of pan-Arabism; he had also for a long time been seen as 
coveting the powerful role of Gamal Abdul Nasser in the Gulf. He also allegedly had a strong 
desire to succeed the Shah of Iran as the ‘policeman’ of the Gulf. Although Saddam was 
represented negatively in the Iraq-Iran war, this negative construction was even stronger during 
the US-led invasion  
In 2003 US-led invasion Saddam was constructed differently by the US press: he was 
demonised and vilified during the build-up to the war. Before and during the actual war there 
were constant discussions in the press highlighting negative traits and wrongdoings, and 
stripping him of every good and godly quality in order to legitimise the intervention. This 
vilification is evident through a process of criminalisation, manifested in the words and 
references associated with him and that often suggest he was against his own people. Other 
references likened him to historical figures like Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini and Mao to establish 
guilt through negative association. Showing a similarity to these actors either by suggesting that 
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Saddam was emulating their wrongdoings or simply by suggesting he admired these people was 
a way of vilifying him. Furthermore, the press linked Saddam to al Qaeda and portrayed him as 
posing an equal threat to Osama bin Laden, erasing all the differences between the two and 
depicting them as one cohesive enemy. The intention was to show that each played a 
complementary role: Saddam harboured al Qaeda forces and providing them with training and 
other kinds of support and as a result he represented a threat to both neighbouring countries and 
the US.  
Another difference in the reporting of Saddam in the two wars was revealed through examining 
the degree of access and how much voice Saddam was given in the US press: i.e., Saddam’s 
statements and claims, and the things he said during the build-up to the war and the war itself 
in the two conflicts under investigation. This was accomplished by sketching (see Footnote 24 
below) words that act as a verb to the subject of Saddam: namely, saying verbs, and by using a 
sketch engine24 to provide a summary of categorised collocation, as shown in Table 30.  
Saying 
Verbs 
Saddam (Iraq- Iran) Khomeini (Iraq-Iran) Saddam 
(Invasion) 
Bush (Invasion) 
  say (222), tell (21), 
proclaim (7),   
speak (12), tell (16),   Say (1,096), tell (130), speak 
(89), ask (60), 
 announce (25), urge (17), 
order  (11), warn (12), 
declare (11), reiterate (9), 
call (17), express (9),  
order (16), call (25), 
warn (14), urge (13), 
issue (12), announce 
(11), authorise (6), 
refuse (12), declare  (53), call (87), 
announce (49), pledge (42), 
vow (39), address (38), 
 accuse (8)    
Table 30 Saddam’s Saying Verbs during the Iraq-Iran war and US-led Invasion 
 
From Table 30, is apparent that the US press gave Iran, Iraq, Saddam and Khomeini a voice 
during the Iraq-Iran war through reporting their actions and citing what they had said, told the 
press or announced to the public. In the 2003 US-led invasion this did not happen, meaning that 
Saddam and Iraq remained voiceless and muted. In contrast, Bush was quoted or reported in a 
vast number of ways, for instance, the verb ‘say’ is used 1,096 times in the corpus. The 
inequality of access to the US press of Saddam and Bush indicates considerable US press bias 
toward US politics.  
Furthermore, as part of Saddam’s criminalisation during the US-led invasion, the US press 
tended to quote, report on and refer to those who had been killed or suffered or those who were 
in exile; their stories were integrated into the press discourse as part of the propaganda 
                                                 
24 Sketch engine is online software that offers a grammatical and collocational one-page summary in which the 
collocates are categorised according to their grammatical relations: e.g., a word that acts as the subject of the verb 
or an object of the verb (Adam Kilgarriff et al., 2014). It can be accessed through  https://www.sketchengine.co.uk/  
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campaign. During the Iraq-Iran war this happened only very rarely. The aim during the 2003 
conflict was to depict the invasion as a humanitarian intervention on the part of the US designed 
to liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam.  
6.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the construction of Saddam during the US-led invasion has been examined, and 
the major reporting differences of this construction during the Iraq-Iran war and the 2003 US-
led invasion have been highlighted. The results of the analysis of the data reveal that Saddam 
was constructed in a negative way during the US-led invasion, when he was depicted as being 
a threat to neighbouring countries, America and the rest of the world through his possession of 
WMD and his links to al Qaeda. He was further demonised and criminalised as part of the 
propaganda campaign as well as being compared with well known historical figures whose 
names had acquired negative connotations in the minds of people. 
With regard to the differences in the construction of Saddam during the two wars, overall the 
frequency of references to Saddam and the number of collocates was much higher during the 
US-led invasion than during the Iraq-Iran war. Furthermore, generally speaking, the role of the 
press during the latter conflict in relation to Saddam was to report what each side - Iraq and Iraq 
- said about the other; this was done to show the nature of the war and how each side perceived 
it. The predicational and referential strategies used by the press in the Iraq-Iran war were 
negative: Saddam was represented as espousing the idea of Pan-Arabism as well as creating his 
own personality cult and using the Islamist and Arabist discourse to continue the war. However, 
these strategies are much less negative than those used during the US-led invasion and in the 
build-up period to this war, when Saddam was characterised by and associated with a discourse 
of demonisation and criminalisation as well as being seen as posing a threat that had to be 
confronted. The history of the Iraq-Iran war was also used during the 2003 conflict to show that 
Saddam had a history of attacking his neighbours.  
Similarly, during the Iraq-Iran war Saddam was never collocated with the Halabja gassing; by 
contrast, fifteen years after the incident, during the reporting of the US-led invasion, Saddam 
was linked and collocated with Halabja. This type of reporting, together with the selective 
shaming campaign and the demonisation of Saddam, contributed to manufacturing general 
consent for organising and going to war against Iraq in 2003; this is indicative of the fact that 
the US press agenda was in line with that of the country’s administration. 
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The predicational, referential and the argumentation strategies followed by the US press have 
all worked in line with the US politicians to demonise and personalise the war by criminalising 
Saddam to legitimise and facilitate the 2003 intervention. This explains the relationship 
between the state and the US press during the period of conflict. The state-press relationship 
has influenced press behaviour through overreliance on the US government’s statement; 
thereby muting and blocking all voices of rivals and giving them little or no access to the press. 
The result was constituting and creating realities and executing the politicians’ agenda. 
Saddam’s construction has come exactly with Bennett's theory of indexing (1990), whereby the 
press tended to index the range of views expressed by the government. Moreover, the voice of 
the ‘other’ is not included in the news story when the enemy’s voice does not reflect the US 
officials’ story and only favoured victims stories were brought to the news that fit the 
propaganda. Whereas, during the Iraq-Iran war, it was seen that the indexing was more relaxed 
and different voices (Iraqi officials and Iranian officials) were allowed to delve in the story 
because it was perceived as having no direct influence on the US.  
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Chapter 7: US-LED INVASION:  HALABJA AND CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the discursive construction of the events at Halabja and the subject of chemical 
weapons (CWs) in the US press during the US-led invasion of Iraq are examined. These two 
constructions are then compared with their equivalents during the Iraq-Iran war described in 
Chapter 5.  
The construction of Halabja and CWs were examined by means of their concordance lines and 
collocates through identifying recurring predicational and referential strategies as well as the 
main arguments used. These strategies were then categorised according to their semantic 
meaning in order to create themes. The theme of Halabja was then divided into sub-themes, 
which are described in sections 7.2.1- 7.2.3. The CWs theme also consists of sub-themes, and 
these are examined in sections 7.4.1-7.4.3. These themes then followed by their comparison 
with counterparts in the Iraq-Iran war7.5.  
 
7.2 The Theme of Halabja 
It is worth mentioning here that the events in Halabja were referred to in a variety of ways, not 
just through the use of the specific word ‘Halabja’. References include ‘killing 5000 Kurds’, 
‘gassing Kurds’, using ‘chemical weapons against Kurds’ and referring to a ‘poison gas attack’ 
that killed thousands of Kurds. All these phrases refer to the actual incident of the Halabja 
gassing. The concordance lines of Halabja were therefore also examined in order to identify the 
predicational and referential strategies, and then classified according to their semantic themes, 
as shown in sections 7.2.1 - 7.2.3.  
7.2.1 Halabja as a precedent   
 
The history of Halabja was referred to on many occasions during the build-up to the 2003 US-
led invasion along with other arguments – in particular those relating to WMD and the need for 
a humanitarian intervention – for the purpose of demonstrating that Saddam had a history of 
mass murder, having killed thousands of men, women and children, and that he is capable of 
any crime and that he would not hesitate to use such weapons against anyone - even his own 
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people. On these basis, Halabja gassing is used repeatedly as a precedent in the 2003 war build- 
up narrative. In this regards, Walton (1996a) argues that the precedence argument is a “species 
of case-based reasoning where citing a particular case is used to argue for changing an existing 
rule, or adding a new rule to supplement existing rules” (p. 94). Therefore, Halabja was used in 
this particular time to promote and aid in demonisation of Iraq in general and Saddam in 
particular.  
 
121. During a 1988 revolt, Hussein's forces attacked villagers from Halabja, on 
the eastern side of the autonomous zone near the Iranian border, with chemical 
weapons. Thousands of people died. 
The Washington Post March 29, 2003 Saturday 
122. The war also showed how vicious the dictator could be when desperate: In 
1988 he allegedly ordered poison gas dumped on the Kurdish town of Halabja to 
punish militants there who were helping Iran. At least 5,000 are said to have 
perished in the attack.  
Philadelphia Inquirer March 20, 2003 Thursday 
In the above US press accounts the Halabja genocide has been reduced to only Saddam gassing 
his own people killing more than 5,000 Kurdish civilians. However, many other relevant details 
of the context are omitted. The gassing of Halabja was a fact, as was the killing of thousands of 
innocent civilians. However, these facts were favourable aspects to capitalise and report since 
they suited the requirements of the war propaganda and they come in line with the demonisation 
of Saddam that was carried out before the 2003 US-led invasion was launched. The fact that 
Halabja was the scene of fighting between Iraqi forces on the one side and Iranian forces aided 
by Kurdish guerrillas who attempted to capture a strategic area inside Iraq on the other were 
unfavourable facts, unsuited to the war propaganda. Therefore, these facts were dropped off 
and the press only selected the facts that adds up to the criminalisation of Saddam25. Below are 
more concordances lines, Table 31,  that shows how the US press foregrounded this particular 
piece of context i.e. and constructing it as merely Saddam gassing his own people in this 
particular time of the US build- up to the war.  
                                                 
25 Although there was no justification for Saddam’s action, the point I am making here is that the public were not 
given all the facts about the situation by the press. 
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Table 31: The use of CWs in the past 
 
7.2.2 Halabja at present 
 
Halabja has suddenly become worthy to cover, draw lesson from and to have its victims 
interviewed 15 years after its happening with more negative construction attributed to Saddam. 
Halabja events and its after-effects, symptoms and defects were proliferated and linked to the 
present time. 
123. Today the people of Halabja suffer from high rates of birth defects, cancer and 
blindness, and many have respiratory illnesses. 
The Washington Post March 16, 2003 Sunday 
This example, as well as example 124, is an attempt to arouse people’s feelings of pity in order 
to lay the ground for subsequent arguments in which the arguer reminds his or her audience of 
the incident by linking the past to the present. In examples 123- 125 from The Washington Post, 
the arguer uses an argument developed gradually, forming a series of small steps of reasoning. 
Rather than providing these steps with one big step, smaller items are introduced gradually in 
an attempt to persuade the audience to accept a particular conclusion (Walton, 1996a, p. 95). 
This conclusion is prefaced by a sequence of accepted preceding premises. Instead of arguing 
that it was necessary to go to war directly, the arguer starts with the fact that CWs have been 
used and killed thousands of innocent people, some of whom are still suffering the aftermath of 
psychological and physical effects that continue across generations – all of which is factually 
true but that has been brought into the limelight suddenly and deliberately at this point in time 
in the press discourses.  
The arguer continues, in examples 124 and 125, with another step to appeal beyond proof to 
secure acceptance and to seek the involvement of the audience through the repeated use of ‘we 
know’ to mix the fact with the claims to reach to the desired conclusion i.e. taking action against 
Iraq. This move has been done through taking the audience from something they already know 
or a common knowledge as ‘chemical weapons cause illness, disease and death’ to claims 
asserting Saddam’s own alleged admission, he possesses these weapons and has tested them 
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without specifying the period. This can be seen in phrases such as ‘Hussein has admitted’, 
‘tested plague’, ‘has mustard gas’, unaccompanied by any details concerning when or where he 
admitted this, or whether it was before his co-operation with the UN inspection teams or before 
the war or after operation Desert Storm in 1990. Mixing untrue or unverified claims with some 
indisputably true statements the arguer hopes to persuade his or her audience to believe the 
claims. The arguer resorts to such methods as part of a propaganda technique designed to make 
it more likely that his or her audience will come to the desired conclusion.  
124. So we know that chemical weapons cause illness, disease and death. We also 
know that biological weapons using anthrax and botulinum toxin, plague and Ebola 
cause severe illness and death. And we know that Hussein has admitted to having 
quantities of weaponized anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. He has also 
tested plague, typhus, cholera, camel pox and hemorrhagic fever. And we know he has 
mustard gas and the VX nerve agent. We know he has no compunction when it comes 
to killing people.  
The Washington Post March 16, 2003 Sunday 
Also, the use of technical scientific jargon such as ‘anthrax and botulinum toxin, plague and 
Ebola’ can potentially deceive an audience by deliberately giving the argument a pseudo-
scientific nature. By using this approach the speaker, according to Pirie (2015), might “induce 
an unearned respect for what is said” as well as give an indication of the strength of the 
argument. The fallacy of what Pirie (2015, p. 22) calls ‘blinding with science’ has been used 
widely in relation to the use of CWs terminologies or WMDs to direct the audience into 
assuming that the statements made were of a scientific nature and based on facts, since in the 
popular imagination science has considerable credibility: people believe scientific statements 
to be right, as opposed to mere judgement. At the same time these arguments were used to 
create fear among the public of the danger of using these weapons.  
In example 125 below, the arguer pulls out all the stops to persuade his audience to come to the 
conclusion that there is only one solution to the problem by instilling the illusion that such 
weapons will be used. The arguer in this example says that there is no cure for the effects of the 
alleged CWs and that Saddam could cause mayhem if the fear of the weapons being used were 
to spread. In the ‘no cure’ argument, an analogy with HIV/AIDS was presented, diseases very 
well known to the public for the difficulty in curing them. It is also known that there is no 
effective cure in spite of research attempts and funds spent; a highly negative perception is 
therefore constructed in people’s minds. The use of the fear appeal based on just one possible 
scenario has the effect of turning a hypothetical situation into a complete certainty.  
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125. We know that there are no vaccines -- and sometimes no treatments -- for the 
disease and illness that would result from his use of many of these weapons. 
Scientists in the best research facilities in the world are constantly seeking vaccines 
and cures. But as we know from the search for a vaccine and a cure for HIV/AIDS, it 
is a very slow process.  
The Washington Post March 16, 2003 Sunday 
7.2.3 Dramatisation of Victims’ Stories 
 
Everything that fall or serve the interest of making the justification to go to Iraq for a war have 
been foregrounded and drawn on. One of strategies that was viewed to serve the justification is 
recalling the accounts of victims of the Halabja genocide- either by quoting them or by 
interviewing people who had a close connection to the them. The victims accounts illustrated 
the horrific moments the victims went through in through retailing.   
Johnson-Cartee (2004, p. 272) argues that such dramatic representations of individual stories 
attract audiences as they are very persuasive, and that it is believed that exemplars that “are 
vivid, emotionally engaging, and attention inviting will have superior accessibility or 
memorability”..  
126. International human rights groups say more than 100,000 Kurds were killed by 
Iraqi government forces in the late 1980s. Most notorious was the 1988 nerve and 
mustard gas attack that killed more than 5,000 people in the Kurdish town of Halabja. 
"My brother . . . my husband's brother," said Nasrin Dewana, 52, counting on her 
fingers the men missing from her family. "They've all been killed. "We've all been 
damaged by Saddam."  
The Washington Post April 10, 2003 Thursday 
127. "The poor man was 28 years old," she says. Michael says she still suffers 
aftereffects from the gassing: trembling in her hands, damaged lungs that cause her to 
wake up gasping for air and -- worst of all, she says -- nightmares. "I can't get rid of 
the pictures I have in my head." That attack was merely an early, crude experiment. 
Over the next year, the Iraqi army learned to make its gas attacks more lethal.  
The Washington Post April 9, 2003 Wednesday 
 
128. Mr. Golestan won acclaim for his coverage of chemical attacks on Kurdish 
town of Halabja in 1988, in which 5,000 people were killed. "It was life frozen, life 
that stopped, like watching a film and suddenly it hangs on one frame," the BBC 
quoted him as saying later. "It was a new kind of death to me. You went into a 
room, say a kitchen, and you saw the body of a woman holding a knife where she 
had just been cutting carrots." A young girl who had been gassed died in Mr. 
Golestan's arms on a helicopter ride out of Halabja, he recalled.  
 
The New York Times April 3, 2003 Thursday 
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7.3 The Theme of CWs  
 
One of the US adminstration’s main justifications for going to war against Iraq was the 
allegation that Iraq possessed WMD. This was considered by US officials to be a threat to the 
international community and evidence of Iraq’s non-compliance with the UN resolution that 
the country should disarm. This is in line with Fairclough (2005, p. 48) argument that “one 
important shift in the would-be hegemonic discourse in the period since September 11 is the 
constitution of a relation of equivalence between ‘terrorism’ and ‘weapons of mass destruction’ 
as members of the class of ‘threats’”. It is only those nations which are classified as belonging 
to the ‘axis of evil’ that are seen as posessing ‘WMD’, rather than ‘nuclear weapons’, and as a 
result as being perpetrators of terrorism, despite the fact that other nations own them (Bhatia, 
2009, p. 279). Fairclough (2005, p. 6) argues that “weapons of mass destruction are only a threat 
in the hands of the ‘bad guys’ – ‘our’ weapons of mass destruction are not alluded to”. 
 
Weapons of mass destruction is a catch-all phrase to describe weapons with “varying levels of 
destructing [sic] power” (Millar and Ipe, 2007, p. 123). According to Korobko and Musa (2014, 
p. 212) In, a weapon of mass destruction is defined as a weapon 
Weapon. of mass destruction (WMD) is a type of weapon with the capacity inflict 
death and destruction on such a massive scale and so indiscriminately that only its 
very presence in the hands of a hostile power can be considered as a grievous threat. 
Modern weapons of mass destruction can be either nuclear, biological, or chemical 
ones.  
 
This definition includes many expressions of threat that denote not only the country’s ability to 
produce this type of weapon but also the kind of arsenal the enemy has. The term WMD was 
used increasingly after 9/11 in both UK and US newspapers. In 1998, there were only thirteen 
articles on The Guardian website that included the phrase ‘mass destruction weapon’ and all of 
those had been written one month prior to the US ‘Desert Storm’ operation. The figure rose to 
75, 204 and 2,070 in 1999, 2001 and 2003 respectively (Richardson, 2007b, p. 187). The term 
has become largly associated with Iraq and Saddam and it has been expanded to include a 
variety of expressions. These include WMD, doomsday, smoking gun/s, mushroom cloud/s, as 
well as chemical and biological agents and chemical weapons (CWs). In the current study, in 
order to answer the question concerning how CWs were represented during the US-led invasion 
and to compare that with the representation of CWs during the Iraq-Iran war, only the phrase 
‘chemical weapons’ is investigated in the corpora. Figure 18 shows the total number of 
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occurences of the phrase ‘chemical weapons’ throughout all the weeks of the conflict in the US 
press corpora.  
 
Figure 18: Frequency of CWs during US-led Invasion 
Figure 18 shows the distribution of use of the phrase ‘chemical weapons’ in the war period. It 
is interesting to see the fluctuation in the number of reports including the term: there is an 
obvious and dramatic rise between week 0 and week 1. The frequency reached its highest level 
in week 1, which is indicative of the fact that this period was the build-up to the war. This rise 
was then followed by a drop in week 2 and another rise in week 3, which was the second highest 
level of reporting of chemical weapons among all the weeks. The number of occurences 
decreased dramatically between week 3 - when it fell from 273 to 3 in  week  7.  
 
In order to investigate how the phrase ‘chemical weapons’ was reported over these weeks and 
to obtain a clearer idea of the rise and falls in frequency, a collocation analysis was conducted. 
The concordance lines for the collocates were also expanded to provide more context in order 
to indicate the themes as well as the semantic topics. Table 32 shows the semantic topics for all 
weeks. A more comprehensive lists of collocates is provided in the Appendix C. 
 
Period Semantic topics 
Week 0 History of using CWs, al-Qaeda, US soldiers protection of CWs, threat of Saddam, 
British set certain conditions for avoiding war, the Kurds’ fear of CW bombings 
Week 1 History of using CWs, delivery of CWs, al-Qaeda link, suspected sites, the search 
for  chemical items or elements, threat, possession, red lines for use of CWs 
Week 2  
Week 3 Saddam’s Red line to use CWs, suspected sites, threat, investigation with POWs, 
history of using CWs, methods of delivering CWs, no CWs found, production of 
CWs  
Week 4 The search for CWs, CWs not found, al-Qaeda, history of usage 
Week 5 Iraq sends CWs to Syria, Syria provides refuge and CWs, Syria accused of 
possessing CWs 
Week 6 Syria accused of possessing  CWs 
Week 7 Syria accused of possessing  CWs 
Table 32: Semantic topics of CWs in the US-led Invasion 
 
132
292
180
273
196
112
59
3
WEEK 0 WEEK 1 WEEK 2 WEEK 3 WEEK 4 WEEK 5 WEEK 6 WEEK 7
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Having calculated the frequencies of the CWs and the collocates along with their expanded 
concordances, the main discourses on CWs were identified. These are summarised in Figure 
19.  
 
Figure 19: The encapsulation of widespread discourses on CWs in the US-led invasion (2003) 
 
7.4 The Threat 
In this section the themes of the threat of CWs are highlighted. The threat, as will be seen, was 
constructed as being manifested in different ways both before the war broke out and during the 
war.  
7.4.1 The threat of al Qaeda 
One of the constructed themes concerning CWs is the threat of al Qaeda’s access to such 
weapons through Saddam and the alleged link between Saddam and al Qaeda, which was later 
proved to be unfounded.  
129. Iraq has trained al Qaeda members to make poisons and bombs while 
providing safe haven to violent extremists, says the CIA.  
The Washington Post March 16, 2003 Sunday 
130. Hussein has used deadly gas against his own countrymen and started two wars. 
It is only a matter of time, Bush and his top lieutenants fear, before Hussein builds a 
nuclear weapon, fires a missile at an American target or delivers biological or 
chemical weapons to terrorists.   
The Washington Post March 16, 2003 Sunday 
In extract 129, the claim that ‘Iraq has trained al Qaeda members to make poisons and bombs 
[…]’ is portrayed as being an incontrovertible fact, since the information came from an expert 
or a valid authority - the ‘CIA’. This gives the statement its credentials and makes it believable 
by the audience. This reference to authority does not make the claim true, however, as no 
supporting evidence was offered. In the case of our example 130 above, the arguer refers to the 
true historical facts that the gas has already been used in Halabja, and that Saddam has already 
started two wars – the Iraq-Iran war and the invasion of Kuwait. This is an example of what 
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Bennett (2012) refers to as the “hypnotic bait and switch” fallacy, in which incontrovertible 
facts are stated in sequence, followed by claims the arguer wants his audience to believe as 
facts. This is done in order to make the arguer’s subsequent claims – first, that Iraq possesses 
CWs and considered as a threat– appear accurate, so that the audience accept them. As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, mixing hypothetical claims with facts is a strategy used to make a 
statement appear to be a true. These two premises were introduced to create a strong impression 
of fear, and to lead the audience to conclude that there was a real danger that Saddam would 
target America directly, or indirectly by providing weapons to al Qaeda, who would then attack 
America – in other words, to persuade the audience to conclude that the threat was very real.  
 
In example 131 below, by contrast, ties between al Qaeda and Saddam have been presented in 
the news as an established truth, rather than requiring a series of arguments to persuade the 
audience that this link exists. Saddam has been constructed as being in a ‘sinister axis’ 
relationship with al Qaeda, which is represented as an international organisation, and the air 
strikes have been organised to destroy these ties. The word ‘international’ suggests that Saddam 
can reach any country in the world indirectly through these terrorists. It is worth mentioning, 
however, that the north of Iraq is an autonomous region completely controlled by the Kurds and 
outside Saddam’s reach.  
131. The United States launched airstrikes on the stronghold of vicious Islamic 
extremists with ties to al Qaeda in northern Iraq - aiming to sever the "sinister axis" 
between Saddam Hussein and international terrorists in the early hours of the war. 
The New York Post March 23, 2003, Sunday 
In example 132, the link with al Qaeda is constructed by showing al Qaeda support for and 
defence of Saddam by sending fighters from different regions to target US forces. The estimated 
number of al Qaeda fighters, as well as the specification of a particular place (Chechnya), is 
intended to give the impression of certainty and truth. The reference to an (unspecified) source 
is used to back up the allegations of the ‘ties’ between Saddam and al Qaeda. The unidentified 
source, according to Bennett (2017), may be used as “a way to fabricate, exaggerate, or 
misrepresent facts in order to deceive others into accepting” a claim. Walton (1996a) argues 
that the naming of the source is very important in indicating how credible or reliable the person 
is, and therefore not giving the name and the use of the opaque phrase tells us a great deal about 
the arguer and his or her intentions, as well as about the nature or reliability of the information 
(p. 62). 
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132. The Ansar al-Islam encampment has been a priority target for U.S. forces 
because of recent intelligence reports that hundreds of al Qaeda fighters have arrived 
from Chechnya and other regions to launch terrorist attacks on U.S. forces, sources 
told The Post. 
The New York Post March 23, 2003, Sunday 
The claim that Iraq possessed CWs and the consequent allegation that Iraq posed a real threat 
were further constructed and consolidated through integrating or quoting the claims of people 
of high societal status. Examples 133 and 134 are examples of the citation of ‘Secretary of State 
Colin Powell’, which serves to strengthen the argument, since the readers would consider him 
as being in a position of knowledge. This construction works on the basis that Powell has either 
knowledge of or access to information the press or audience do not have, and therefore more 
weight is given to his statements based on this presumption being true. The information 
provided contains very specific details of the type of chemical, group movements and the 
countries where al Qaeda members are active. It also shows the countries they have been to, 
which is not information that an ordinary person knows and therefore adds to credibility.  
133. Powell charged that the group was producing ricin and other deadly chemical 
weapons for al Qaeda terror cells throughout the world and that Jordan-born master 
terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has been operating there. 
The New York Post March 23, 2003, Sunday 
134. Powell told the United Nations that al-Zarqawi received medical treatment in 
Baghdad after escaping Afghanistan and formed a "Baghdad cell" responsible for the 
killing of U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley in Amman, Jordan, last year. 
The New York Post March 23, 2003, Sunday 
The continuous repetition of false arguments or premises in terms of Saddam’s link to al Qaeda 
and their access to CWs in the US press with no useful information or evidence being provided 
served to construct a perceived reality or truth in the minds of the audience.  
 
7.4.2 The threat of Iraq’s possession of CWs  
7.4.2.1 Attacking Saddam’s ethos 
 
One of the main strategies constructed in the US press to prove Saddam’s possession of CWs - 
while failing to provide evidence - was attacking Saddam’s credibility. For example, in extract 
135, the argument of inconsistency and the ethotic argument were used by Bush in order to 
bring to light the issue of WMD by means of CWs and other naming. This involved questioning 
Saddam’s commitment to UN obligations and his temporising regarding disarmament, and at 
the same time suggesting his lack of credibility using examples of breaches of ‘longstanding 
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obligations’. The purpose was to present convincing arguments that would persuade the global 
community to distrust Saddam and encourage them to vote against him.  
135. Saddam Hussein has a history of mass murder. He possesses the weapons of mass 
murder. He agrees -- he agreed to disarm Iraq of these weapons as a condition for ending the 
Gulf War over a decade ago. The United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1441 has 
declared Iraq in material breach of its longstanding obligations; demanded once again Iraq's 
full and immediate disarmament; and promised serious consequences if the regime refused to 
comply. That resolution was passed unanimously, and its logic is inescapable. The Iraqi 
regime will disarm itself or the Iraqi regime will be disarmed by force. And the regime has 
not disarmed itself.  
The New York Times March 17, 2003 Monday 
In employing these strategies, according to Walton (1996a, p. 85), the “ethos (the character of 
the speaker) is used to transfer credibility (either positively or negatively) to the proposition 
advocated by the speaker”. Since Saddam was constructed as a person with a negative ethos, 
represented by his lack of commitment to and manipulative attitude towards UN resolutions, an 
either-or position was presented. Saddam has the option either to ‘disarm itself’ or to ‘be 
disarmed by force’. These two options were squeezed down even further into a single option 
by the statement: ‘the regime has not disarmed itself’, which effectively eliminates one of the 
two options and suggests that the only way to disarm Saddam is by using force. 
7.4.2.2 Arguments based on ‘Signs’  
 
Another strategy used to persuade the public to accept the conclusion that Iraq possessed CWs 
was to publicise the fact that there had been ‘signs’ of such weapons. In example 136, the 
‘argument of sign’26 is preceded by the sign ‘reconnaissance image showed munitions being 
delivered’. The information is presented as coming from what is considered a high or credible 
authority that is presumed to have reliable information. This sign is followed by another sign 
that strengthens the suggestion that the munitions referred to were CWs - the allegation that 
these weapons were ‘accompanied by chemical decontamination trucks’. All of these signs are 
intended to lead to a conclusion that there is a presence of CWs. These two signs, along with 
many other examples of signs, are constructed as accumulating evidence, each of these signs 
has a weight that is used to add more weight to or support the conclusion that Iraq possess 
WMDs.  
136. "There are intelligence reports that Iraq has distributed chemical weapons, most 
likely VX [nerve gas] to the Republican Guard," including the Medina division, said Kenneth 
                                                 
26 An argument of sign is an argument where a “a particular finding or observation x is taken as evidence of the 
existence of a property or event” (Walton, 1996a, p. 47). For instance, an observation of CWs protective suits, 
masks gear and antidotes were considered as signs of Iraq’s possession of CWs and WMDs. 
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M. Pollack, a former CIA analyst of Middle Eastern militaries. When reconnaissance images 
showed munitions being delivered, he said, they were accompanied by chemical 
decontamination trucks.  
The Washington Post March 25, 2003 Tuesday 
137. A Pentagon official expressed concern that chemical weapons, most likely VX or 
mustard gas, are being transferred to Iraqi forces. "The indication we've gotten is that they've 
dispersed chemical weapons to some of their troops. We take this as a sign that they've got 
the capacity to use it," said the official,  
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 20, 2003 Thursday 
Saddam and Iraq were referred to as possessing CWs or WMD during the week following the 
outbreak of war, and this construction continued throughout all the weeks of the corpora up 
until the occupation of Baghdad. The claim was based on finding other signs i.e. Iraqi CW 
protection gear and an antidote for nerve agents in some places by the advancing US forces or 
on information allegedly provided by the Iraqi soldiers and officers who surrendered. It was 
also suggested by the statements and speculations of US officials about the possible 
whereabouts of CW plants. The presence of this equipment was constructed to suggest that 
Saddam had such weapons.  
138. Some Iraqi troops had up-to-date chemical-weapons equipment when they 
surrendered - a warning sign that Saddam Hussein's forces are ready to use the dread 
arms, a new report says. They had old guns but 2002 gas masks, chemical 
decontamination kits and atropine - an antidote for nerve gas…  
The New York Post March 25, 2003, Tuesday 
7.4.2.3 Alleged Certainty 
 
During the US advance and the seizing of some cities in Iraq there was a continuous search for 
suspected sites of CWs, since this was the basis for the invasion. Notably, nothing was found. 
US officials attempted to justify the decision to continue the war by continuing to insist that 
Iraq possessed CWs, despite the fact that no evidence had presented itself. As a result, excuses 
were made and statements were constantly being defined and redefined.  
139. So far, allied troops haven't found any "smoking gun" chemical weapons - but 
Pentagon officials insist it's only a matter of time. 
The New York Post March 25, 2003, Tuesday 
140. "I have no doubt that we'll find weapons of mass destruction, but you 
shouldn't think it's going to happen tomorrow." 
The New York Times March 24, 2003 Monday 
141. Mr. Powell was asked by a skeptical European journalist why American and 
British armed forces had not yet found any evidence of nuclear, biological or 
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chemical weapons, which Mr. Bush made a reason for the war. "We will continue to 
search for weapons of mass destruction, and I'm quite confident they will be 
found," Mr. Powell said.  
 
The New York Times April 4, 2003 Friday 
In above examples (139-141), officials are arguing from a position of alleged certainty for Iraqi 
possession of WMD without providing any evidence. This can be seen in the use of phrases 
such as ‘no doubt’, ‘quite confident’ or showing that ‘it’s only a matter of time’ and ‘you 
shouldn’t think it’s going to happen tomorrow’. Examples 142- 143, show how, in the light of 
the repeated failure to uncover WMD, US officials kept modifying their claims according to 
the situation in Iraq in order to sound certain and right despite the lack of any evidence, 
persisting in defending this wrong claim in the light of the failed repeated search is engaging in 
what is Carey (2011, pp. 120-21) refers to as Ad Hoc rescue in which he argues that  
[T]his move is not intended to find new and better ways to test a claim nor even to 
provide grounds for modifying the claim. Rather, the aim of an ad hoc rescue is simply 
to save the claim in the face of mounting evidence that it is wrong 
 
In addition, since nothing was being found in the seized areas, it was reported that the WMD 
were actually located in the capital, Baghdad a false claim to have the mission of invasion 
completed. 
142. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told ABC's "This Week" yesterday that 
it's no surprise that U.S-led forces haven't yet found the actual chemical weapons 
because most of them are near Baghdad and Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit.  
The New York Post March 31, 2003, Monday 
143. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein is hiding deadly biological and chemical weapons 
in sites around Baghdad that coalition forces have not captured, Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld said yesterday. "  
Daily News (New York) March 31, 2003, Monday 
 
7.4.3 The continuous threat of CWs 
 
The fear and threat of CWs was continuous both before and after the invasion. The first threats 
were viewed through the Iraqi Kurds’ fear of Saddam’s deployment of CWs and through 
recalling the history of what had happened to them in Halabja in 1988.  
144. Thousands of Kurds fled areas near Iraqi military forces in northern Iraq, 
fearing that Saddam would unleash chemical weapons similar to those he used in that 
region in 1988.  
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St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 18, 2003 Tuesday 
Another constructed threat in relation to the use of CWs was the allegation that Saddam had 
delivered WMD to his on-the-ground officers to use when war broke out and that he had ordered 
them to use them. These allegations were constructed in the press through quoting ‘Marine 
officers’, ‘intelligence’ and ‘U.S. officials’. Those individuals are expected to be in a position 
to know or are seen as experts who are presumed to have access to reliable information. These 
statements contributed to the establishment of the presupposition that Iraq did, in fact, possess 
CWs. 
145. Marine officers said intelligence indicates President Saddam Hussein has given 
"release authority" to Iraq's regional military commanders and possibly down to corps 
commanders.  
The Washington Post March 18, 2003 Tuesday 
146. On the eve of all-but-certain war, U.S. officials warned of fresh threats that 
Saddam has given chemical weapons - VX, sarin or mustard gas - to some Republican 
Guard units. "There are indications that there is a high risk the Iraqi regime will use 
chemical weapons at some point in any conflict," said a U.S. official. 
The New York Post March 18, 2003, Tuesday 
Another strategy used to persuade the public that the threat of Saddam continued to be very real 
was to recall the tactics used by Iraq in the war against Iran. In that conflict Saddam’s forces 
had resorted to using artillery shells to deliver CWs, showing that he had the capacity to use 
different ways of delivering the alleged weapons.  
147. Artillery shells and rockets Iraq made extensive use of artillery shells filled 
with chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq War. Mortars also can be used for chemical 
weapons. Iraq is known to have tested shells and rockets to deliver biological agents.  
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 18, 2003 Tuesday 
Furthermore, Baghdad was constructed as being the ‘red line’ for the CWs to be unleashed 
when the allied forces approached it.  
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Table 33: Baghdad as a red line 
 
7.5 Halabja and CWs in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and the US-led Invasion in 
2003 
In this section the question of whether there is a shift in the reporting of the Halabja genocide, 
that took place in 1988, during the Iraq-Iran war and the references made to it in the build-up 
to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and during that invasion is discussed. Also, the question 
of whether there is a shift in the way the CWs were reported during the Iraq-Iran war and the 
way they were referred to during the US-led invasion is also examined.   
7.5.1 Halabja 
 
When the corpora from the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion in 2003 were compared, some 
differences were found in the data with regard to the reporting of Halabja. One difference is 
that in the Iraq-Iran war, more references and context were provided for the Halabja gassing, 
showing that CWs were used during a fight between Iraq and Iran when Iranian forces were 
trying to capture a strategic area inside Iraq with the aid of Kurdish guerrillas causing many 
Kurdish civilians to die as a result of this attack. In the US-led invasion, by contrast, such 
references were either omitted or were extremely rare. There were no mentions of such 
offensives and no attempts to show that there was a fight inside Iraqi soil. Without the 
background of the military offensives being provided, the chemical gas attack was constructed 
as an attack carried out on only civilians, villagers and residents of Halabja. The Halabja gassing 
was highlighted by the US press when Iraq became an enemy state to fit the needs of 
propaganda, as well as contributing to manufacturing the war by communicating what the 
officials said. By demonstrating Saddam’s cruelty in violating human rights by killing his own 
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people and the threat he posed to the rest of the world, this subsequently became a justification 
for an intervention. Similarly, in 2003, fifteen years after Halabja gassing stories of survivors 
surfaced and victims of the chemical massacre were interviewed, describing their bitter 
experience and the pain they had gone through when they were subjected to the chemical gas. 
The victimisation and dramatisation of such stories had not previously been used to criminalise 
Saddam in the Iraq-Iran war. Also, following the analysis in the Iraq-Iran war (see section 5.5) 
the US and UN stance in relation to Halabja was constructed in the US press as denouncing, 
decrying and condemning the act of gassing as well as it was seen to be ‘grave violation of the 
1925 Geneva protocol’ but never expressed as a threat to the neighbour, world, or the US as the 
way it constructed in the US press in 2003 US-led invasion.  
In the Iraq-Iran war, the role of the US press was that of a third party observer reporting what 
each side - Iraq and Iran - said about each other, including accusations, assertions, claims, 
denials and confessions. The US press also, in some instances, took the Iranian side by 
weighting the Iranian version of events through listing and packing the stories of survivors, 
witnesses and experts that would add more credibility to the stories. During the US-led invasion, 
the scenario was different. The Halabja incident was used by the US press, and by US officials 
and non-officials, all attempting to convince the UN and the public of the threatening nature of 
Iraq, its WMD and its history of using such weapons on its own people, as well as its possession 
of CWs.  
In the Iraq-Iran conflict, the accusations and other reporting of the use of CWs in Halabja were 
constructed around and attributed to Iraqi officials and the Iraqi Army, but not to Saddam 
Hussein: e.g., ‘Iraq admitted’, ‘Iraqi officials no longer deny using such weapons’, ‘Iraqi 
warplanes drop chemicals’. In the US-led invasion, on the other hand, every incident was 
attributed and linked to Saddam: for instance, ‘Hussein’s forces attacked villagers from 
Halabja’, ‘he [Saddam] allegedly ordered poison gas’, ‘Today is the 15th anniversary of Saddam 
Hussein’s horrific chemical attack’. Furthermore, the theme of Halabja was used and developed 
in arguments as well as used as historical justification for invading an Iraq allegedly in 
possession of WMD.  
7.5.2 The use of CWs 
 
Generally, US press reporting of the use of CWs in the Iraq-Iran war is characterised by citing 
the conflicting views of different parties who commented on the incidents in terms of 
accusations, denials, confirmations and expressions of concern. By contrast, during the US-led 
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invasion, the US press adopted the US official stance toward the intervention, the reporting 
being in one direction and only US officials being given a voice in the news discourse, with 
conflicting ideas or opinions from other parties being muted or quoted only rarely. The 
reporting was limited to what officials said and thought about Saddam and Iraq, which shows 
a clear bias in terms of reporting the build-up or invasion phase.  
In many instances in the Iraq-Iran war, although the press did not take a stance, it took a side 
through providing indications or providing more details from the Iranian side to indicate Iran’s 
credibility, or by giving the Iranian side more weight. Reports gave little or no weight to the 
Iraqi side and offered support for the Iranian version of events. This was achieved by showing 
that Iran has interviewed casualties, survivors and witnesses and POWs. In the US-led invasion, 
in addition to widespread reporting of statements by US officials that effectively demonised 
Iraq and Saddam, the press cited many stories of the victims of previous wars and conflicts, 
projecting them onto the present war and the build-up to the war. The intention was to represent 
Saddam and Iraq negatively and to justify the proposed invasion of Iraq on the grounds that it 
would free the Iraqi people.  Furthermore, the data sets reveal that during the Iraq-Iran war, in 
many instances the US press was critical of the US and UN responses to Iraq and its use of 
CWs. This is particularly noticeable in the use of terms like ‘sympathetic’ and ‘lenient’ to 
describe the attitude of the US and the UN when they refused to name Iraq as the user of the 
CWs or the aggressor or suppressing any calls to punish Iraq or  impose sanctions on Iraq. 
Likewise, the US sliding toward Iraq use of CWs against Iran in the Iraq-Iran war was 
constructed to be a threat that could lead to the widespread of the CWs in the whole gulf region.  
It is worth mentioning that although CWs were used on many occasions during the Iraq-Iran 
war, they were never referred to as weapons of mass destruction. This is in obvious contrast to 
the way CWs were referred to (as weapons of mass destruction) both in the build-up to and 
during the 2003 US-led invasion. Furthermore, Saddam is never collocated with the use of 
chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iran war corpus. Instead, Iraq, Iraq’s and Iraqi were frequent 
collocates for the CWs. By contrast, when examining the collocates of CWs in the US-led 
invasion it was found that Saddam appeared forty-eight times as a collocate with CWs and 
Saddam’s occurred seven times. This shows how the war was personalised, with the state being 
presented as a person, during the US-led invasion: the focus was on the person in particular and 
on Iraq on general, while the Iraq-Iran war was seen to be a conflict between two countries.  
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7.6 Conclusion 
The analysis of the reporting of Halabja and the use of CWs presented in this chapter has shown 
how different the treatments of these two themes are in the two wars Iraq-Iran war and the US-
led invasion. It shows how journalist practices were not maintained in the US press in the two 
wars in a way that it facilitated directly or indirectly in propagating and communicating what 
the US officials wanted to say to the public and as a result facilitating the 2003 US-led invasion. 
This is done through the emphasis on the crimes, violence and the human rights violation 
committed by Saddam’s regime during Iraq-Iran war 15 years after its happening which was 
not reported and given such importance then. The aim of recalling Halabja history and the use 
CWs was for the sake of investing and using these events in the present time was to demonise 
Saddam and to mobilise the public and as a result justify the invasion. In fact, these events were 
even more negatively constructed during the build-up to the 2003 US-led invasion than they 
had been at the time they took place. Similarly, the use of the victim accounts were only acted 
as a tool to reach an end i.e. the invasion rather than an end itself. What is more, the construction 
of CWs was not the same in the two wars: although Iraq used CWs on many occasions against 
Iran and the Kurds in the Iraq-Iran war, these weapons were never referred to as weapons of 
mass destruction and never collocated with Saddam which was quite the opposite in the US-led 
invasion when the CWs were referred to as WMDs and Saddam was collocated with WMDs 
and CWs. This shows the fact that the use of terminology is deliberate with an ideological nature 
that comes in line with US admin propaganda.   
The reporting of the use of CWs on Halabja and the killing on thousands of Kurds was not 
deemed important in coverage of the Iraq-Iran war. When a country is a client of the US, the 
victims in that country are implicitly regarded as insignificant. Whereas, when the same country 
becomes an enemy to the US, the people abused gain importance and will be subject to more 
intense and indignant coverage, as was the case in 2003. The same can be said about the use of 
CWs during the two wars. Iraq’s use of CWs was not criminalised when Iraq was allied to the 
US; however, when Iraq was constructed as an enemy state in 2003, the use of CWs was 
considered a threat. This strategy remains in place and is applied to many countries that are 
constructed as the enemy of the US; for example the nuclear programme in Iran and North 
Korea.  
The next chapter (8) sheds light on how the media contributed even further to the negative 
construction of Iraq and Saddam by presenting the war as a humanitarian intervention. This is 
done through an analysis of the construction of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Shiites. 
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Chapter 8: US-LED INVASION: IRAQI PEOPLE/SHIITES 
8.1 Introduction 
One of the justifications for the US going to war with Iraq was the US political leadership’s 
employment of the humanitarian narrative that included claims of the repression and suffering 
of the Iraqi people and the need to liberate them from Saddam. The aim of this chapter is 
therefore to examine how first the Iraqi Shiites and secondly the Iraqi people were constructed 
in the US press during the US-led invasion. These constructions are then compared with the 
corresponding constructions during the Iraq-Iran war in order to highlight the salient reporting 
differences between the two wars.  
8.2 Iraqi Shiites 
In order to obtain a clearer understanding of the way Shiites were mentioned in the US press in 
the 7 weeks of US-led invasion in 2003, the frequency of Shiites was calculated to see when 
they were reported the most and when they were reported the least, as shown in Figure 20.  
 
Figure 20 The frequency of Iraqi Shiites in the US-led invasion 
From the above line graph, it can clearly be seen that there was a gradual increase between 
week 0 and week 6, with the exception of week 3, in which the figure decreased slightly. The 
reporting of Shiites was at its highest level in week 6, when the figure reached 245, only to 
plummet in the last week of the corpus. 
 
In order to discover the main semantic topics in the whole corpus, the concordance lines of Iraq 
Shiites were examined and then categorised according to their semantic topic (see Table 34).  
  
Week Main semantic topics of Shiites 
Week 0 Iran’s fear of the establishment of a democratic Iraq, atrocities against Shiites, 
Shiites and Kurds uprising in 1991 
Week 1 Saddam’s killing of Kurds and Shiites in 1991, the fear of conflict breaking 
out between Sunni, Shiites and Kurds, US failure to help Shiites in 1991 
Week 2 Reasons given for Shiites’ reluctance to revolt against Saddam, attributing 
Shiites’ lack of retaliation to a fear of Iranian expansion, proportion of 
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population compared with government representation, recalling their revolt in 
1991 
Week 4  Suppressed, welcoming 
Week 5 Freedom to practise religious rituals, opposition to US presence in Iraq, 
Shiites vying for power and control 
Week 6  Shiites vying for power and control, Shiite demonstrations against US 
presence in Iraq, the difference between Iraqi Shiites and Iranian Shiites, 
population and representation in the government, concerns over Iran’s 
interference in Iraq or the installation of an Iran-style theocracy in Iraq. 
Week 7 demonstrations against US presence in Iraq 
 
Table 34 Main semantic topics of Shiites 
 
Having checked the concordance lines for  the queries under question and Having them 
semantically categorised , the most frequently occurring themes related to Shiites were 
identified. These are examined in the following sections (8.2.1- 8.2.4) 
8.2.1 The theme of the victimisation of Shiites 
 
In predicational terms, Iraqi Shiites were constructed as being victimised and oppressed in the 
reporting during the week before the war as well as in the first week of the war. The 
victimisation and marginalisation were put in the foreground and the press purposefully 
highlighted this issue through comparing the percentage of Shiites in the total population to 
their representation in the government. Thus, although they constituted ‘60 per cent’ of the 
population, they were marginalised in the government, being viewed as having ‘little or no say’, 
as being ‘oppressed’, or ‘long repressed’, and as having lived for a long time as ‘second-class 
citizens’ under the rule of a Sunni Muslim minority.  
148. Although the Shiites represent an estimated 55 percent to 65 percent of the 
population in Iraq […] they have been politically marginalized by Hussein's regime 
The Washington Post March 22, 2003 Saturday 
 
149. Shiite majority has waited decades for equal rights.  
USA TODAY March 20, 2003, Thursday 
150. Shiites make up about 60 percent of Iraqis but have historically been 
politically repressed and economically impoverished 
The New York Times March 21, 2003 Friday 
151. Shiites, who make up 60 percent of the Iraqi population of 24 million, for 
generations have had little or no say in its government and were oppressed  
The Washington Post April 26, 2003 Saturday 
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The Shiite population and their marginalisation in government was generally compared with 
the situation of the Sunni minority who were, on the other hand, viewed by the US press as 
constituting ‘20’ or ‘37’ per cent of the total population and thus as being the ‘minority’ group; 
however, they were portrayed as dominating the majority Shiites and the government was run 
by them. In addition, Sunnis were not only viewed in the US press as dominating but also as 
persecuting and repressing the Shiites.  
152. Sunni Muslims, about 37 percent of the population, dominate the government 
and have persecuted the majority Shiites, especially in southern Iraq.  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution March 16, 2003 Sunday 
153. The Baath Party, whose leadership is dominated by Hussein's clan and loyal 
Sunni Muslim tribes, has waged a withering war against Shiite political groups, 
from bloody crackdowns to the forced exile of tens of thousands to neighboring Iran.  
The Washington Post March 15, 2003 Saturday 
154. Shiite Muslims, victims of discrimination in Iraq, which is dominated by the 
Sunni minority, make up most of the rest.  
USA TODAY March 20, 2003, Thursday 
155. The real wild card in Iraq is the Shiite Muslim underclass, which has been 
savagely repressed by the Sunni minority that dominated Saddam Hussein's 
military and secret police.  
The Washington Post April 15, 2003 Tuesday 
 
The minority/majority dichotomy was used in the US media to portray how discriminatory 
practices were employed by Saddam in relation to the ethnic and religious groups, i.e., Sunni, 
Shiites and Kurds. This strategy was used by the US press to separate and differentiate between 
these groups by drawing a line between the minority Sunni and majority Shiites, directing the 
readers’ attention that there was a difference between the treatment of these ethnic and religious 
groups and that these groups did not have equal rights, representing Shiites and Kurds as victims 
of Sunnis.  
 
The victimisation and marginalisation of Shiites were used to accentuate and problematise the 
issues that concerned the minority Sunni, devaluing the Sunni by assigning them negative traits, 
describing them as ‘persecuting’ and ‘dominating’ the Shiites, as waging ‘a withering war 
against Shiites’ or savagely repressing the Shiites, as well as linking the Sunni to Saddam. 
 
The oppression and the marginalisation of Shiites is a fact. However, the portrayal of the Sunnis 
as a single entity that killed or persecuted Shiites is an oversimplified image based on a 
stereotypical generalisation that paints them all indiscriminately with the same brush as having 
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privileged access to the government.  Cordesman and Davies (2008, p. 50) say that although 
most of Iraq’s elite ruling were from Sunni the top elite Sunni are the small portion that have 
ties to Saddam family or other families in Tikrit, the city where he was born in, as Majid family 
and al-Bu Nasir tribe. But “the vast majority of Sunnis got little special benefit from Saddam’s 
rule, and many Sunnis suffered from his oppression in the same way as other Iraqis”. 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the first sign of revolt against Saddam in 1991which 
was called Shiites revolt occurred first in two Sunni towns, Abu’l Khasib and Zubair,  and then 
spread to the south of Iraqi (al-Jabbar, 1994) (see section 2.9.). The criminalisation of Sunnis 
was accomplished in relation to Saddam’s acts, in what Bennett (2017, p. 21) calls guilt by 
association, in that they were portrayed negatively because of the constructed association 
between them and Saddam, who had already been presented and constructed in a negative way. 
  
Targeting the Iraqis according to their religious background, population and/or their ethnic 
background through the ‘divide and rule’ strategy aimed to break up the power structure of Iraqi 
society, weakening them and preventing them from linking up. Therefore, the Shiites were seen 
as worthy victims who could be used to accomplish the war and propaganda purpose of 
portraying the war as a humanitarian intervention. The portrayal of the Shiites as worthy victims 
was also an attempt to convince the Shiites to align themselves with the Western powers and 
not put up any resistance to the invasion as well as encourage them to revolt against Saddam 
since they make up the majority of Iraqi army. This portrayal also served to demonise Saddam 
through illustrating Saddam’s criminal record in his violation of human rights and constructing 
him as brutal as well as building the case for the cause of the war around freeing/saving the 
Iraqi Shiites. Therefore, the voices of Shiite victims or those of other Iraqis who were in exile 
were integrated into the news; in particular, those who had suffered from the oppression and 
the crimes were invited to contribute to the news by telling their own stories and by testifying 
or describing what they had experienced, as well as the consequences of the experiences they 
had gone through on their future and their families. According to Walton et al. (2008, p. 108), 
the use of victimisation stories gives support to phatic arguments regarding the Shiites’ distress 
and need for help through emotional appeals. Through these appeals, hearers (or readers in this 
case) find themselves involved in the problem through a process of reasoning, the aim of which 
is not only to provide solutions to the problems but also to make the problems as relevant as 
possible to the audience. Recounting the stories of the victims in detail is designed to enable 
audiences to imagine themselves in such situations, thus appealing to their sense of compassion.  
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156. Horror stories detailing the extent of his villainy abound; most are impossible to 
verify. By one published account, he tossed a Shiite dissident into a tub of acid and 
watched him dissolve.  
Philadelphia Inquirer March 20, 2003 Thursday 
157. In Delran: “Our holocaust that has lasted for 34 years is about to come to an 
end,” said Aziz Altaee, an Iraqi who owns an electronics store in Northeast 
Philadelphia. Altaee’s political persuasion was born of personal history. He fled Iraq 
20 years ago, after, he said, Saddam Hussein had his cousin killed, the mutilated body 
later sent to his family. A Shiite who refused to join Hussein's political party, Altaee 
said he feared that he, too, would be targeted. 
Philadelphia Inquirer March 23, 2003 Sunday 
158. Although the Shiites are a majority in Iraq, under Mr. Hussein, a Sunni Muslim, 
they were subjected to years of oppression. The mosque bears the scars of that 
past. Its brickwork is marked with bullet holes, and only the base of the minaret 
survives. The rest was blasted to rubble during the 1991 uprising. “So many people 
were killed,” said another man outside the mosque, who gave his name only as 
Hammad and said he was an English teacher. 
The New York Times April 12, 2003 Saturday 
In the above examples, victims are quoted to validate the claims that the Shiites were victimised. 
This is done through keynoting by giving sources labels: for instance, identifying them by name, 
by a qualification, or sometimes by a combination of these two labels, as in examples 157 and 
158 respectively: ‘said Aziz Altaee, an Iraqi who owns an electronics store in Northeast 
Philadelphia’; ‘said another man outside the mosque, who gave his name only as Hammad and 
said he was an English teacher’. This type of labelling encourages the audience to believe in 
the veracity of the statement. Morley and Brunsdon (1999) argue that this kind of labelling is 
used for “clueing the audience in as to the identity of extra-programme participants or 
interviewees; establishing their “status” (expert, eyewitness, etc.) and their right competence to 
speak on the topic in question - thus establishing their proposed degree of credibility/authority 
within the discourse” (p. 79).  
 
 
8.2.2 The theme of Shiites’ reluctance to revolt 
 
One of the argument to invade Iraq was to liberate the Iraqis from the oppression and it was 
constructed that the Iraqis will welcome the invading forces and revolt against Saddam. 
However, Iraqi people in general and the Shiites in particular did not revolt a move that if 
happened would prove the US causes of invasion and would be in the US favour. Thus, for the 
US to maintain its war justifications it was constructed in the US press that Shiites were cautious 
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and reluctant to revolt against Saddam. The reluctance was reported in the second and the third 
week of the invasion. This reluctance was attributed, according to the US press, to the Shiites’ 
distrust of the US based on its past actions: specifically, the earlier failure of the US to help the 
Shiites and Kurds in the 1991 Gulf War, when they revolted and seized some cities in northern 
and southern Iraq at the urging of George H.W. Bush. However, the US aid never materialised, 
leaving the Shiites vulnerable to the Iraqi forces, many of them being killed and many others 
fleeing to other countries for refuge. Therefore, the reasons for the Iraqi Shiites’ failure to rise 
in revolt on this occasion were constructed to be the lessons they had learned from the February 
1991 Shiite uprising. 
 
159. The United States, through its past acts, is largely to blame for the failure of 
Iraq’s Shiite majority to rise in revolt against Saddam Hussein, a senior American 
military commander at Central Command said here today. “We bear a certain 
responsibility for what we didn't do in 1991,” the officer said.  
The New York Times April 2, 2003 Wednesday 
160. The Shiites, Iraq’s majority Muslim strain, are still aggrieved over then-
President George H. W. Bush's encouragement of an uprising in 1991 and his 
subsequent refusal to support it.  
The Washington Post March 27, 2003 Thursday 
161. the Shiites, a majority in southern Iraq, have adopted a more cautious attitude 
this time around.  
The New York Post March 26, 2003, Wednesday 
162. In interviews, many Shiites in southern Iraq recalled the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War, when they revolted against Hussein but were given no aid by American forces, 
who stood by as Hussein’s forces crushed the rebellion.  
Philadelphia Inquirer March 26, 2003 Wednesday 
The attribution of Shiites reluctance to have learned the 1991 lesson serve first to show to the 
public opinion that Shiites still dislike Saddam and are in favour of the US-led invasion to 
liberate them but their reluctance to revolt was due to past failure. Secondly, to show that it is 
the US commitment to finish what it failed to accomplish in 1991 by letting Shiite to get killed 
and that they learned from that ‘mistake’. To apply Forchtner (2014) analytical perspective 
here,  the use of rhetoric of US failing through linking ‘Our’ past wrongdoing with the present 
through a more self- critical form where the conclusion of such event is directed to the in-group 
i.e. US and the coalition countries as well as to the out-group Shiites that the US will not repeat 
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the same mistakes and to have learned such lessons from the past. Therefore, the argument 
could be formulated as in the following figure.  
 
Figure 21: Rhetoric of Failure (adapted from Forchtner, 2014)  
 
Furthermore, the US was not constructed in a negative way in terms of its failure to help the 
Shiites; although the use of verbs such as ‘failed’ and phrases like ‘largely to blame’ were 
indicative of the fact that the US should be held responsible for not saving the Shiites, no other 
words that might have criminalised or constructed the US in a negative way were used. Even 
the words and phrases that were used to described the Shiites – for instance,  ‘aggrieved’, ‘have 
adopted a more cautious attitude this time around’, ‘recalled the 1991 war’, - were not strong 
enough to convict or construct the US in a negative way, but rather showed the Shiites as being 
cautious and sad about what happened in the past.  
8.2.3 The theme of the Iranian threat  
 
Although Saddam’s removal had been seen as a necessity by the US, because he had been 
constructed as being an imminent threat to the US and the world, even after his removal the 
threat remained. This was because the Iranian influence on Iraqi Shiites in general was seen as 
an emerging threat to both Iraq and the US in reshaping the post-Saddam government. This was 
explicated by the US press through Iran’s officials’ concern about and rejection of a ‘pro- 
American government’, and of an ‘American puppet regime on its borders’:   
163. On Monday, The Associated Press quoted Iran's foreign minister as declaring, 
in a TV interview, that “the government led by Americans in Iraq” would not be 
acceptable to Iran or to some groups in Iraq. 
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution April 22, 2003 Tuesday 
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The Iranian influence was also not only conceived through the Iranian officials’ rejection of a 
US-led Iraqi government; it was also realised by physical interference, for instance, in allowing 
Shiites to move through Iranian land to places in Iraq, which was viewed in the press as an  
attempt to influence and reshape the post-Saddam government. This influence was constructed 
as sought after by Iran as a way of expanding its influence by helping Iraqi Shiites.  
164. Shiite-dominated Iran has reportedly allowed Shiites from southern Iraq to pass 
through Iranian territory into northern Iraq, which could be an attempt by Tehran, 
which fought a war against Iraq in the 1980s, to extend its influence in a post-Saddam 
Iraq. Iran may also seek to diminish any American puppet regime on its borders.  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution March 16, 2003 Sunday 
165. The war also created provocative opportunities for Iran, historically mistrusted 
by the Arab states, to expand its influence through support of some Iraqi Shiites.  
The New York Times April 27, 2003 Sunday 
The United States’ rejection of an Iranian-style government in Iraq, a country that had many 
minorities, such as Sunni, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians and Yazidis, was presented in the US 
press by representing the Iranian government as the negative ‘Other’, constructing it as a 
theocratic and undemocratic government that did not represent the whole society and was made 
up of only a few Shiite clerics who governed the whole country. On the other hand, the rejection 
of this type of government not only implied a positive view of a US-style government; a 
democratic government that would include all the Iraqi minorities and majorities, and that was 
quite the opposite of the Iranian style government, it also suggested that what Iran wanted was 
quite different from what the US thought it should have.   
166. In an interview with the Associated Press in his Pentagon conference room, 
Rumsfeld said the United States would not allow an Iran-style theocracy in Iraq. “If 
you’re suggesting, how would we feel about an Iranian-type government with a few 
clerics running everything in the country, the answer is: That isn't going to happen,” he 
said. 
The Philadelphia Inquirer April 25, 2003 Friday 
 
167. Some U.S. officials worry that the Islamic government in Iran, which is 
predominantly Shiite, may seek to influence Iraq’s reshaping.  
The Philadelphia Inquirer April 25, 2003 Friday 
 
The sudden muscularity of the Iraqi Shiites is constructed as evident in their organising and 
assuming roles in society and securing the important service institutions, was constructed as a 
threat for the US that feared a Shiite-dominated government, which was represented negatively 
through comparing it to the Iranian-style government.  
168. Iraqi Shiites are organizing local committees, doling out funds to pay salaries, 
collecting looted property and sending militias to secure hospitals and electric plants. 
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They have raised concerns that some may try to install a theocracy like the one next 
door, in Shiite-dominated Iran.  
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) April 24, 2003 Thursday 
 
Furthermore, the possibility that the Shiites might come to dominate the government was 
constructed as a threat not only to the US but also to other Arab countries in general and to 
those countries that had Shiite majorities or minorities causing ethnic and religious divisions in 
particular. The fear of a Shiite-dominated government was seen as having the potential to be 
infectious and to cause a ‘domino effect’ that could destabilise the entire region. Thus, Saudi 
Arabia, for instance, was described as being concerned that the rise of a post-Saddam, Shiite-
dominated government in Iraq could align itself with their-co-religionists Shiites in Iran, a 
country where Shiite Islam is the official religion. The possibility of such an outcome was 
constructed to have caused a deep anxiety for the Saudis, who were afraid that their own 
minority Shiites would then become restive. The possibility of Shiites coming to power in Iraq 
was seen as a cause for anxiety since it could lead to empowering Shiites in other countries.  
 
169. The Saudi leadership has worried openly about the possibility that Iraq might 
shatter along ethnic and religious lines as a result of a war, with a push for power by 
the Iraqi Shiite Muslim majority. Such an outcome could directly aggravate Saudi 
Arabia's own brittle relations with its Shiite minority.  
The New York Times March 16, 2003 Sunday 
170. Iran and Iraq fought a bitter war in 1980-88, and Iraqi nationalism is strong 
among Shiites as well as Sunnis. But there could be a domino effect if Shiites take 
power in Iraq, strengthening calls for empowerment of Shiites in Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Bahrain.  
USA TODAY April 16, 2003 Wednesday 
The Iranian threat was also constructed in the press by its references to the issuing of edicts, to 
‘receiving significant directions’, as well as the incitement of Iran to fill the post-Saddam gap 
in the government institutions and other significant positions which had resulted in a lack of 
security in the cities. The threat was also represented through references to Iran’s ‘orchestrating’ 
the Iraqi Shiites to demonstrate against the US presence in Iraq. 
171. A religious edict issued in Iran and distributed to Shiite mullahs in Iraq calls on 
them “to seize the first possible opportunity to fill the power vacuum in the 
administration of Iraqi cities.” The edict, or fatwa, issued on April 8 by Kadhem al-
Husseini al-Haeri, an Iraqi-born cleric based in the Iranian holy city of Qum, suggests 
that Shiite clerics in Iraq are receiving significant direction from Iran as they try 
to assert the power of Iraq’s long-oppressed religious majority. 
The New York Times April 26, 2003 Saturday 
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172. But already, Shiite clerics in Iraq are calling for the United States to leave, and 
the most active among them are turning toward Iran for support. 
The New York Times April 28, 2003 Monday 
173. The anti-U.S. demonstrations by Iraqi Shiites in recent days have been 
orchestrated in part by Iran. 
The Washington Post April 27, 2003 Sunday 
Not only was Iran perceived as indirectly inciting and orchestrating the Iraqi Shiites, but also 
as being directly involved by sending Iranian agents across the border ‘to destabilize the Shiite’, 
and ‘promote friendly Shiite clerics’. 
174. The United States has warned Iran not to meddle in Iraqi affairs, suggesting 
this week that Iranian agents have crossed into Iraq to destabilize the Shiite 
population.  
The New York Times April 26, 2003 Saturday 
175. The United States has said that Iranian agents have crossed into Iraq to 
promote friendly Shiite clerics in Basra, Karbala and Najaf and advance Iran’s 
interests. The agents are said to be members of the Iraqi Badr Brigade and Iran’s hard-
line Revolutionary Guards.  
The New York Times April 25, 2003 Friday 
176. According to The Times’s Douglas Jehl, Iranian-trained operatives have 
crossed into southern Iraq to help the Shiites who are demanding a state like Iran’s. 
The New York Times April 23, 2003 Wednesday 
 
8.2.4 The theme of Shiites being free to practise their rituals 
 
Another major thematic predicational construction of the Iraqi Shiites post- Saddam phase was 
representing the Shiites as being free to practise their religious rituals27 in honour of Imam 
Hussein, rituals that had for a long time been outlawed under Saddam’s regime. They were 
represented as being ‘free to honor martyr [sic] for the first time in 30 years’, and as having a 
‘long pent-up religious fervor’. There were references to Saddam’s oppression of Shiites ‘The 
mass pilgrimage, banned under Saddam Hussein’, and to ‘a crowd unheard of under Saddam 
                                                 
27 This is a collective mourning ritual in which enormous significance is given to the martyrdom of Hussein, the 
grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, by Shiites, involving a pilgrimage on foot to Karbala where the Imam 
Hussein is buried. It is also known as Marad al-Ras (the return of the head), since after the Battle of Karbala the 
head of Imam Hussein was taken on a spear to the caliph at Damascus and after that was reunited with his body in 
Karbala after the the release of his family from prison and their return to Karbala. Hussein and another 72 fellow 
Muslims were slaughtered by the Yazid army on the tenth day of the Muslim month of Islam(which month?)??. 
This event is also commemorated at the fortieth day to honor his memory and attracts many visitiors from Shiites 
from different parts of the world (Christia et al., 2016) .  
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Hussein’. This construction contributed to the United States’ self-legitimisation in the war and 
to the broadly propagated representation of Shiites as being victimised, as well as contributing 
to one of the war causes, which was to liberate the Iraqi Shiites and the Iraqi people and to 
install a democratic government.  
177. For the first time in three decades, Iraq’s Shiites were free to mark their 
holiest festival […] With Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein no longer able to torment 
them, millions of Shiite Muslims flooded into the holy city of Karbala and eagerly 
tormented themselves in a remarkable explosion of long pent-up religious fervor. 
Daily News (New York) April 23, 2003, Wednesday 
178. In an extraordinary display of the raw power of Iraq’s Shiites, the country’s 
long repressed yet dominant Islamic sect, hundreds of thousands converged on this 
holy city today to perform one of the most important rituals in the Shiite calendar for 
the first time in a quarter of a century. 
The New York Times April 22, 2003 Tuesday 
179. “Now, they can perform the rituals as they please,” Jaferia member Shabbir 
Moosvi said of Iraqi Shiites, who before the war could have been imprisoned for public 
displays of such rituals as chest pounding and self-flagellation. “They are free to do 
them in the way we are here.” 
The Washington Post April 26, 2003 Saturday 
 
8.3 The theme of Iraqi people 
 
Another feature of the US press discourse surrounding the build-up to the war and the invasion 
period is that of humanising the war through the use of the humanitarian discourse. The 
discourses of humanitarian and human rights were used to justify the case for the invasion, 
emphasising the moral basis of the intervention along with the themes of WMD and the threat 
of Saddam. This goal was achieved through the frequent use of the Iraqi people as shown in 
Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22 The Frequency of Iraqi people 
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The line graph (Figure 22) shows the frequencies of Iraqi people in the US press in the whole 
corpus. It can be seen clearly from the graph that there was a high frequency of Iraqi people in 
the whole corpora with a total of 1593, which shows that they were the focus of the US press 
reporting in this period. It also shows that there was a gradual and significant increase in the 
frequency between week 1 and week 2, which then dropped slightly in week 3, only to shoot 
up dramatically in week 4, when it reached its highest peak. This was then followed by a sharp 
fall in week 5, and the frequency continued to decrease until it reached its lowest in week 7. 
In order to identify the major semantic topics in these weeks and to determine how they were 
reported during this period, the concordance lines were examined in detail. The main semantic 
topics are presented in Table 35 below.   
Week  Semantic topic 
Week 0 Suffering, better future for Iraqi people; liberate Iraqi people, benefited 
from sources of wealth, humanitarian needs, empowerment, calling on 
Iraqi army not to use WMD against Iraqi people.  
Week 1 Liberate, free Iraqi people, suffering, humanitarian assistance, 
empowerment, beneficiaries, help Iraqi people.  
Week 2 Humanitarian mission, troops were not welcomed, long-suffering, calls 
for Iraqi people to get rid of Saddam, freedom.  
Week 3 Long-repressed, edict to call on Iraqi people to resist US, empowerment 
of Iraqi people, beneficiaries, humanitarian assistance, liberation, 
welcoming the US troops 
Week 4 Iraqi people are to run/govern Iraq, liberation, suffering, benefit for Iraqi 
people, assuring Iraqi people that US is to liberate, the resources are from 
Iraqi people  
Week 5 Help, Iraqi people are free/liberated, happy, Iraqi people are to 
govern/rule themselves, protecting their wealth, looting, helping Iraqi 
people to build a representative government, beneficiaries 
Week 6 Concern about an Iran-like theocracy, looting, representative 
government, wealth is for Iraqi people, help them to build better nation  
Week 7 Iraqi people to govern themselves  
Table 35 Semantic topics of Iraqi people 
Owing to the large number of collocates of Iraqi people; only those with at least 10 occurrences 
or more in the whole corpus are listed in Table 36. A comprehensive list of all collocates with 
MI scores of 3 and LL of 6.63 is given in Appendix A. The concordance lines for these 
collocates were then examined and categorised according to their semantic meaning for the 
predicational and referential themes, as shown in sections 8.3.1- 8.3.4.  
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Week Collocates  
Week 0- Week 7 against, all, anyone, assistance, being, believe, belong, belongs, benefit, 
better, build, capable, choose, day, decades, decide, democracy, 
destruction, exterminate, fight, free, freedom, future, gift, give, good, 
government, great, happy, have, hearts, help, helping, heroic, hope, 
humanitarian, know, liberate, liberated, liberating, liberation, life, long, 
medicine, message, minds, must, need, needs, political, possible, 
quickly, regime, Rumsfeld, Saddam, should, show, suffered, suffering, 
support, sure, tell, their, themselves, trying, want, wealth, welcome 
, 
Table 36 Collocates with at least 10 occurrences in all weeks 
 
8.3.1 The Theme of Victimisation 
 
The Iraqi people in general and the Shiites in particular were seen as worthy victims, which 
helped to legitimise the war against Iraq. The Iraqi people were reported extensively in the 
build-up phase as well as after the invasion, as shown in Figure 22. In this regard, Herman and 
Chomsky (1988) attributed such attention to people in times of conflict as being part of the 
propaganda system, through depicting “people abused in enemy states as worthy victims, 
whereas those treated with equal or greater severity by its own government or clients will be 
unworthy” (p. 34). In the same vein, Johnson-Cartee (2004) maintains that “for the average 
person, simply the appearance in the news of a person, object, or public act is enough to lead to 
the conclusion that the person, object, or public act must be important” (p. 234). This explains 
the frequent use of the phrases Iraqi people and people of Iraq in the press, as well as the 
interviewing of Iraqi victims who were in exile or reiterating their stories.  
 
Therefore, they are expressed in predicational terms as being victimised, and detailed and 
dramatic accounts of the suffering inflicted on the them were provided, accusing the Iraqi 
regime of killing, and torturing his people, including the use of biological and chemical 
weapons against the Kurds in Halabja and the repression of the Shiite uprising after the 1991 
Gulf War. This victimisation strategy was manifested through the use of collocates such as 
suffer, killed, executed, exterminated and crushed. 
180. In his State of the Union speech, Bush promises to liberate the Iraqi people and 
catalogues what happens to Saddam’s enemies: “electric shock, burning with hot 
irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues 
and rape. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning.” 
Daily News (New York) March 20, 2003, Thursday 
181. It will also free the long-suffering Iraqi people, who have endured one of 
the cruelest and most murderous dictatorships of the past half-century.  
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The Washington Post March 20, 2003 Thursday 
 
8.3.2 The theme of liberation  
 
From the day the United States decided to engage in a war with Iraq, the violation of the human 
rights of the enemy state (Iraq) became one of the war objectives, along with the threat of 
Saddam, through his supposed possession of WMD and his links to al Qaeda, and the Iraqi 
people became worthy victims. Therefore, the damage, suffering and abuse inflicted on the 
victims were highlighted by US officials and by the press reliance on the elite sources they had 
in the government. In this regard, Zollmann (2017, p. 67) argues that when the Western elite 
decides to intervene in the affairs of another state, this is first advocated and communicated 
through the media by journalists, human rights activists, or by policy makers. The media then 
acts as an instrument for shaming the enemy states by using the statements of government 
spokesmen or those of other allied groups to shame them. Therefore, the news press published 
stories that portrayed the victimisation of the Iraqi people and that criminalised the Saddam 
regime, both in reporting the accounts of officials or those of the victims.  
 
182. In his State of the Union speech, Bush promises to liberate the Iraqi people and 
catalogues what happens to Saddam’s enemies: “electric shock, burning with hot 
irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues and 
rape. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning.” 
Having capitalised on the crimes committed against the worthy victims, the need for taking an 
action comes into play towards such human rights violations where an indignation is usually 
produced by the news press which could include, as elaborated by Zollmann (2017, p. 69), 
statements suggesting military policies, sanctions, investigations and/or criminal proceedings 
as well as outrage, concern and mourning. Therefore, the liberation of the Iraqi people was 
articulated in the US press, whether by officials and non-officials, as being one of the war 
objectives.  
183. “We have chosen to confront terror and tyranny,” said U.S. Rep. Todd Akin, R-
Town and Country, one of several speakers. “We have chosen to give the greatest gift 
of freedom to the Iraqi people.” 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 29, 2003 Saturday 
 
184. of course our aim is to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and make our 
world more secure, the justice of our cause lies in the liberation of the Iraqi people. 
And to them we say: We will liberate you. The day of your freedom draws near. 
The New York Times March 28, 2003 Friday 
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185. “Our goal is to defend the American people, and to eliminate Iraq's weapons 
of mass destruction, and to liberate the Iraqi people,” Mr. Rumsfeld said during a 
Pentagon news briefing and defining the overall goal of the war. 
The New York Times March 22, 2003 Saturday 
Furthermore, the war was presented, in relation to liberation, as a ‘black and white’ affair, in 
that an ‘either/or’ position was presented, whereas in reality there were more than two options 
that could exist. Pirie (2015, p. 19) calls this the “fallacy of bifurcation”. In this fallacy, only 
restricted choices are to be made, and it is used to squeeze out other options. Thus, in the 
example below, Iraqi soldiers and officers were given only two options: either survive or die; 
be on the wrong side and ‘die fighting for a doomed regime’ or be on the righteous side, stand 
with the liberators and survive and help their own people.  
186. “The Iraqi soldiers and officers must ask themselves if they want to die fighting 
for a doomed regime or do they want to survive, help the Iraqi people in the liberation 
of their country and play a role in a new, free Iraq,” he said. The Bush administration 
has been urging Saddam's generals for months to overthrow him, offering amnesty for 
war crimes if they lay down their arms. 
Daily News (New York) March 21, 2003, Friday 
On the other hand, in example 187 the US soldiers were pictured as heroes who cared about the 
Iraqi people and were prepared to sacrifice their own lives to liberate and save them. If the fate 
of the Iraqi soldiers is compared with that of the American soldiers, it appears that if an Iraqi 
soldier dies, he died ‘fighting for a doomed regime’, whereas the American soldiers who went 
to their deaths ‘didn’t die in vain’, and in fact their names will go down in history because they 
liberated the Iraqi people.  
187. Rincon, a native of Colombia, has just been awarded U.S. citizenship in 
posthumous gratitude for his sacrifice. He and other soldiers gave their most 
precious possession to give the Iraqi people and the people of the United States 
an enormous opportunity.  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution April 10, 2003 Thursday 
188. Brown was one of three soldiers who died along with two reporters last week 
when an Iraqi missile slammed into the Tactical Operations Center of the 2nd Brigade 
Combat Team south of Baghdad. “He didn't die in vain. He didn't die without a 
purpose. He died for the liberation of the Iraqi people,” said Capt. Ron Cooper, task 
force chaplain.  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution April 12, 2003 Saturday 
In addition, the press portrayed the American soldiers as caring and humane, in that even during 
the course of the war they were benevolent and treated the Iraqi people respectfully. In the 
following extract this can be seen in the use of the word ‘fixate’, as well as in the reference to 
the sandwich which was given to the boy by another soldier, representing them in a good way.  
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189. Mrs. Miller, who regards the war as a “moral and just” effort to protect 
American national security and liberate the Iraqi people, fixates on a little boy who 
was eating a sandwich -- she imagined it to be peanut butter and jelly -- given him 
by a soldier. “His face,” she said, “was just rapturous.” Mrs. Miller has a long history 
with the military.  
The New York Times April 5, 2003 Saturday 
 
The construction of the American soldiers as heroes, in the above examples, conforms to 
Hankings’ (Browne and Fishwick, 1983, pp. 269-270) archetype of heroism. The first criterion 
is that the hero must come from “outside the society in which he operates”. The above extracts 
show that the American soldiers are operating in a distant country for the sake of liberating and 
freeing the Iraqi people from suffering. The second criterion is that the hero must show 
asceticism and morality, as in the case of the American soldiers, who are constructed as not 
looking for wealth or material gain, but are ready to sacrifice themselves. This is evident in the 
following example: ‘He and other soldiers gave their most precious possession to give the Iraqi 
people and the people of the United States an enormous opportunity’. Furthermore, as seen in 
example 189, the fourth criterion is that “the hero exhibits compassion for the society of which 
he is not really a part” (Hankins, 1983, p. 269). Lastly, they must be fighting evil; in the case 
of the American soldiers, they are depicted as being motivated by the inherent desire to do good.  
 
One aspect of the liberation theme is the continuity of the positive representation of ‘Our’ side 
and the negative representation of ‘their’ side, through drawing on the differences between ‘The 
West’ on the one hand, constructing Westerners as civilisers, and the Middle East in general 
and Iraq in particular on the other, constructing them as uncivilised and lacking in freedom and 
democracy. Therefore, in examples 190 and 191 America is constructed as a free country while 
Iraq is not, and the purpose of the invasion is seen as being to give the Iraqi people some of the 
freedom American people have that the Iraqis had only dreamed of. 
190. “It's about time,” said Irving Levine, 71, who lived in Battery Park City for 21 
years and spent a year displaced from his home. “We've been ready for it for a while. I 
think our soldiers are prepared, we'll go in quickly and give the Iraqi people maybe 
some of the freedom that we have,” he said.  
The New York Post March 20, 2003, Thursday 
191. “This is about giving the Iraqi people the kind of freedom they can only 
dream of,” said Ann Yarko, a 19-year-old FSU student from Orlando.  
St. Petersburg Times (Florida) March 21, 2003 Friday 
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Another objective of the US-led invasion was also constructed as being to establish Iraq as a 
model of democracy for all of the Middle East countries.  
 
192. “Unlike Saddam Hussein, we believe the Iraqi people are deserving and capable 
of human liberty, and when the dictator has departed, they can set an example to all 
the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation.”  
The Washington Post March 18, 2003 Tuesday 
193. The United States and the coalition are on the verge of destroying the regime of 
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, liberating the Iraqi people and constructing the 
foundation of a new era of freedom and prosperity in the Middle East.  
Daily News (New York) April 6, 2003, Sunday 
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8.3.3 The theme of beneficiaries 
 
In addition to constructing Iraq as a beneficiary of the ‘liberation’, the Iraqi people were also 
constructed as being beneficiaries of the help in a more concrete way, in that the wealth of the 
country was to be used for their benefit through the use of the Iraqi oil, resources, assets, welfare 
for the benefit of the Iraqi people, using collocates such as ‘belong’, ‘belongs’, ‘asset’, ‘assets’, 
‘interests’, ‘resource’, ‘resources’, ‘wealth’, ‘welfare’ and  ‘treasures’ as shown in the Table 
37.  
 
Table 37 Concordance lines of Iraqi people as beneficiaries 
 
8.3.4 The theme of empowerment 
 
Another salient pattern that was apparent in the data was that of empowering the Iraqi people 
in the post-Saddam government, with promises being given that the people would have a role 
to play and a certain amount of choice in deciding on the type of government they would have, 
using collocates such as administer, choose, chosen, decide, determine, govern, governed, 
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government, running, secure, sovereignty, rule and run. Some of these collocates are shown in 
the table below. 
 
Table 38 The empowerment Iraqi people 
 
8.4 Reporting Differences in the two wars 
 
In this section, the differences between the reporting of the two themes: the Iraqi Shiites and 
Iraqi people, in the Iraq-Iran war and the subsequent US-led invasion are discussed.  
8.4.1 The Iraqi Shiites 
 
The differences between the two wars in terms of the reporting of the Iraqi Shiites lies in the 
frequency of the references and in the topics covered. The first reporting difference between 
the two wars that can be seen from the Figure 23 is in the frequency of use of the phrase Iraqi 
Shiites. Although the Iraq-Iran war lasted for eight years, Iraqi Shiites were mentioned only 95 
times. By contrast, in the corpus of data from the US-led invasion (which lasted only 7 weeks), 
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Iraqi Shiites were mentioned 908 times which about 9 times of the number in Iraq-Iran war, 
which shows that the Iraqi Shiites had become worthy subjects and were talked about in the US 
press both before and after the invasion. 
 
Figure 23 Shiites frequency in Iraq-Iran war and US-led Invasion 
 
In both wars, Iraqi Shiites were constructed as being marginalised and disadvantaged in their 
political representation in the Iraqi government. However, the predications chosen were more 
negative in the 2003 conflict both in terms of number and portrayal. This was done by 
comparing the percentage of Shiites in the total population with their representation in 
government. They were seen, for instance, as a majority or as constituting 60 per cent of the 
total population, yet they held little power, and had for a long time been repressed. By contrast, 
the Sunni were described as being the minority group; however, they dominated/ran the 
government. Furthermore, in the US-led invasion in 2003, the portrayal of the Sunni as 
suppressing and killing Shiites and their association with Saddam was emphasised. A portrayal 
which was part of the propaganda campaign to demonstrate the need for the humanitarian 
intervention. During the Iraq-Iran war, only the percentage of Shiites population and their 
representation in the government, showing them as marginalised, in comparison to Sunni was 
given. The portrayal of Sunni persecuting the Shiites were not present.   
 
In both wars, the Iraqi Shiites were used as a winning card by both the countries engaged in the 
conflict. In the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi Shiites were targeted by the Iranian officials as well as 
by the state radio, urging them to topple Saddam, since the Shiites constituted the majority in 
both countries and they shared religious practices, aspects on which Khomeini was counting 
heavily. In the 2003 US-led invasion, the Iraqi Shiites were also targeted by the US to revolt 
and stand by the side of the US. Also, the history of Shiites being repressed, killed and 
marginalised by Saddam was used largely through portraying the Shiites as victims and 
accusing Saddam of violating the human rights of his people  a pretext used to invade Iraq and 
it wasn’t an honest call for the humanitarian intervention. The use of the human rights violation 
Iraq- Iran war US-led invasion
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was overshadowed in the Iraq-Iran war, however, in terms of the frequency of references to it 
and also by listing all the wrongdoings done by Saddam to the Shiites.  
 
The Shiites’ reluctance to revolt at the call of the Iranian officials and radio stations in the Iraq-
Iran war and at the call of the US during the US-led invasion in 2003 was evident in the 
reporting of the Iraqi Shiites in both wars. However, this reluctance to revolt was constructed 
differently in the two wars. In the Iraq-Iran war it was attributed to the notion that the Iraqi 
Shiites were feeling ‘more Arab and Iraqi than Shiite’ and that they were ‘more motivated by 
Iraqi and Arab nationalism’. The reluctance was also attributed in the press to the Iraqi 
government’s suppression and crackdowns. In the 2003 US-led invasion, by contrast, their 
reluctance was attributed to that the Iraqi Shiites distrusted the US because of America’s past 
actions - when the US had failed them when they had previously revolted against Saddam (see 
section 8.2.2).  
 
8.4.2 The Iraqi people/ People of Iraq 
 
From the chart below, it is apparent that there is a big difference in the frequencies of Iraqi 
people in the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion; the Iraqi people phrase was used far more 
during the US-led invasion than in the Iraq-Iran war, despite the fact that the Iraq-Iran war 
lasted for eight years, compared with the seven weeks of the US-led invasion. More 
importantly, the revealed semantic motifs of the Iraqi people was employed differently in the 
two wars, and that depended on the stance of the US press in relation to the war as well as on 
the US involvement in the wars.   
 
 
Figure 24: The frequency of Iraqi people in two wars 
 
Therefore, during the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi people and People of Iraq were viewed as key 
players, and the historical and religious enmity was used by Iraq to urge them to continue the 
fight against Iran, which also used the religious theme exclusively to urge the Iraqi people to 
iraq-Iran war US-led invsion
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revolt and overthrow Saddam. Iraqi people were constructed differently in the US-led invasion, 
however, and they were one of the main motifs through which the war was humanised to justify 
the US intervention against Iraq. Therefore, the semantic motifs constructed were that of 
victimisation, in that the Iraqi people had suffered or been killed under Saddam’s rule; 
accordingly, the invasion was viewed as a liberation from Saddam’s regime and the Iraqi people 
as being beneficiaries of this liberation and of empowerment under the post-Saddam 
government. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
The aim of the present chapter was first to examine the construction of the Shiites and the Iraqi 
people in the US-led invasion and, second, to demonstrate the differences in the reporting of 
these two social groups during the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion in 2003. Thus, with 
regard to their construction, the investigation has revealed that the Shiites were portrayed as 
victimised, marginalised and suppressed by Saddam and the Sunnis during the US-led invasion. 
Furthermore, the reluctance of the Shiites to revolt against Saddam was perceived as being a 
lesson learned from the 1991 Gulf War, when they had revolted and were failed by the US. 
Furthermore, the Iraqi Shiites were regarded as being free to practice their religious rituals, 
which had been outlawed during Saddam’s regime. The Shiites’ sudden post-Saddam 
masculinity was constructed as a threat to Iraq’s democracy post-Saddam. The US rejected the 
Iranian-style government, which was portrayed as being run by a few clerics. Conversely, no 
attention was paid to the coverage of the Iraqi people and Iraqi Shiites regarding victimisation 
strategies in the Iraq-Iran war. The role of the media in regards to reporting these social groups 
were limited to reporting. However, no negative representation was attributed to Saddam as a 
victimiser of these social actors.  
 
Similarly, the Iraqi people and Iraqi Shiites were also seen as being worthy victims, in order to 
serve the propaganda purpose of giving the war a cause prior to the US-led invasion. Therefore, 
they were regarded as people who had been victimised and had suffered and therefore required 
liberation. They were also constructed as being beneficiaries of the liberation and the resources 
and wealth of Iraq after the liberation.  
 
One of the primary principles of CDA is to discover the inconsistencies and contradictions in 
the internal texts structures and shed light on the issues that could cause inequality, power 
relations or abuse through the use of discourse. Thus, having examined the DHA strategies in 
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the US press in regards to the Iraqi people and Iraqi Shiites, it has been revealed that the 
strategies used work in combination to legitimise the US intervention. Politically, this bias 
favours and is advantageous to US policy makers for highlighting and capitalising on the 
victimization of Iraqi people and Shiites during a war in which the US is involved, while 
ignoring the same people who were suppressed in an earlier war when the US was allied with 
Iraq and Saddam. More importantly, many of the human rights violations occurred during the 
Iraq-Iran war went unchecked and were not highlighted by the US press. The predictions of the 
Herman and Chomsky propaganda model (1988) are validated here when the case of Iraqi 
people and Iraqi Shiites were examined. Therefore, in the US-led invasion, the crimes and 
damage inflicted on the Iraqi people and Iraqi Shiites were reiterated in full accounts. This is 
followed by the demands for justice and stressing on indignation, expressing outrage towards 
the damages inflicted on the people and consequently holding Saddam responsible for such 
damage and victimisation; thereby ending these actions by liberating people and invading Iraq. 
The dangerous aspect of the selective shaming of countries and individuals in the media can 
play an important role in preparing the ground for any military intervention and bringing about 
a humanitarian intervention if they go unchecked in the age of militarism, where the US can 
bomb or intervene militarily in any country constructed as an enemy.  
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Chapter 9: CONCLUSION 
 
The aim throughout this thesis has been to examine the discursive construction of Iraq in the 
US press during the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion, and to compare the reporting in 
these two war periods. This was accomplished by focusing on the representation of Saddam, 
the Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people, Halabja and CWs in the US press during the two wars in question 
and to identify the differences in the reporting of these themes during the two periods.  
Therefore, in this final chapter I would first like to put together some of the findings as they 
appear in the analysis. I then conclude the chapter by presenting some of the contributions of 
the theoretical and methodological frameworks as well as the study’s contributions to our 
understanding of war reporting and journalism in the Middle East and during international 
conflicts. The limitations of the study are also outlined and suggestions are made for future 
research.  
 
9.1 Summary of findings 
9.1.1 The construction of Saddam 
In general, the US press represented Saddam negatively in its discourse on the Iraq-Iran war. 
This was done by showing him to be utilising the historical and religious enmity between the 
Arabs and the Persians to achieve his war purpose and to urge his people, as well as the Arabs, 
to rally round him by constructing the war as being religious. Even more negative was the 
portrayal of Saddam as having for a long time desired to be a military voice and power in the 
Gulf, and to take over the role of the Gamal Abdul Nassir and the late Shah of Iran.  Along with 
this negative construction, he is further portrayed as creating a personality cult comparable to 
the personality cults of Stalin and Kim II, figures who had already been negatively constructed 
in history. 
During the US-led invasion, the negative representation and devaluation of Saddam in the US 
press became even stronger, in terms of the frequency of his name and the strength of the 
negative attributes. This is despite the short period (seven weeks) of the conflict compared to 
the Iraq-Iran war, which lasted eight years. Saddam was the focus in the build-up to the war as 
well as during the invasion. He was consistently constructed as representing the evil camp in 
the good-evil binary. He was criminalised in the press, which recalled his past wrongdoings, 
assigning him negative attributes. The vilification included comparing Saddam with well-
known brutal figures such as Hitler, Stalin and Mao, who had already acquired a bad reputation 
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in the minds of the public. Justifications for the analogy included the claims that Saddam had 
read books about these figures, alleged similarities between the crimes they had committed, and 
similarities in their appearance and charisma. Moreover, the history of Saddam’s wrongdoings 
was brought back to the surface to serve the propaganda purpose, and his past was linked to the 
present to show that he was still a real threat that needed to be confronted. Saddam was also 
constructed as being an imminent threat to the neighbouring countries, America and the rest of 
the world because of his alleged possession of WMDs, and because of his connection with al 
Qaeda, constructing him as harbouring, training and supporting al Qaeda members.  
 
The fact that the frequency of references to Saddam in the US-led invasion was far higher than 
during the Iraq-Iran war could be explained by the fact that in the US-led invasion the focus 
was on Saddam himself as the target of the war; thus, the press accentuated the need to disarm 
and overthrow him. In the Iran-Iraq war, on the other hand, the focus was not on Saddam as an 
individual: the conflict was portrayed as being between two countries rather than between 
individuals.  
The other significant difference that is apparent from the data is Saddam’s access to the US 
press. Thus, whereas during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war the US press gave both Saddam 
and Khomeini a voice, by quoting them or reporting what they said, in the US-led invasion, 
Saddam’s voice was muted and he was not quoted, while Bush was quoted frequently both 
before and after the invasion.  
 
9.1.2 Iraqi people and Iraqi Shiites 
The Shiites and the Iraqi people were also constructed differently in the US press during the 
two war periods in terms of the number of frequencies to them in the corpus and in terms of the 
topics covered. Both groups were used to fulfil the purpose of the war propaganda by portraying 
them as worthy victims who needed to be liberated. Thus, the US-led invasion in 2003 was 
constructed as being a humanitarian intervention. During the Iraq-Iran war, by contrast, this 
was not the case, as only a small percentage of the references were to these two groups. With 
regard to the Shiites, they were viewed in both wars as being marganalised in the Iraq’s 
administration in spite of the fact that they make up the majority of the population; this was in 
comparison with the Sunni population, who were consistently portrayed as being dominant and 
prosecuting the Shiites. The Shiite-Sunni comparison was employed and highlighted even more 
in the build-up to the 2003 conflict and during the invasion. The Shiites were seen as being 
persecuted and repressed by the Sunni minority, who were linked to Saddam by guilt. This 
construction was employed not only to show the global community the suffering of the Shiites 
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and to present the invasion as a humanitarian intervention; it was also used to urge the Shiites 
to revolt against Saddam and align themselves with the US-led invading forces.  
 
Similarly, there were few mentions of the Iraqi people during the Iraq-Iran war, and in these 
few mentions they were constructed as being targeted by both Saddam and Khomeini: the 
Khomeini encouraging them to revolt and overthrow Saddam, and Saddam encouraging them 
to fight against Iran by playing on the historical enmity between the two countries. On the other 
hand, the Iraqi people were mainly reported as having been victimised and abused and as having 
suffered under Saddam’s regime. Detailed stories of killing and torturing were cited and the 
victims were interviewed. The Iraqi people were also constructed as being beneficiaries of the 
liberation, since they would benefit from the assets, belongings, resources and treasures of Iraq 
after the liberation. The invasion was also constructed as an intervention that would empower 
the Iraqi people by enabling them to choose, run and govern the post-Saddam government.  
 
9.1.3 Halabja and CWs 
In the Iraq-Iran war, the reporting of Halabja and CWs was characterised by accounts of the 
competing opinions and of what each side in the war said about the other: accusations, denials 
and confirmations with regard to the use of CWs. Furthermore, when no action was taken 
against the use of CWs, and when neither the US nor the UN was willing to name Iraq either as 
the user of the weapons or as the aggressor in the war, there were many instances of the US 
press being critical of US policy in its tilting towards and sympathy with Iraq. This tilt was 
constructed as being at the expense of the security of the region, since it would increase the 
threat of the spread of the use of CWs. Having said all this, however, the US press did not 
explicitly used negatively loaded words or negative attributes or traits towards Iraq; rather, it 
was a process of weighting stories to emphasise particular events.   
 
Fifteen years later, in 2003, when the US wanted to invade Iraq, the history of the Halabja 
gassing was resurfaced many times and was invested in the US press with an even more 
negative construction and evaluation of Saddam than had been the case at the time of the 
incident: in 2003, Saddam was linked directly to the Halabja gassing attack, while during the 
Iraq-Iran war the attack was linked to and associated with Iraq as a nation and with the Iraqi 
armed forces. In the same vein, some details of the context were omitted from the context of 
the occurrence in the US press during the 2003 US-led invasion, in order to portray the gassing 
as an attack by Saddam on his own people. 
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With regard to the CWs, during the Iraq-Iran war, these were never referred to as weapons of 
mass destruction; by contrast, during the US-led invasion they were indiscriminately referred 
to as such, and Iraq was constructed as having used these WMD in the Iraq-Iran war. The over-
reliance on US officials and experts meant that the claims regarding Iraq’s possession of CWs 
and the threat this posed were constructed as being present throughout the course of the war.  
 
9.2 Contribution to the Knowledge 
The current study makes many contributions to knowledge in the field with regard to the 
construction of the five themes examined, in terms of methodology, theory, and as a general 
contribution to the literature.  
 
9.2.1 Methodological contribution 
1. Data: the data obtained for the study are completely new and original and were obtained to 
achieve the purposes of this research by selecting specific query words that would retrieve all 
the relevant articles in each time span (war period) to answer the research questions of this 
study.  
2. Scale: In this research the immense corpus of available news articles on the LexisNexis 
online archive (7,937,701 million words in the Iraq-Iran war and 9,223,117 million words in 
the US-led invasion on the five themes in question) were collected and examined. To the best 
of my knowledge, this study is the first of its kind to examine the construction of these five 
themes in the US press in the two wars.  
3. CL tools: With a corpus of over 16 million words, it would have been impossible to 
examine the data manually. In this study, various corpus linguistics tools were used as a method 
of triangulation to achieve better results. The frequency analysis was used to direct the 
researcher’s attention to particular peaks or plunges in the data that might lead to something of 
interest. This was followed by the examination of the collocations of the words in question. The 
concordance lines of these words were then expanded to enable me to examine the whole 
context. These three tools served to reduce subjectivity as well as to allow more patterns of 
interest to be marked up. Another contribution of the research lies in its use of a variety of 
corpus linguistics software as a method of triangulation. Each software programme had its own 
particular properties, capacity and purpose that served the purposes of this research in a 
particular way. Wmatrix facilitated the categorisation of the collocates according to their 
semantic meaning. Wordsmith was used to do the major work of deriving the collocates, 
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frequencies and the concordances. Sketch engine was used to obtain a clearer idea of the nature 
of the corpus.  
4. Time Span: Furthermore, in this study the query words in question were examined in 
the US press in two different war periods: the first when the US government was tilted 
towards Iraq, during the Iraq-Iran war, and the second when the US government stance 
was against Iraq, when it invaded Iraq in 2003. The diachronic and historical changes 
of these words in these two periods in the US press were also taken into consideration 
in this research. Therefore, a comparison is made of the stance of the US press when the 
nation is at peace and when it is at war.  
 
9.2.2 Contribution to the literature 
 
The motivation for the current research was derived from an observation of gaps in the existing 
empirical literature. Thus, it provides many contributions with regard to the construction of the 
five themes in question. First, it takes the construction of the Iraq war in the US press to another 
level by investigating the US newspapers and by shedding light on the behaviour of the US 
newspapers when the nation goes to war and when it is at peace. 
 
Second, at the moment of writing this thesis, there are many conflicts and wars, such as those 
in Yemen, Syria and Myanmar, where mass killing is taking place and human rights are being 
violated; however, they have been rendered invisible and receive little attention by the US press. 
By contrast, some of the older conflicts, such as those in Iraq (1990, 2003), Kosovo (1999) and 
Afghanistan (2001), have been very popular in the news media pages. This is best explained in 
terms of the concept that some wars are ‘Our’ wars that ‘We’ are involved in, or conflicts that 
affect ‘Our’ interests, whereas other wars and conflicts are ‘their’ wars, they do not affect ‘Our’ 
interests, and therefore they are not worth covering. Thus, this research makes contributions in 
line with those of researchers such as Herman and Chomsky (1988), Zollmann (2017) and 
Keeble (2004) among others, in shedding light on how the news media communicate and 
facilitate the aim of the US elites to justify a  military intervention, in  particular when the 
country is constructed as being an enemy of the Western elites. It has been shown in this 
research how the US press became involved in a selective process of shaming, and how it 
assisted the intervention by manufacturing and re-constructing the facts; this was done by 
adopting and relying on the views of officials, and any other pro-American interest, with regard 
to the crimes committed against the Iraqi people, the Shiites and the Kurds, and by demonising 
Saddam during the US-led invasion.  
 179 
 
 
Furthermore, in line with Herman and Chomsky (1988), with regard to the aspect of “worthy 
and unworthy victims”, this study has shown how the Iraqi people, the Shiites and the Kurds 
became worthy victims when Iraq became an enemy state to the US, since this view fit well 
with the propaganda model. By contrast, during the Iraq-Iran war, their suffering, the abuses 
they were subjected to, and the mass murders that took place were paid no attention. Equally 
important, the human rights violations, that were accorded little importance during the Iraq-Iran 
war or the Desert Storm, were resurfaced in the 2003 conflict, with more negative and stronger 
attributes added.  
 
Another important contribution of this study is that it reveals how some good journalistic 
practices were put to a severe test when the journalists’ nation went to war and how the 
journalists were in fact unable to sustain these practices. The findings also reveal that the press 
went beyond simple war reporting in the 2003 US-led invasion: by adopting and relying on the 
views of those in power.  
 
This aim of this study is also aligned with Wodak and Meyer’s (2016) definition of the main 
principle of CDA, which is to “produce and convey critical knowledge that enables human 
beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self- reflection”, and as a 
result to produce “enlightenment and emancipation”. Therefore, exposing the inconsistencies, 
manipulation and propaganda in the US press could provide a basis for other scholars 
researching the field as well as to extend the scope of their research.  
 
9.2.3 Theoretical contribution 
With regard to the theoretical contribution made by this research, although the CDA and CL 
combination is not a new practice in the field and many studies have adopted this approach, in 
this study it has been re-contextualised and applied in a new context (that of the Iraqi wars and 
news coverage of these wars) using existing techniques, strategies and the DHA framework. 
Furthermore, the study highlights the fact that neither corpus linguistics nor DHA is a single, 
indivisible method of answering a research question: there are many tools and software in CL 
and there is no single way of using combinations of these tools. Each tool, or an integration of 
a group of tools, can be used to answer a particular question. Similarly, DHA has various 
strategies that can be employed to answer different research questions. In this study I began by 
using the CL as a quantitative method, since I was dealing with a corpus of enormous size; as 
the research progressed the approach became qualitative. It started with frequency lists, 
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collocates, concordance lines (the quantitative part) and semantic categorisation, investigating 
the intertextuality of the query words under question in the contexts in which they appeared in 
to see how the themes are referred to and talked about according to DHA strategies (qualitative 
part).  
  
9.3 Implications 
The findings of the current study have significant implications for the understanding of how the 
US press promoted a military intervention in the age of ‘new militarism’ interventions in other 
countries’ affairs without the authorisation of the UN Security Council.  Under the ‘new 
militarism’, the US has become more involved in proxy wars, imposing economic sanctions, 
and using bombing in what Keeble (2004) refers to as a Low Intensity Conflict Strategy to 
avoid direct criticism by the public. In the essence of this strategy are the media-hyped 
operations which the US has conducted. There are many conflicts and issues in the world in 
general and in the Middle East in particular which are dealt with differently by the mainstream 
media. Keel (cited in Zollmann, 2017) argues that the bombing of Yemen by Saudi Arabia, for 
instance, and the continuous killing taking place there, have created famine and poverty. 
However, Saudi Arabia is supported by the UK and the US, who approved the sales of billions 
of dollars of weapons to Saudi Arabia that are still being used to attack civilians and hospitals; 
the Saudi princes, however, are not demonised in the way Saddam was demonised, nor has any 
action been taken against these violations of human rights. Similarly, Israel’s violation of 
human rights by killing Palestinians in Gaza was not criminalised. By contrast we can see the 
process of demonisation being conducted in the case of the North Korean president, the Syrian 
president and Iran, all being portrayed as constituting a threat. These are all examples of the 
selective shaming the media employ to demonise and problematise issues in order to suggest 
the necessity for a particular solution or remedy that is in the interests of and desirable to the 
powers that be. 
 
With regard to the justification of the interventions on humanitarian grounds described in this 
research, this study reveals the double standards and the inconsistencies of the US press in 
reporting the same social actors in two different wars; the first war, in which the US was tilted 
towards Iraq, and the second, when the US opposed Iraq. The human rights violations, the 
killings, and the death toll during the Iraq-Iran war were glossed over by the US press. This was 
also the case during the Desert Storm, when thousands of Iraqi people and Shiites died when 
they revolted against Saddam at the urging of Bush, but were let down by the Americans, and 
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as a result crushed by the Iraqi forces. Furthermore, many died as a result of the economic 
embargo imposed on Iraq by the US in 1991 and which continued until 2003. When the US 
decided to go to war against Iraq, this all changed the Iraqi people were seen to be worthy 
victims  in order to serve the purposes of the propaganda that would justify the intervention on 
humanitarian grounds.   
 
9.4 Limitations of the study 
 
Although the research achieved its aims, there were some unavoidable limitations, which the 
study was unable to compensate for. First, because of the time limit, the construction of the 
Kurds, the US and other Iranian social actors lay beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, 
owing to practical constraints, this study could not provide a review of the construction of 
Saddam, the Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people Halabja and CWs in all the wars Iraq has been through: 
for instance, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Operation Desert Fox, sectarian violence and the 
ISIS (Daesh) have not been covered in this research.  
 
There are many academic works that have examined the power of the media in general and 
newspapers in particular to influence public opinion (see van Dijk, 1991). It was, however, 
beyond the scope of this research to examine this influence, as only the US press discourse and 
content in regard to the themes in question were investigated.  
 
It is also important to point out that a newspaper’s political affiliation (conservative or liberal) 
was not taken into consideration when the corpus for this research was created, and all the 
newspapers were put together in a single corpus for each war. Therefore, despite the negative 
representation of Saddam in the US press, especially in 2003, not all newspapers were in favour 
of the invasion. Equally important, this study did not take into consideration the individual 
journalists or columnists who might be well known for their negative representation of Iraq. 
Baker (2008) argues that columnists or commentators could be employed by newspapers to 
write about particular topics in a way which might not necessarily represent the newspaper’s 
stance; such writers have more freedom than staff journalists, and as a result could be more 
opinionated. Similarly, there could be email messages, other messages and stories that were 
supplied by readers commenting on particular issues, and these could be negative construction 
of Iraq. In this study these texts were treated in the same way as news discourse, with no 
distinction made between journalists’ reports, readers’ comments, or those of commentators. 
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Baker (2008, p. 12) argues that such texts “have the power and the potential to influence others”. 
Therefore, such texts were all included in the corpus.  
 
Some limitations pertaining to data collection should also be noted here. Among these is the 
accessibility of some newspapers in the 1980s, since at that time not all newspapers were 
archived in a digitalised form, in contrast to the present, when all newspapers are archived 
electronically. Furthermore, this study is a corpus-based study, in which only texts are dealt 
with, and all the images or videos have been stripped from the data.  
 
In the same vein, while the findings showed that overall, the image of Saddam that emerged 
from the analysis of the corpus of the US press was negative, it would be a mistake to consider 
the entire US press as a monolith, and it would be an oversimplification to attribute this negative 
representation to the whole body of US newspapers, if we take into consideration their 
availability at a particular time, since some of the newspapers were not previously available in 
digital form. For instance, there were only five newspapers in the Iraq-Iran war that were 
available in a digital form that reported on this war. These were The New York Times, The 
Washington Post, Information Bank Abstracts, the Journal of Commerce and the Tampa Bay 
Times, and it was only in 1987 and 1988 that the last two papers could be found in the 
LexisNexis. Similarly, the number of articles retrieved from each newspaper in both periods 
was not the same, and sometimes there was a huge difference between newspapers in this 
respect. For instance, in the US-led invasion period, the total number of articles in The New 
York Times during the whole period was 2,672, whereas The Daily Oklahoman only carried two 
articles. Therefore, it would be unfair to generalise the findings to cover all US newspapers as 
they have different weights. It is also important to say that despite the negative representation 
of Saddam in some newspapers but that does not mean that these newspapers were part of 
propaganda machine because not all the newspapers were in favour of the invasion as well as 
they have different ideologies and some are critical of the US government.   
 
9.5 Recommendations for further research work 
In terms of directions for future research, a fascinating project would be to study individually 
or in conjunction the changes over time in the reporting of Shiites/Iraqi people/ 
Saddam/Kurds/Halabja or the use of CWs in the various conflicts and wars Iraq has been 
involved in: for instance, the Iraq-Iran war, the Desert Storm, the US-led invasion, the Sectarian 
Divide and the ISIS war. The aim would be to see how these themes were represented in 
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different time spans, taking into account the US involvement (direct or indirect) in these wars 
and conflicts, and the effect of this involvement on the reporting. It would be interesting to 
investigate the historical changes in reporting in these wars and conflicts. To track the changes 
in the reporting of these themes over time would be interesting, since it could highlight the 
fluctuations in reporting and reveal the inconsistencies that reveal the aim of serving the 
purposes of political propaganda, if any.  
 
Another possible area for future research would be to compare different newspapers in different 
countries to show the differences in reporting: for instance, to compare the UK, the German 
and the US press with each other in relation to the construction of Shiites/Iraqi 
people/Saddam/Kurds/Halabja and the use of CWs, or to study the press stances in times of 
conflict.  
 
Another potential area of research is to examine how the way Iraq was constructed in the US 
press in the two wars might shape audience perceptions and beliefs: to be pro-invasion or anti-
invasion. Nowadays, there are many platforms on which news articles and news can be 
published: e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Telegram and other social media, where audiences can 
engage and interact, leaving their opinion. Therefore, it would be interesting to examine the 
relation between the news and the audience commentary, or to study them separately. Similarly, 
journalists could be interviewed, or asked in a questionnaire how they report or why they report 
in the way they do. An evaluation of reporters’/writers’/ presenters’ language in TV/radio 
broadcasts and other kinds of media could be an interesting and valuable study.  
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 COLLOCATES OF IRAQI PEOPLE (US LED INVASION ) 
 
ADDING DANCING GIFT MESSAGE SHOULD  
ADDRESS DAY GIVE MINDED SHOW  
ADDRESSED DECADES GOOD MINDS SIMMONS  
ADMINISTER DECIDE GOVERN MISCALCULATED SIN  
AEYOUAERE DEFENDING GOVERNED MIX SLAUGHTER  
AGAINST DEHUMANIZE GOVERNMENT MOISE SOLEMN  
AIDING DEMOCRACY GRAFFITI MULTIPLIES SOVEREIGNTY  
AIMED DENZEL GREAT MUSLIMS SPELLED  
ALBEIT DESERVE GREET MUST SPOKEN  
ALIENATING DESERVING HAPPINESS NASIF SQUANDER  
ALL DESIRE HAPPY NEED STAKE  
ALLOWED DESPERATELY HARTGROVE NEEDS STANDPOINT  
ALSWAIMANI DESPOTIC HATE OBLIGATION STANDS  
ANYONE DESTROYING HAVE ORDEAL STOLE  
ASADI DESTRUCTION HEARTS POLITICAL STOLEN  
ASPIRATIONS DETERMINATION HELP POSSIBLE SUFFERED  
ASSETS DETERMINE HELPING PRESERVES SUFFERING  
ASSIST DICTATORS HEREBY PROHIBITS SUPPLIED  
ASSISTANCE DICTATORSHIP HEROIC PROPERLY SUPPORT  
ASSURING DIGNITY HOPE PROTAGONISTS SURE  
ATTACHE DIVERSITY HORRIBLY PROTECTS SURVIVE  
BEFRIENDED DIZAEY HUMANITARIAN PROVIDING SYMPATHY  
BEHALF DOMINIQUE HUMANITY QUICKLY TALENTED  
BEING DOURI ILLEGITIMATE REASSURE TELL  
BELIEVE ECHOING INDICATES RECEIVE THEIR  
BELIEVING EDICT INSTILLED RECOVER THEMSELVES  
BELONG ENJOYING INSTITUTIONS REGIME THROATS  
BELONGS ENRAGE INTENTIONS RELIEVE TOPPLING  
BENEFIT EXCLUSIVELY INTERESTS REPRESENT TOTALITARIAN  
BETTER EXHORTED INTERNATIONALLY REPRESENTATIVE TRAMPLES  
BOON EXPRESSED INTERVIEWER REPRESENTS TRANSITION  
BRINGING EXTERMINATE JASIEM REPRESSION TRULY  
BROTHERLY EYAIH JOINTLY RESISTING TRYING  
BRUTAL FACING KAREEM RESOURCE TYRANT  
BUILD FAIL KILL RESOURCES UNIQUE  
BURDEN FIGHT KNOW RESPECTS UPSIDE  
CAPABLE FLAIH LEGITIMACY RESTS UPTON  
CAPITULATION FLOWERS LIBERATE RICH UTILIZING  
CELEBRATING FOREMOST LIBERATED RICHES WANT  
CHOOSE FORESEEABLE LIBERATING RID WEALTH  
CHOSEN FREE LIBERATION RUMSFELD WELCOME  
CLAIBORNE FREEDOM LIBERATORS RUNNING WELCOMING  
COMMUNIQUE FREEING LIFE SADDAM WELFARE  
COMPETING FREELY LIFTED SAHAF WHATEVER  
CONGRATULATIONS FREER LONG SAKE WIPE  
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CONQUERORS FUTURE LOOSENED SAVE   
CONVINCE GAIN LOOSENING SECURE   
COURAGEOUS GENUINELY LOOTER SELF   
CRONIES GERE MEDICINE SETTLE   
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 SADDAM COLLOCATES IN US-LED INVASION  
SADDAM AVCI BUILT CLUTCHES CULT DESTROYED DOWNFALL EXPIATED FORCES GUARD  
ABDICATE AYAT BUNKER CODING CURRENCY DESTROYING DRAG EXPIRED FORCIBLY GUNNING  
ABED BAATH BUNTZIE COHORTS DANCED DETERMINE DRAINED EXTERMINATED FORGET GURFEIN  
ABILITY BAATHIST BY COLLAPSE DEAD DETEST DRAPE FADED FORMERLY GUY  
ACCOUNT BAGHDAD BYE COLLAPSED DEADLINE DIABOLICAL EBAY FALL FROM HALF  
ACE BANNED CAMPAIGN COLLAPSING DECAPITATE DICTATOR EFFIGY FALLEN FUGITIVES HAMPERING  
ADEPT BARZAN CANAL COLLIDING DECAPITATION DICTATORSHIP ELDEST FALLS FUNCTIONARIES HANGED  
ADMIT BASTARD CAPABILITIES COMMANDED DECEIVED DIE ELIMINATE FANATICAL FUNNELED HAQADER  
ADVISER BEARING CAPITULATE COMMISERATING DECIDES DIMINISHED ELIMINATING FANATICALLY FUSSED HARBORED  
AGAINST BEHEADING CAPTURE COMPLY DECLARED DINAR ELITE FASCIST GALLOWS HARBORING  
AGED BELIEVE CAPTURED COMPOUND DEEPENED DINARS EMBARK FATE GARRISONS HARDENED  
AIDES BELIEVED CAPTURES COMPULSORY DEFACE DIPLO EMBARRASS FATED GASSED HARSHER  
AIMED BELIEVES CAPTURING CONCEALING DEFEAT DISARM ENCLAVE FAYHEEN GASSES HARSHLY  
AIRED BELIEVING CARDIAC CONFIDED DEFEATED DISARMAMENT END FEARED GASSING HAS  
AIRPORT BELONGED CATCHY CONFRONTATION DEFEATING DISARMED ENDLESSLY FEARING GAVE HASAN  
AL BELOVED CELEBRATED CONFRONTING DEFENSES DISARMING ENTOURAGE FEARSOME GENOCIDAL HASSAN  
ALIVE BERET CELEBRATING CONSISTS DEFIANCE DISARMS ENTRUST FEDAYEEN GIANT HATE  
ALREBAT BIN CENTERING CONSTITUTES DEFIANT DISLIKE EQUESTRIAN FERAYDOON GIVEN HATED  
AMERICANISM BIOGRAPHY CHANCE CONTAINED DEFIANTLY DISLIKED ERA FEYADEEN GIVES HATEFUL  
AMIR BIRTHDAY CHANT CONTROL DEGENERATE DISLIKING ESCAPE FIERCELY GIVING HATES  
ANCESTRAL BIRTHPLACE CHANTED CONVINCED DEMISE DISLODGE ESCAPES FIGHT GLAD HATRED  
APPARAT BLAME CHANTING COOPERATE DEMOLISHED DISMANTLES ESCAPING FIGHTERS GLEEFULLY HAYS  
APPARATUS BODYGUARD CHEERED COUSIN DEMOTED DISMEMBERED ET FINISHED GONE HEARTLESS  
APPEARED BODYGUARDS CHEERING CREDENCE DEPICTING DISPLACING EVIDENCE FIRDOS GONER HEIGHTENING  
ARABI BRITTLE CHEMICAL CRISTYNE DEPOSE DISTRUSTS EVIL FIREBRAND GOVERNATE HENCHMAN  
ARCHIVE BROADCAST CHEZ CRONIES DEPOSED DNA EVILS FLED GOVERNMENT HENCHMEN  
ASSOCIATING BRONZE CHOOSE CRONY DEPOSES DOMAIN EX FLEE GRANDCHILD HEY  
ATROCITIES BROOKES CINNAMINSON CRUMBLE DEPOSING DOMINATED EXCELLENCY FLEEING GRANDEST HIDE  
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ATTACKING BROTHER CIRCLE CRUMBLES DESIRABILITY DOOMED EXECUTIONER FLEES GRANDIOSITY HIDEAWAY  
ATTEMPT BRUTAL CLAIMED CRUMBLING DESPERATE DOOMSDAY EXHORTED FOLHA GRATEFULLY HIDEOUT  
ATTEMPTS BRUTALITY CLING CRUSH DESPISE DOPPELGANGERS EXHORTING FOLLOWERS GREETING HIDING  
ATTRIBUTED BRUTALIZED CLIQUE CRUSHED DESPOT DOUBLES EXILE FOOT GRIP HIKMAT  
AUTOGRAPHED BRUTALLY CLOSEST CUBS DESTROY DOWN EXPELLED FOOTAGE GRUDGING HIMSELF  
INNER LIEUTENANTS MIGHT NOTKNOW PERSONALLY PUENTE RESTED SECRETS SQUADS TAKING  
INORDER LIKENESS MILITIA NSC PERSUADES PURGE RESURFACED SEIZES STAMPING TALISMAN  
INTELLIGENCE LINK MILITIAS NUMBERED PHENOMENA PURPORTED RETALIATED SEIZING STASH TAPE  
INTERNATIONAL LINKAGE MINDED NUTCASE PICTURE PURPORTEDLY RETRIBUTION SELF STASHED TARGET  
INTERROGATORS LINKED MINIONS OBSESSION PICTURES QADIR REVAK SHATTERING STATUE TARGETING  
INVADED LINKS MISATTRIBUTED ODAI PLACED QAEDA REVILED SHELTERING STATUES TEAR  
IRAQ LOANED MONSTER ONCE POROUS QUASHED REVOLT SHIITE STATUTE TEARING  
IRAQI LOATHSOME MORTALLY OPPOSED PORTRAIT QUASI RID SHIITES STILL TELEVISED  
IRAQIS LONGER MOSAIC OPPRESSED PORTRAITS QUSAI RIDDANCE SHOUTED STOOGE TELEVISION  
IS LOOMED MOUTHPIECE OPPRESSIVE POSED QUSAY RIDDING SHOUTING STRANGLE TEMPERING  
ISLAMISM LOSING MUJAHID OPULENT POSES RAIDED ROGUES SHOWDOWN STRIKE THIRDS  
ITCHING LOVE MURAL OR POSSESS RAWI ROTATES SHOWED STROLLING THREAT  
IYAD LOVEFEST MURALS ORNATE POSSESSED READ ROUT SICKO STRONGHOLD THUG  
JABAR LOYAL MURDERED OSAMA POSSESSES REBELLED ROUTED SIDEKICK STRONGMAN THUGS  
JIHADISTS LOYALIST MURDERER OUST POSSIBLY REDEEM RULE SIGHTINGS STUMPING TICKS  
JOVIAL LOYALISTS MURDEROUS OUSTED POST REFUSES RULER SIZED SUBMISSION TIGHTENS  
JUNTA LOYALTY MUSAHIM OUSTER POSTER REGIME RULING SLAMS SUCCESSES TIKRIT  
KILL MAGNIFIED MUSED OUSTING POSTERS REIGN RUMORS SLEDGEHAMMER SUFFERED TIKRITI  
KILLED MAILS MUST OUTFLUNG POSTHUMOUSLY REMAINED RUSHAMIYA SLIM SUGGESTING TILED  
KILLING MAJEED MUSUMECI OVEREAGER POWER REMNANTS RUTHLESS SLUM SUNNI TINTED  
KNOWN MAJID MUZAFFER OVERNIGHTING PRE REMOVAL SABOTAGES SLUMS SUPERNATURAL TIP  
KOWTOWED MAMMOTH MUZZLED OVERPROMISED PREORDAINED REMOVE SACRIFICE SMACKED SUPPLANTING TIPPED  
LADEN MAN MYSTERY OVERTHROW PRERECORDED REMOVED SADDAMISM SMASHING SUPPORTER TO  
LAMPREYS MANIAC NAB OVERTHROWING PRESIDENT REMOVING SADDREN SMILING SUPPORTERS TOOLING  
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LATEGANO MARTS NABBED OVERTHROWN PRESIDENTIAL RENAMED SAJIDA SNUFFING SUPPORTING TOP  
LAURELS MARTYRS NAILING PALACE PRESIDING RENAMES SAO SON SURVIVED TOPPLE  
LEADEN MARVELING NAJIM PALACES PRO REPLAYED SAVAGERY SONS SURVIVING TOPPLED  
LEADER MASS NASAR PARAMILITARIES PROFILER REPRESSED SCIMITARS SOOTY SWEAR TOPPLING  
LEADERSHIP MEANT NATHEM PARAMILITARY PROOF REPRESSION SCRAWLED SOULS SYMBOLS TORCH  
LEAVE MENACE NEIGHBORHOOD PATHOLOGICAL PROP REPRESSIVE SCUFFLE SPADES SYMPATHIZERS TORCHED  
LED MESSAGE NEUTRALIZE PAULO PROPAGANDA REPUBLICAN SCULPTURES SPECULATED SYMPATHIZES TORCHING  
LEGACY METAPHORICALLY NIGHTMARE PAWN PROTESTOR RESIDENCE SEAT SPECULATION SYMPATHY TORE  
LIAR MHUTAR NO PERSECUTED PROVE RESIST SEBASTIANO SPRAWLING TAKEDOWN TORN  
VIDEOTAPE VIDEOTAPED VIDEOTAPES VIOLATORS VISAGE VOLUNTARILY VOWED VOWING WAGE WALDO  
WEED WHERE WHEREABOUTS WHETHER WHITHER WHITTLED WIELDING WILL WIZARD WORTHLESS  
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 CWS COLLOCATES IN US-LED INVASION  
 
BIOLOGICAL GOOEY BEEN EX 
CHEMICAL-
WEAPONS TONS SITES DAMS 
USE HARDER PROTECTIVE DESCENDED 
USED THAT PRODUCING DEPLOY 
SYRIA MASKS DANGER AMY 
AGAINST DONNING CONTRAVENTION SUPPRESS 
DEVELOPING NICKNAME CHROMATOGRAPH LABORATORIES 
KURDS SHELTERING SEARCHING TESTED 
USING EMPLOY REBELLIOUS DISPERSED 
FOUND COULD BEDROOMS TEST 
SUITS SMITHSON DESTROYED RESORT 
OR SHELLS ALI DEVELOP 
EVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT GASES TEMPERATURES 
ATTACK CACHES CONCLUDED PROTECTION 
FACTORY FORCES DIRECTING SUBSTANCE 
POSSIBLE STOCKPILES UNFOUNDED HUNT 
NERVE SADDAM SCIENTISTS BE 
POSSESSING BANNED FINDING WORKED 
CONVENTION POSSESS UNLEASHING RUDIMENTARY 
IRAQI STORAGE IDENTIFYING NARD 
VX ATTACKED LABORATORY TURNED 
ALLEGED CACHE MAY POSSESSION 
PLANT CAPABLE LIKELIHOOD SMOKING 
MIGHT EXPOSURE PROGRAMS HEATED 
NUCLEAR ARTILLERY NO IRAQ 
DISCOVERY MUNITIONS THREAT TUCKER 
MISSILES HAVE LOCATES CHARGED 
POSSIBLY PASTE HUSSEIN CRUDE 
USES PRECAUTION PROOF JAFFAR 
POSSESSES LIKELY DELIVER HARBORED 
PROGRAM SAMPLES PROSPECT ARMED 
FUGITIVES UNCOVERING UNLEASHES PRESENT 
DEADLY CONTAIN BURWELL RAIDED 
FACILITIES OVERSAW PARAPHERNALIA HEADED 
AGENTS TESTS MUTHANNA SUDAN 
SUSPECTED ORDERING EMPLOYED TOXINS 
UNLEASH STORING SPONSORING IF 
SEARCH PRACTICED LOADED DOCUMENT 
SITE OF ANTI EXISTENCE 
GAS INSPECTOR SUGGESTING DISCOVERED 
ACCUSED FORSWEAR BELIEVED BELIEVES 
DETECT STOCKPILE GEAR ATTACKS 
ARSENAL WITH SIGNATORIES EXPERTISE 
HIDDEN HAS NEAR TRAINING 
KILL CONTAMINATE VALIDATE PIERCE 
HARBORING PRODUCED ANY MAXIMUM 
TROOPS AND DEPOT ELIMINATED 
EXPERTS EQUIPMENT TEAM DRUMS 
EXPERT MUSTARD SAFEGUARD KURDISH 
ANI SCUD SARIN RETALIATE 
DEADLIEST WARFARE SAADI ACTIVE 
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VILLAGES RADIOLOGICAL TREATIES YET 
EQUIPPED MANUFACTURE MOBILE DITCH 
FALLUJAH DELIVERING RATIFIED ANALYZE 
WISELY FIND PIGEONS ORDERED 
ENDGAME CONTAINING ORDERS INDICATE 
ACCUSES STOCKPILING TABUN INEFFECTIVE 
NEUTRALIZE BARRELS TANGIBLE UNCONVENTIONAL 
RELATING AMBIGUOUS HAD COUNTERATTACK 
PROTECT VULNERABILITY INVOLVING INSTALLATION 
LEONARD SAMPLE DEPLOYING DESTRUCTION 
KINDS THWART PERHAPS TREATY 
RESPONSE PLANNING SCARE UNLEASHED 
WEAPONS AGENT BOOTS MATERIALS 
TIPPED CONCERTED FACILITY  
SCIENTIST DECONTAMINATION TREAT  
DISPERSE GERM EXAMPLE  
COMMANDING PREMATURE STRETCHES  
TESTING CONTAINED COMPONENTS  
PRODUCTION TOXIC RAPIDLY  
CHEMICAL IRANIAN DESPERATE  
FRUSTRATING QUANTITIES ACQUIRE  
HALABJA SCRAMBLING CONCERN  
HENRY DETECTION GROWS  
TERRORISM ELUSIVE ACCURACY  
MEDIUM CONCLUDE INVOLVEMENT  
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 SADDAM REFERENTIAL STRATEGIES 
Discursive 
Strategy 
Objective Categorization  
Referential/ 
Nomination 
Discursive 
construction 
of Saddam 
 
  Collectivization 
His 
his doomsday weapons , his programs, his weapons of mass destruction, his terrorist allies, 
his inner circle, his many crimes, his top aides, his main defenses, his troops, his regime, his 
diehard special Republican Guard, His brutal regime, his defiance, his behavior, his ugly 
weapons, his military ambitions, his ruling Baath Party, his illegal arsenal, his loyalists, his 
diabolical regime, his gang, his army, his two ruthless sons, his two murderous sons, his 
hateful regime, his fanatical followers, his secular regime,  
  Negative Ideologisation 
Fascist, Hitler, Baathist, Stalin 
   Religionisation / Religionyms 
a Sunni Muslim, preordained, Saddam Hussein and his "jihadists, secular Iraqi regime of 
Saddam Hussein,  
  Ideological anthroponyms 
tyrannical bully, butcher of Baghdad, Saddam: King of Terror, Fanatical, wizard, bad man, 
wicked, "evil", dangerous, the ace of spades, heartless, defeated, vanquished, disarmed, 
hateful, doomed, rogues, degenerate, liar, diabolical, loathsome, bastard, retaliatory-minded, 
pathological, sicko, worthless, maniac, wald, deposed, nightmare, expired, inhuman, toppling 
both Saddam and Saddamism, Iraqi dictator Saddam 
  Criminalisation/ criminonyms 
Brutal, brutality, thug, torture, atrocities, ruthless, savagery, monster, genocidal, murderer, 
murderous, repressive, oppressive, despot, dictator, dictatorship, tyranny, tyrant, 
  Militarisation/ Militarionyms 
hunt for Saddam, war with Saddam, war against Saddam, military action against, 
disarmament of Saddam, war on Saddam, Saddam Hussein's weapons, the Fedayeen Saddam, 
Saddam Hussein's military, showdown with Saddam, paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam, strike 
against Saddam, defeat of Saddam, Saddam Hussein's thugs, victory over Saddam, revolt 
against Saddam, attack on Saddam, fight for Saddam, gunning for Saddam 
  Negative metaphorical anthroponyms 
mural of Saddam, Saddam Hussein's downfall, downfall of Saddam, Iraq under Saddam, a 
final ultimatum, on the run, fall of Saddam, statue of Saddam, deadline for Saddam, statues 
of Saddam, toppling of Saddam, portrait of Saddam, removal of Saddam, overthrow of 
Saddam, end of Saddam, campaign against Saddam, ouster of Saddam, ousted president 
Saddam, death to Saddam,  
  Temporalisation 
post Saddam Iraq, after Saddam Hussein, after the fall, Iraq after Saddam, post Saddam 
Hussein, post Saddam government, after president Saddam, after the war, 
  Political actionalisation 
his terrorist, Saddam Hussein's agents, Saddam loyalists, armed members of Saddam 
Hussein's Baath party, Fedayeen Saddam militia, elite republican guard, allies of Saddam, 
Saddam Hussein's forces, government of Saddam, Hussein's Baath party, Hussein's 
republican guard, Saddam Hussein's thugs, and his "jihadists, supporter, Baathist, ashbal, 
Fedayeen, forces, lieutenants, militia, militias, paramilitaries, paramilitary, squads, 
henchmen, inhuman, sympathizers, loyal, loyalist, loyalists, followers, sons, cousin, 
bodyguards, regime, operatives, apparatus, Baath, circle, elite, Iraqis, supporters, youngsters 
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 SADDAM'S PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES 
Discursive 
Strategy 
Objective Categorization  
Predicational Discursive 
constructio
n of 
Saddam 
 
  Saddam (Authoritarian) 
- they see in Saddam Hussein the kind of despot they know too well. 
- Saddam Hussein is a dictator, and he needed to be taken down. 
- Saddam Hussein is a murderous tyrant.  
- Saddam is the oppressor." 
  Saddam (Hitler, Stalin, fasist) 
- I watch TV clips of this guy Saddam and I see a Hitler 
- Will we learn first-hand of the last days of Saddam in his Hitlerian bunker?  
- read books on Hitler and Stalin. He modeled his entire regime after that of Hitler 
and his ruthlessness after that of Stalin 
- "It's because Saddam is really a fascist regime," 
-  Known to admire Josef Stalin, Saddam has tortured thousands and his wars have 
killed more than 1 million 
   Saddam (Criminal, violant, brutal, oppressor) 
- Perez called Iraqi President Saddam Hussein a "brutal dictator," 
- has tortured and brutalized his people for a long, long time. 
- "(Saddam) is a heartless, cold-blooded killer,  
- Saddam was gassing, killing and displacing hundreds of thousands of Kurds and 
Turkmen 
- His brutal regime has reduced a country with a long and proud history to an 
international pariah that oppresses its citizens 
- Saddam has one of the most disgusting records of human rights abuses 
- Saddam is an international outlaw who must be permanently contained or ousted 
  Saddam (Threat, Link with al-Qaeda) 
- has "trained and financed... al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations 
- has aided a local Islamist group in Iraqi Kurdistan with al-Qaeda links 
- poses to our nation and the world 
- is a supporter - rhetorically, morally and financially - of radical Islamic terrorism 
- is a threat to his own country, and a terrifying threat to us." 
- is a danger, and he must be removed 
  Saddam (non-compliance) 
- has refused to disarm. 
- has had 12 years to give up his weapons 
- had no intention of leaving the country 
- had not cooperated more 
- has defied previous U.N. resolutions demanding that he disarm 
- has shown little willingness to give up his illegal weapons. Instead, he has tried to 
wiggle out of obligations and stall for time 
  Saddam (negative traits of Saddam) 
- is a fool. 
- is a monster 
- is a bad man 
- is a pathological dictator, 
- is the vile pharaoh. 
- 's desperate to hold onto his power 
- is the sicko 
- is a mad dog, 
- is a terrorist threat 
- is a horrible man 
- is a dog, the son of a dog, 
- " Saddam 's a bad guy. It's time for him to go." 
 209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
